# DEMOCRACY BAD

## WAR

### 1nc – War

#### Democracies cause War

#### a. LIO promotion causes global wars and fails

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The Perils of Democracy Promotion

The most important requirement for building a liberal international order is to spread liberal democracy far and wide, which was initially seen to be an eminently feasible task. It was widely believed in the West that politics had evolved to the point where there was no sensible alternative to liberal democracy. If so, then it would be relatively easy to create a liberal international order, because spreading liberal democracy around the world would meet little resistance. Indeed, most people would welcome the idea of living in a Western-style democracy, as appeared to be the case in Eastern Europe after the collapse of communism.

This endeavor, however, was doomed from the start. To begin, there never has been and never will be universal agreement on what constitutes the ideal political system. One can argue that liberal democracy is the best form of government (I would), but others will invariably favor a different governing system. It is worth remembering that during the 1930s, many people in Europe preferred communism or fascism to liberal democracy. One might then point out that liberal democracy ultimately triumphed over those two “isms.” Although that is true, the history of the 1930s is a reminder that liberal democracy is not the preordained order of things, and it is not unusual for elites and their publics to opt for alternative political systems. Thus, it should not be surprising that illiberal democracies are appearing in Eastern Europe, while China and Russia have embraced authoritarian rule, North Korea is a dictatorship, Iran is an Islamic republic, and Israel increasingly privileges its Jewish identity over its democratic character.51 Nor should it be surprising that there has never been a time when more than 50 percent of the countries in the world were liberal democracies.52

This diversity of opinion about what constitutes the best governing system combines with nationalism to make the process of spreading liberal democracy around the world extremely difficult. Nationalism, after all, is a remarkably powerful political force that places great emphasis on self-determination and sovereignty. Nation-states, in other words, do not want other nation-states telling them how they should order their political system. Thus, trying to impose liberal democracy on a state that prefers an alternative form of government is almost certain to provoke fierce resistance.

FIGHTING LOSING WARS

Trying to build a liberal international order invariably leads to wars against minor powers that aim to turn those targets into liberal democracies. There are significant limits on how much social engineering of this sort great powers can attempt in a bipolar or multipolar system, mainly because they must focus on competing with each other for power and influence. Spreading liberal democracy is of secondary, if not tertiary, importance; indeed, at times liberal states will seek to prop up authoritarian governments if they are aligned against rival great powers, as the United States did repeatedly during the Cold War.

In unipolarity, however, the sole pole is free to go on crusades to make the world more democratic, simply because there are no rival great powers to worry about. Thus, it is unsurprising that the United States has fought seven wars in the years since the Cold War ended and has been at war for two out of every three years over that period.53 Such wars, however, regularly fail to achieve their objective.

The U.S. effort to use military force to bring about democracy has been focused primarily on the Greater Middle East, where it has led to one failure after another.54 U.S. military forces invaded Afghanistan (2001) and Iraq (2003) with the intention of turning them into liberal democracies. The occupying forces not only failed to achieve that goal, but they also ended up precipitating bloody wars that did enormous damage to political and social life in those two countries. The main reason for this dismal record is that large-scale social engineering in any society is difficult, but it is especially daunting in a foreign country whose political leadership has just been toppled from power. The target state will be in turmoil; the invading forces will be dealing with an alien culture that might even be hostile to liberal democracy; and most importantly, nationalist sentiment is sure to increase sharply and generate an insurgency against the occupier, as the United States discovered in Afghanistan and Iraq.

Although these failures eroded public support for the liberal international order and cast doubts on the competence of its leaders, they did not stop the sole pole from trying to spread liberal democracy by military means, over-extending itself even further.55 Instead, it looked for less costly ways to accomplish that task, which effectively meant giving up on conquering and occupying non-democracies and employing different strategies to bring down authoritarian leaders. Thus, when fighting broke out among rival factions in Libya in 2011, the United States and its European allies employed airpower to help remove Col. Muammar al-Gaddafi from power. But the Western powers had no way of turning Libya into a functioning state, much less a liberal democracy, with or without troops on the ground.

Also in 2011, the United States and its allies in the Middle East sought to topple President Bashar al-Assad from power in Syria by arming and training rebel groups that opposed him. That effort failed, however, largely because Russia, which has had long-standing strategic ties with Syria, intervened in 2015 to keep Assad in power. Realpolitik thwarted U.S. efforts in Syria. But even if Assad had been deposed, the end result would have been either a continuation of the conflict, as in Libya, or the installation of another ruthless autocrat, as eventually happened in Egypt after President Hosni Mubarak was deposed in early 2011. Liberal democracy in Syria was not a serious possibility, but an abundance of murder and mayhem was.

TURNING THE MAJOR POWERS INTO ENEMIES

Finally, the crusader mentality that underpins the attempts to build a liberal international order leads to the poisoning of relations between the unipole and any major power in the system that is not a liberal democracy. Although the dominant state will be strongly inclined to make war on minor powers to promote liberal democracy, it will rarely ever attack major powers for that purpose, especially if they possess nuclear weapons.56 The costs would be too great, and the likelihood of success would be especially low. Hence, U.S. policymakers in the post–Cold War period have never seriously considered invading China or Russia, even though the United States is far more powerful than either of those countries.

Nevertheless, the United States has been committed to turning China and Russia into liberal democracies and absorbing them into the U.S.-dominated liberal world order. U.S. leaders have not only made their intentions clear, but they have also relied on nongovernmental organizations and various subtle strategies to push Beijing and Moscow toward embracing liberal democracy. In effect, the aim is peaceful regime change. Predictably, China and Russia have resisted the unipole’s efforts for the same reason that minor powers have contested U.S. efforts to shape their domestic politics, and indeed for the same reason that Americans now recoil at the idea of Russia interfering in their country’s politics. In a world in which nationalism is the most powerful political ideology, self-determination and sovereignty matter hugely for all countries.

China and Russia have also resisted the spread of the liberal order for realist reasons, because it would allow the United States to dominate the international system economically, militarily, and politically. Neither Beijing nor Moscow, for example, wants U.S. military forces in its neighborhood, much less on its borders. Thus, it is hardly surprising that China talks about pushing the U.S. military out of the Western Pacific and that Russia has long been deeply opposed to EU and NATO expansion into Eastern Europe. Indeed, moving those institutions toward Russia eventually led to the Ukraine crisis in 2014. That ongoing conflict has not only poisoned relations between Russia and the West, but it has incentivized Moscow to find ways to weaken both the EU and NATO. In short, both nationalist and realist calculations caused the two major powers in unipolarity to contest the unipole’s efforts to build a robust liberal international order.

#### b. Median voter theory – democracies fight capital intensive wars more frequently.

**Caverley 10** – Jonathan, Poli Sci Prof @ NU, The Myth of Military Myopia: Democracy, Small Wars, and Vietnam, International Security 34.3.

This section offers a theory of how a rational actor, the average voter in a democracy, can favor what appears to be a nonstrategic policy. To do so, it uses the core logic of a research program claiming that this sort of behavior should rarely happen in democracies. The theory presented here shares three impor- tant assumptions with the cost-internalization logic of democratic exception- alism: the distribution of costs within the state affects its pursuit of security; a democratic government's provision of security is a public good; and voters "take a reasonably level-headed cost-benefit approach in forming attitudes to- wards military missions."28 I relax the claim that costs are always internalized within democracies, however, arguing that the average voter's share may be much lower than the state's per capita costs. Even in democracies, wealth is not distributed equally within any given state; the person with median income is less well off than someone possessing the mean. A political-economic approach, the Meltzer-Richard hypothesis, suggests that if the median voter can set a tax rate and spend the revenue on a service available to all citizens, she will take advantage of the potential for re- distribution.29 Even with a flat tax on income, the wealthy will pay a larger portion of the costs for a public good enjoyed by all. For example, in 2005 the fifth of the population with the highest incomes paid 69 percent of all U.S. fed- eral tax revenue, and the middle fifth paid only 9 percent.30 Similarly, the median voter will prefer to tax capital more heavily than labor, because labor income is distributed more equally than capital income.31 How these taxes are spent plays a most important role in establishing the redistributive nature of the public good of defense. Military doctrine, the means by which military power is developed and exercised, can be stylized as a production function consisting of two factors - capital (e.g., tanks, planes, ammunition, and even training) and labor (soldiers, sailors, etc.) - as well as the technology that allows one factor of production to serve as a substitute for another.32 Capital and labor are imperfect replacements and show diminishing returns; given a hundred tanks and ten soldiers, adding another tank will not produce as much capability as adding another soldier. The type of conflict af- fects substitutions as well; it is much harder to substitute capital for labor when fighting an unconventional opponent. Tax revenue can pay for both the capital and labor inputs. Personnel also can be supplied through conscription, a tax on a citizen's labor rather than income. Even if the odds of being conscripted are equally distributed, the median voter will demand that a larger amount of the military budget go toward the purchase of capital to reduce the risk of conscription. In cases where existing threats do not currently justify resorting to conscription, military capitalization will still to a large degree determine a draft's future likelihood. The median voter normally will be happy with an expensive, all-volunteer military; but once the level of threat creates a demand for labor that reaches into the middle class, the voter will support a conscripted military where draftees are protected by large amounts of capital.33 Casualties are also a public bad: no one wants to see their fellow citizens die. The less wealthy are more likely to be drafted and to join an all-volunteer force; they may gain jobs from domestic weapons manufacturing; and they of- ten regard military service as a means of acquiring human capital. Conscription is therefore an important, but not the only, reason why militaries with large amounts of labor can be a public bad. The median voter will accept a higher tax, what the British socialist Sidney Webb called the "conscription of riches," to build highly capitalized militaries both in peace and in war, because such militaries redistribute money and skills through jobs and training as well as reduce the risk of conscription and casualties. The median voter theory outlined above does not claim to perfectly capture how policy is made in a democracy, nor does it argue that one's relative in- come determines one's position on foreign policy. Rather, this simple theory suggests an equally simple insight: a military doctrine that privileges capital over labor will reduce the costs of conflict for an important swath of voters. A capitalized military not only results in many voters doing less of the fighting themselves, but also allows someone else's resources to fund the costs of war. Politicians should respond accordingly. This distribution of costs explains how a state's seemingly nonstrategic behavior may be in the interests of important rational actors within a democracy. Because of its redistributive nature, a capitalized military doctrine can lead to moral hazard, which arises when perverse incentives encourage actors to pursue risky behavior. For example, drivers with auto theft coverage are more likely to park on the street than pay for secure parking. Many domestic gov- ernment programs merge moral hazard with the Meltzer-Richard effect dis- cussed above. Deposit insurance uses government backing to insure bank deposits up to a certain limit, a redistributive public good. Because the insur- ance applies regardless of the bank (subject to government regulations), an individual has little motivation to consider the bank's solvency. Indeed, she is likely to choose the higher interest provided by a bank making risky investments. Regarding defense provision, a lack of cost internalization creates an incentive for the median voter to support risky behavior: that is, using a capital- intensive military in conflicts where substitutability is low because the decreased likelihood of winning is outweighed by the lower costs of fighting in such a manner. If the median voter's risky behavior is in effect being subsidized by the wealthy, democratic leaders sensitive to this voter's costs will pursue strategies that make success less likely. I argue that this is what happened in Vietnam.

### I/L War – Interventionism

#### Democracy promotion ensures endless interventionist wars – efforts at regime change suppress minority rights, and increase states’ reliance on terrorism and prolif

Mearsheimer ’18 (John Mearsheimer, R. Wendell Harrison Distinguished Service Professor of Political Science and the co-director of the Program on International Security Policy at the University of Chicago, *The Great Delusion: Liberal Dreams and International Realities*, Yale University Press, <https://nationalinterest.org/feature/great-delusion-liberal-dreams-and-international-realities-32737>, ME)

Liberal hegemony is an ambitious strategy in which a state aims to turn as many countries as possible into liberal democracies like itself while also promoting an open international economy and building international institutions. In essence, the liberal state seeks to spread its own values far and wide. My goal in this book is to describe what happens when a power­ful state pursues this strategy at the expense of balance­-of­-power politics. Many in the West, especially among foreign policy elites, consider liberal hegemony a wise policy that states should axiomatically adopt. Spreading liberal democracy around the world is said to make eminently good sense from both a moral and a strategic perspective. For starters, it is thought to be an excellent way to protect human rights, which are sometimes seri­ously violated by authoritarian states. And because the policy holds that liberal democracies do not want to go to war with each other, it ultimately provides a formula for transcending realism and fostering international peace. Finally, proponents claim it helps protect liberalism at home by eliminating authoritarian states that otherwise might aid the illiberal forces that are constantly present inside the liberal state. This conventional wisdom is wrong. Great powers are rarely in a position to pursue a full­-scale liberal foreign policy. As long as two or more of them exist on the planet, they have little choice but to pay close attention to their position in the global balance of power and act according to the dictates of realism. Great powers of all persuasions care deeply about their survival, and there is always the danger in a bipolar or multipolar system that they will be attacked by another great power. In these circumstances, liberal great powers regularly dress up their hard­-nosed behavior with liberal rhe­toric. They talk like liberals and act like realists. Should they adopt liberal policies that are at odds with realist logic, they invariably come to regret it. But occasionally a liberal democracy encounters such a favorable balance of power that it is able to embrace liberal hegemony. That situation is most likely to arise in a unipolar world, where the single great power does not have to worry about being attacked by another great power since there is none. Then the liberal sole pole will almost always abandon realism and adopt a liberal foreign policy. Liberal states have a crusader mentality hard­-wired into them that is hard to restrain. Because liberalism prizes the concept of inalienable or natural rights, committed liberals are deeply concerned about the rights of virtually every individual on the planet. This universalist logic creates a powerful incen­tive for liberal states to get involved in the affairs of countries that seriously violate their citizens’ rights. To take this a step further, the best way to ensure that the rights of foreigners are not trampled is for them to live in a liberal democracy. This logic leads straight to an active policy of regime change, where the goal is to topple autocrats and put liberal democracies in their place. Liberals do not shy from this task, mainly because they often have great faith in their state’s ability to do social engineering both at home and abroad. Creating a world populated by liberal democracies is also thought to be a formula for international peace, which would not just eliminate war but greatly reduce, if not eliminate, the twin scourges of nuclear prolifera­tion and terrorism. And lastly, it is an ideal way of protecting liberalism at home. This enthusiasm notwithstanding, liberal hegemony will not achieve its goals, and its failure will inevitably come with huge costs. The liberal state is likely to end up in endless wars, which will increase rather than reduce the level of conflict in international politics and thus aggravate the problems of proliferation and terrorism. Moreover, the state’s militaristic behavior is almost certain to end up threatening its own liberal values. Liber­alism abroad leads to illiberalism at home. Finally, even if the liberal state were to achieve its aims—spreading democracy near and far, fostering eco­nomic intercourse, and creating international institutions—they would not produce peace. The key to understanding liberalism’s limits is to recognize its relation­ship with nationalism and realism. This book is ultimately all about these three isms and how they interact to affect international politics

#### Democracy promotion locks-in permanent instability and inevitably fails due to US hypocrisy

Walt 16, (John Walt, Professor of International Affairs at the Harvard Kennedy School, “The Case for Offshore Balancing: A Superior U.S. Grand Strategy,” Foreign Affairs, August 2016, <https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/united-states/2016-06-13/case-offshore-balancing>, ME)

Other critics reject offshore balancing because they believe the United States has a moral and strategic imperative to promote freedom and protect human rights. As they see it, spreading democracy will largely rid the world of war and atrocities, keeping the United States secure and alleviating suffering. No one knows if a world composed solely of liberal democracies would in fact prove peaceful, but spreading democracy at the point of a gun rarely works, and fledgling democracies are especially prone to conflict. Instead of promoting peace, the United States just ends up fighting endless wars. Even worse, force-feeding liberal values abroad can compromise them at home. The global war on terrorism and the related effort to implant democracy in Afghanistan and Iraq have led to tortured prisoners, targeted killings, and vast electronic surveillance of U.S. citizens. Some defenders of liberal hegemony hold that a subtler version of the strategy could avoid the sorts of disasters that occurred in Afghanistan, Iraq, and Libya. They are deluding themselves. Democracy promotion requires large-scale social engineering in foreign societies that Americans understand poorly, which helps explain why Washington's efforts usually fail. Dismantling and replacing existing political institutions inevitably creates winners and losers, and the latter often take up arms in opposition. When that happens, U.S. officials, believing their country's credibility is now at stake, are tempted to use the United States' awesome military might to fix the problem, thus drawing the country into more conflicts.

#### Liberalism is *inherently* destabilizing—democratic pursuit inevitably leads to expansionism

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During the presidency of George W. Bush, the administration’s cabinet and top advisors were an eclectic mix of liberal internationalists and neoconservatives. The thing these two ideologies have in common is their lust for foreign interference. At the surface their objectives were different, but at their core, they believed the United States should have a grand strategy of dominant manipulation on the world stage. In invading Afghanistan and then Iraq, liberal hegemonic rhetoric was shouted as not only justification for war but as a divine duty of the United States as the world’s sole hegemon. It was common to hear Bush and his team promote ideas such as the democratic peace theory, and the duty to liberate the veiled Afghani women under Taliban control. **Although one can easily get behind democratic peace or the liberation of women, these were little more than post hoc justifications for invading sovereign nation-states. This is the unfortunate reality; liberalism is an expansionist ideology that inevitably does more harm than good.** The Core Assumptions of Liberalism At its base level, liberalism emphasizes inalienable rights and individuality. From this baseline, thinkers have developed theories and ideas about how these rights should be manifested. The conclusion is at the crux of whether liberalism acts as an expansionist ideology or not. Although one could trace liberalism quite far back in historical political thought, John Locke acts as a cornerstone of the philosophy. Importantly, Locke lays the groundwork in Two Treaties of Government that all men are in “a state of perfect freedom,” that is to say, that humans have natural or inalienable rights.1 Although different thinkers have come to different conclusions of the type of liberalism that is dominant. In the American case, which will be the primary subject for the remainder of this piece, progressive liberalism and its emphasis on positive rights is the only dominant strand. According to John Mearsheimer in The Great Delusion: Liberal Dreams and International Realities, this is true for three reasons: The Industrial Revolution, nationalism, and modern peacetime militaries.2 Since the United States is the sole world superpower and also subscribes to modern liberalism, the next section will explore how those two characteristics make liberalism incredibly expansionist in its aims. **Liberalism is Inherently Expansionist** To first explain why liberalism is inherently expansionist, one must understand how important the concept of inalienable rights is too liberal thinkers. It is through this understanding that the other layers form. If one believes, as liberals do, in inalienable rights, it means that everyone in the world has the same inherent set of rights. This is so important to internalize as a concept because of what this belief drives a country to do. For instance, if the fundamental principle is that each human has the same rights, then there is inevitably a duty to ensure that these rights are protected. **It is from this duty that humans feel a calling, and eventually, a nation-state can be provoked to meddle.** The American view of liberalism and its focus on positive rights results in social engineering. Social engineering manifests itself through policies aimed at leveling the playing field. On the domestic side, an example of this would be affirmative action. This policy manipulates the playing field in order to give a group who is historically disadvantaged a fairer opportunity. This is done at the expense of negative rights. Since people within a nation have more in common with each other than they do with people of other nations, it is possible to agree on foundational rights within the confines of one’s borders. For example, in the United States, the Bill of Rights is mostly noncontroversial. However, since each nation-state has its own identity, agreeing on foundational rights between states, or worse, globally is all but impossible. However, **many liberals feel confident that they can project positive rights aboard. It is from this confidence that nation-states begin to feel obligated to intervene in places that rights are threatened.** Even though a desire to meddle and optimism of success is in the DNA of liberal internationalists, they frequently lack the number one characteristic needed for liberal hegemonic pursuit, unipolarity. For most of the modern world, the globe existed with multiple superpowers. In a world with more than one superpower, countries’ foreign policies were preoccupied with survival. Since there is not a global state, the nation-state is the highest level of authority. In a multipolar world, nation-states are required to operate using a realist strategy. This strategy forces countries to balance, position, and align themselves in a rational way. However, in 1991, and the collapse of the Soviet Union, the United States found itself without a rival. This unipolar world gave the liberal United States the rare opportunity to pursue any foreign policy strategy they wanted without fear of attack or significant pushback. Thus far, it has been established that liberal internationalists believe in global inalienable rights and that these rights are positive in nature thus requiring social engineering. Further, they have profound confidence in their own ability to execute global social engineering. Now, as the lone global power, the United States is unencumbered in its choice of foreign policy strategy. With all of this in place, according to liberal logic, one has the duty to protect and enforce the rights of others. From this duty, the next question is how is this accomplished? Despite the liberal internationalist fascination with international organizations, it is interesting that the policies of those institutions mirror that of the dominant state. With the United States being that state, the United Nations and NATO have taken their lead in liberal projection and have acted as a puppet organization. By the logic presented, it is unreasonable not to promote rights abroad if able. Now that the United States is able, that is exactly what they have done. Also, as established above, international organizations are part of the bedrock of liberal internationalism. It is through the ruse of these organizations that the United States can act under the veil of legitimacy. With these two pillars, the United States the state, and the United States the United Nations, numerous interventions have been waged, and there is no logical conclusion, with the exception of the emergence of another superpower. **As the unipolar power, the United States not only has tried to liberalize several countries as the dominant front but has also led non-U.S. participant resolutions in the U.N. which started violent interventions.** An example of this is the AMISOM run intervention in Somalia. While the United States is not a direct participant, they fronted and legitimized this effort using the international community.3 **It’s illogical for liberalism as a foreign policy to be non-expansionist and has proven itself to be very expansionist.** If inalienable rights are real, then how can a liberal internationalist not protect those rights abroad, even if it is through violence. It is from this paradox that one should understand that **despite the peaceful façade, liberalism as a foreign policy is not only inherently expansionist but innately violent.**

### I/L War – Security Dilemma

#### DPT is empirically denied – democracies demonize non-democracies – ensures hair trigger security dilemma

**Muller**, director of the Peace Research Institute in Frankfurt, professor of International Relations at Goethe University, **15**

(Harald, Democracy, Peace, and Security, Lexington Books pp. 44-49)

My own proposal for solving the problem. developed together with my colleague Jonas Wolff (Müllcr 2004. Muller/Wolff 2006). turns the issue upside down: We do not start with explaining mutual democratic peacefulness, but its opposite. the proven capability of democracies to act aggressively against non-democracies. We note that—apart from self-defense where there is no difference between democracies and non-democracies——democratic states go to war—in contrast to non-democracies—to uphold international law (or their own interpretation thereof), to prevent anarchy through state failure, to “save strangers” when dictatorships massacre their own people, and to promote democracy. None of these acts is likely to find its target in a democracy. Since the use of force by democracies is hardly possible without public justification, even the rhetorical use of the said reasons will not stand public scrutiny when uttered against a democracy—people will not believe it, War other than for self-defense thus can only be fought by democracies against non-democracies because against a fellow democracy justification would fail. Because whether this is the case or not to a degree that justifies war as the ‘ultimate means” must rely on practical judgments. and practical judgments can differ among even reasonable people. democracies might disagree whether or not the judgment applies in specific cases. Democracies also show variance in that regard due (o a systematic. political-culturally rooted different propensity to judge situations as justifing war or not, and to participate in such wars (Gels et al, 2013). It should also be noted that, given the continuum between autocracy, anocracy and democracy, whether a given state is a democracy or not can be subject to interpretation. and this interpretation may even change over time (Oren 1995, Hayes 2013). The fact is that there are a couple of fairly warlike democracies, and that the democracies participating most frequently in military disputes (apart from the special case of Israel) are, by and large. major powers such as the United States, the United Kingdom. France. or India. This pattern is important to keep in mind when the question of the utility of democratic peace for today ‘s world problems is to be answered. Transnational terrorism, failed states, civil wars and the like dominate the international agenda on war and peace. At the classical level of international relations, in the relationships among major powers. developments arc undcr way which potentially pose an even greater threat than this diverse collection of non-interstate problems presently does. We are living in an era of rather rapid and disturbing power change (Tammcn et al. 2000). The United States are still the leading power of the world with unprecedented militany and economic poer. But others are coming closer: China. India. Braiil and Indonesia, China is at the top of this cohort, All major power changes chal lenge existing structures and thus contain the potential for great disturbance. The leading power may start to fear for its dominant position and take measures to ensure its position at the lop. These actions may frustrate emerging powers and even lead to the perception that their security is endangered. which would motivate counter-measures that further propel a political escala tion spiral. An increasingly focused competition in which a true power change appears increasingly possible. that is. a change of position at the top of the international hierarchy, has an even greater risk potential. If the inherent dangers are not contained—which remains always a possibility major power war may ensue defying all propositions that major war has become obsolete or that nuclear deterrence will prevent this calamity once and for all. Of course, states can grow peacefully into roles of higher responsibility. status and influence on the world stage. There arc no natural laws saving that changes in the world’s power structure must end in war, despite all distur bances and ensuing risks (Rauch 2014). The less conflict an emerging power experiences with established ones, and with peer challengers that emerge simultaneously, the better the chances that the rise will travel a peaceful trajectory. Looking through this lens. thc relations of only one emerging power with the present hegemon appear to be partially conflict-pronc. and seriously so: it concerns the pair China/United States. The Iwo great powers are rivals for preponderance in East and South East Asia and eventually for being the number one at the global level. There is also Chinese resentment stemming from the US role in China’s past as a victim of Western imperialism. On the other hand. China’s authoritarian system of rule and ensuing violations of human and political rights trigger the liberal resentment discussed in the first part of this chapter. which is rooted particularly strongly in US political culture. The Chinese—US relationship is thus thc key to a peaceful. tense or even violent future at the world stage. A small group of major powers. Including the United States and China, is interconnected today by a complex conflict system. China has territorial claims against Japan, South Korea, Vietnam. the Philippines. Brunci. and India which it pursues by a variety of means, not shying away from the limited, small scale usc of militan force in some cases, notably against obviously weaker counterparts (Ellcman ci al. 2012). China’s relation (o wards Japan is the one most burdened by China’s past as a victim of Japanese oppression and related cruelties, and the propcnsit of the conservative part of Japan’s elite to display cavalier attitudes towards this past or even sort of celebrate it (as through visits to the notorious Yasukuni shrine hosting the remnants of war criminals) only adds to anti-Japanese feelings in China (Russia. another great power. also openly pursues a revisionist agenda. as vividly shown in the recent Crimean move, but these territorial ambitions are not part of the most virulent conflict complex in Asia). Territorial claims are always emotionalized and dangerous. Territorial claims by a major power bear particular risks, because threatened countries look for protective allies which are, by necessity, major powers with the capability to project power into the region of concern. The great power claimant and the great power protector then position themselves on the opposite sides of the conflict. A classical constellation of great power conflict results that looks far more traditional than all the talk about post-modern global relations in which state power struggles fade into oblivion would suggest. In the Asian conflict complex that structures the shape of the US—Chinese contest (Foot/Walter 201 1). Japan. South Korea and the Philippines arc for mall allied ith the United Slates. India and Vietnam today entertain rda (ions ith the United States that can be depicted as cordial entente, already include military cooperation, and might move further towards an alliance. depending on deelopmens in Asia. The United States is also a protector of Taiwan. officially a Chinese province, factualh an independent political entity. and the main object of Chinese interest because of the unfinished agenda of national re-unification. Given the enormous asymmetries between China and Taiwan. the latter’s independence depends fully and unambiguously on the US guarantee. Russia and China have a fairly ambivalent relation with each other that is officially called a strategic partnership. Ambiguous as this relationship is, it is predictable that the more the West and Russia are at loggerheads, the closer the Russian—Chinese relations might become. On the other hand. Chi na is the stronger partner and harbors not completely friendly feelings to wards Moscow. as Russia took part in China’s humiliation during the imperi alist period no less than the United States did. Russian fears concerning covert immigration into Eastern Siberia and demographic repercussions and political consequences that might result therefrom add to the uneasiness. China and India arc natural rivals for regional preponderance in Asia (Gilbov/Hcginbotham 2012). Both arc developing rapidly. with China still ahead. Territorial disputes. India’s liospitalit Lo TibeLan exiles including the Dalai Lama. China’s close relation to Pakistan and a growing naval rivalry spanning the Indian Ocean from the Strait of Malacca to Iranian shores (Garofano/Dew 2013) run parallel to rapidly growing economic relations and ostensible efforts lo present the relationship if not as amiable then at least as partner-like. The United States, China, Russia and India even today conduct a multi- pronged nuclear arms race (Fingar 2011: Gangul /Thompson 2011: O’Neill 2013. Müllcr 2014). In this race, conventional components like missile de fense. Intercontinental strike options, space-based assets and the specter of cbcr war play their role, as does the issue of extended dcterrcncc The general US militar’ superiority induces Russia and China to improve their nuclear arsenals, while India tries not to be left too far behind the Chinese in terms of nuclear capability. Pakistan and North Korea ork as potential spoilers at the fringe of this arms race. They are not powerful but thc arc capable of stirring up trouble, whenever they move. In tems of the military constellation, the most disquieting development is the drafting of pre-emptive strategies of a first (most likely conventional) strike by the United States and China, on either side motivated by the per ceived need to keep the upper hand early in a potential clash close to Chinese shores (such as in the context of a Taiwan conflict). China is building up middle-range ballistic capabilities to pre-empt US aircraft carrier groups from coming into striking distance and to desiroy US Air Force assets in Okinawa. while the United States is developing means to neutralize exactly these Chinese capabilities. They are steering towards a hair-trigger security dilemma in which the mutual postures cry out for being used first before the enemy might destroy them (Goldstein 2013: Le Miôre 2012). It cannot be excluded that this whole conflict system might collapse into two opposing blocks one da the spark for a major violent cataclysm could even be lighted by uncontrolled non-state actors inside some of the powers. or—in analogy to the role of Serbia in 1914— a ‘spoiler” state with a particularly idios ncralic agenda. Pakistan. North Korea or Tai an arc con ceivable in this role. Even Japan might be considered, if nationalism in Nippon grows further and seeks confrontation with the old rival China. If anything. this constellation does not look much better than the one which drove Europe into World War I a century ago. and it contains a nuclear component. To trust in the infallibility of nuclear deterrence in this mufti- pronged constellation needs quite a lot of optimism Can democratic peace be helpful in this constellation? Our conflict system includes democracies—the United States, India, Japan. Indonesia and non- democracies such as China. Russia, and Vietnam, but not necessarily on the same side. Should the European theater become connected to the Asian one through continuous US—Russian disputes and a Russian—Chinese entente. defective democracies like Ukraine and Georgia may feature rather importantly as potential triggers for a worsening of relationships. While democracy is useful in excluding certain conflict dyads in the whole complex, such as India and the United States. Japan and the United States. Japan and India. from the risk that they might escalate into a violent conflict, and as democratic peace is pacifying parts of the world. such as South America or Europe. it helps little in disputes between democracies and non-democracies. To the contrary: as discussed above, democracies have a more or less moral-emotional inclination to demonize non-democracies once they dis agree, and to feel a missionary drive to turn them democratic. This might exacerbate the existing, more interest-based conflicts between democracies and non-democracies, and it creates fears in the hearts of autocratic leaders that they might be up for democratization sooner or later. The close inter- democratic relations which democratic peace tends to produce, in turn, only exacerbate these fears as democracies tend to be rich, well organized, and powerful and dispose together of much more potent military capabilities than their potential non-dcnwcratic counterparts. Rather than helping with peace. the inter-democratic consequences of the democratic peace tend to exacerbate the security dilemma which exists between democracies and non-democracics an way. This non-peaceful dark side of democratic peace has escaped the attention of most academic writings on this subject and certainly all political utterances about democratic peace in our political systems. But democratic militancy is the Siamese twin of democratic peace as the Bush Administration unambiguously taught us (Gels et al. 2013: Müllcr 2014b).

### I/L War – Median Voter

#### US and Israel prove – citizen preferences for a capital-intensive military doctrine lock in aggressive foreign policy and protracted warfare – legal reforms fail.

**Caverley 10** – Jonathan, Poli Sci Prof @ NU, The Myth of Military Myopia: Democracy, Small Wars, and Vietnam, International Security 34.3.

This article shows that, contrary to the consensus regarding U.S. military intransigence in the face of unconventional warfare, civilian officials in Lyndon Johnson's administration - and ultimately the American public - played an essential role in the selection of a capital-intensive strategy to fight insurgents in the Vietnam War. President Johnson was convinced that the American public would punish any administration that "lost" South Vietnam to communism, but he was equally certain that public preferences constrained the number of U.S. forces to be deployed and lives to be lost far more than the amount of money to be spent and ordnance to be consumed. In response, he and his sub- ordinates instructed the military to fight what they themselves acknowledged to be an ineffective, capital- and firepower-intensive strategy. The article ex- plains this seemingly nonstrategic behavior using a theory, generalizable be- yond this specific case, of the distribution of the costs of war within the electorate.138 Israel's experience in its 2006 war against Hezbollah suggests that this phenomenon is not limited to the Vietnam War or to U.S. strategic culture.139 Israel expended 170,000 artillery shells, twice the number fired in the conve tional 1973 Arab-Israeli War, in a month.140 The Israel Defense Force's (IDF's) initial campaign plan - a rapid air and small-unit ground assault that relied on firepower to control territory - was designed to minimize the number of ground forces and casualties. The Israeli cabinet rejected it; the transportation minister objected to "exposing 40,000 troops to the Lebanese reality."141 Four days into the conflict, the IDF deputy chief of staff recommended stopping the campaign: "We have exhausted the [aerial] effort; we have reached the peak; from now on we can only descend."142 Nonetheless, despite its intention to avoid a ground war, the Israeli government announced ambitious goals far beyond releasing hostages and deterring further rocket attacks.143 A report written by a subsequent government commission describing the strategic co- nundrum evokes the constraints faced by Johnson in Vietnam: "Declared goals were too ambitious, and it was publicly stated that fighting will continue till they are achieved. But the authorized military operations did not enable their achievement." The report acknowledges the government's bind: no "other ef- fective military response to such missile attacks than an extensive and pro- longed ground operation" existed, but this "would have a high 'cost' and did not enjoy broad support."144 Cost distribution theory makes such behavior explicable. From four ma- jor assumptions - security is a public good; voters weigh security benefits against taxes, conscription, and casualties; median wealth is less than mean wealth in every state; and the preferences of the median voter are heeded in a democracy - I derive a voter preference for a capitalized military. Like the democratic exceptionalist research program, this article finds evidence that the American public weighs the benefits of limited war against the costs. Although one recent study of American public opinion assigns expectations of success as the most important factor in the public's support for a conflict, it also points out that the public more generally carries out relatively competent cost-benefit analysis.145 This article extends this logic by arguing that when the ability to substitute matériel for personnel is low, as it is against unconventional opponents, democracies may still prosecute wars using an ill-suited military doctrine (and thus a lower chance of success), because the costs remain modest for this pivotal voter. Democratic exceptionalism's cost-internalization mechanism provides an overly optimistic assessment of democracies' discretion in how and even when they fight small wars. Neither an apolitical public, nor a dysfunctional military culture, nor a military doctrine divorced from grand strategy causes a flawed warfighting strategy. Rather, it results from political leaders' assessment of the average voter's preferences. Although claiming that democracies substitute capital for labor to reduce the costs of war for voters is not news, tying the pur- suit of such a strategy to a rational voter has two novel and important implications. First, many observers argue that most wars of the twenty-first century will be hybrid conflicts involving unconventional opponents; finding the root cause of poor counterinsurgency is an essential task. This article argues that fixating on reforming the armed services (or even the civilian tools of foreign policy) in an effort to improve democratic performance in small wars is its own form of myopia. My theory gives reason to be skeptical of how much the U.S. military will be allowed to shift by future administrations and the public to which they are held accountable. Dysfunctional organizations can eventu- ally learn and adapt. If the public suffers from foolish preconceptions, it may be dissuaded through public education and the marketplace of ideas. Even positing a powerful strategic culture underpinning U.S. doctrine suggests that "it is at least possible that by deconstructing the standard American 'way' . . . some pathways to improved performance may be identified."146 But if a rational, fully informed electorate views such a military doctrine as its best option, the prospects for change are less clear.

### AT: DPT

#### DPT is wrong – theorist conflate causation and correlation – demo promo is the greatest cause of modern war

Skidelsky 22 — Robert Skidelsky, a member of the British House of Lords and Professor Emeritus of Political Economy at Warwick University. Robert Skidelsky, “The False Promise of Democratic Peace,” Project Syndicate, 4-19-2022, https://www.project-syndicate.org/commentary/democratic-peace-theory-is-wrong-by-robert-skidelsky-2022-04, accessed 7-3-2022 WMK

Clinging to the assumption that only dictatorships start military conflicts, proponents of democratization believed that the global success of their project would usher in a world without war. But this theory lacks a sound foundation and has produced one disaster after another when put into practice.

LONDON – Through persuasion, exhortation, legal processes, economic pressure, and sometimes military force, American foreign policy asserts the United States’ view about how the world should be run. Only two countries in recent history have had such world-transforming ambitions: Britain and the US. In the last 150 years, these are the only two countries whose power – hard and soft, formal and informal – has extended to all parts of the world, allowing them plausibly to aspire to the mantle of Rome.

When the US inherited Britain’s global position after 1945, it also inherited Britain’s sense of responsibility for the future of the international order. Embracing that role, America has been an evangelist of democracy, and a central US foreign-policy objective since the fall of communism has been to promote its spread – sometimes by regime change, when that is deemed necessary.

In fact, this playbook dates back to US President Woodrow Wilson’s time. As historian Nicholas Mulder writes in The Economic Weapon: The Rise of Sanctions as a Tool of Modern War, “Wilson was the first statesman to cast the economic weapon as an instrument of democratization. He thereby added an internal political rationale for economic sanctions – spreading democracy – to the external political goal that…European advocates of sanctions have aimed at: inter-state peace.” The implication is that, where the opportunity offers, military and non-military measures should be used to topple “malign” regimes.

According to democratic peace theory, democracies do not start wars; only dictatorships do. A wholly democratic world thus would be a world without war. This was the hope that emerged in the 1990s. With the end of communism, the expectation, famously expressed by Francis Fukuyama’s 1989 article, “The End of History?,” was that the most important parts of the world would become democratic.

US supremacy was supposed to ensure that democracy became the universal political norm. But Russia and China, the leading communist states of the Cold War era, have not embraced it; nor have many other centers of world affairs, especially in the Middle East. Hence, Fukuyama has recently acknowledged that if Russia and China were driven together, “then you would really be living in a world that was being dominated by these non-democratic powers…[which] really is the end of the end of history.”

The argument that democracy is inherently “peaceful,” and dictatorship or autocracy “warlike,” is intuitively attractive. It does not deny that states pursue their own interests; but it assumes that the interests of democratic states will reflect common values like human rights, and that those interests will be pursued in a less bellicose manner (since democratic processes require negotiation of differences). Democratic governments are accountable to their people, and the people have an interest in peace, not war.

By contrast, according to this view, rulers and elites in dictatorships are illegitimate and therefore insecure, which leads them to seek popular support by whipping up animosity toward foreigners. If democracy replaced dictatorship everywhere, world peace would follow automatically.

This belief rests on two propositions that have been extremely influential in international relations theory, even though they are poorly grounded theoretically and empirically. The first is the notion that a state’s external behavior is determined by its domestic constitution – a view that ignores the influence the international system can have on a country’s domestic politics. As the American political scientist Kenneth N. Waltz argued in his 1979 book, The Theory of International Politics, “international anarchy” conditions the behavior of states more than the behavior of states creates international anarchy.

Waltz’s “world-systems theory” perspective is particularly useful in an age of globalization. One must look to the structure of the international system to “predict” how individual states will behave, regardless of their domestic constitutions. “If each state, being stable, strove only for security, and had no designs on its neighbors, all states would nevertheless remain insecure,” he observed, “for the means of security for one state are, in their very existence, the means by which other states are threatened.”

Waltz offered a bracing antidote to the facile assumption that democratic habits are easily transferable from one location to another. Rather than trying to spread democracy, he suggested that it would be better to try to reduce global insecurity.

Though there is undeniably some correlation between democratic institutions and peaceful habits, the direction of causation is disputable. Was it democracy that made Europe peaceful after 1945? Or did the US nuclear umbrella, the fixing of borders by the victors, and Marshall Plan-fueled economic growth finally make it possible for non-communist Europe to accept democracy as its political norm? The political scientist Mark E. Pietrzyk contends that, “Only states which are relatively secure – politically, militarily, economically – can afford to have free, pluralistic societies; in the absence of this security, states are much more likely to adopt, maintain, or revert to centralized, coercive authority structures.”

The second proposition is that democracy is the natural form of the state, which people everywhere will spontaneously adopt if allowed to. This dubious assumption makes regime change seem easy, because the sanctioning powers can rely on the welcoming support of those whose freedom has been repressed and whose rights have been trampled underfoot.

By drawing superficial comparisons with postwar Germany and Japan, the apostles of democratization grossly underestimate the difficulties of installing democracies in societies that lack Western constitutional traditions. The results of their handiwork can be seen in Iraq, Afghanistan, Libya, Syria, and many African countries.

Democratic peace theory is, above all, lazy. It provides an easy explanation for “warlike” behavior without considering the location and history of the states involved. This shallowness lends itself to overconfidence that a quick dose of economic sanctions or bombing is all that is needed to cure a dictatorship of its unfortunate affliction.

In short, the idea that democracy is “portable” leads to a gross underestimation of the military, economic, and humanitarian costs of trying to spread democracy to troubled parts of the world. The West has paid a terrible price for such thinking – and it may be about to pay again.

#### DPT is wrong – longitudinal analysis disproves peaceful dyad thesis

Owsiak and Vasquez 22 — Andrew P Owsiak, John A Vasquez, The Limited Scope of the Democratic Peace: What We Are Missing, International Studies Perspectives, Volume 23, Issue 2, May 2022, Pages 169–190, <https://doi.org/10.1093/isp/ekab015> WMK

Cumulatively, our analysis offers three main, interrelated findings. First, the democratic peace potentially accounts for only a minority of peaceful dyads in the interstate system. The exact amount of its explanatory power varies, depending on myriad research design choices; yet that amount most often falls below 10 percent of peaceful dyads. The democratic peace does not, then, account for the majority of peaceful dyads in the interstate system over the past 200 years. It has a limited scope. Second, the democratic peace performs better in more recent, shorter periods, as opposed to longer historical ones. Finally, most peaceful dyads, regardless of time period, require a theory other than the democratic peace to explain why they have never had a war or a MID. We now turn our attention to where scholars might most fruitfully search for the factors capable of accounting for these overlooked, peaceful dyads.

## CLIMATE

### 1nc – Climate

#### Democracy terminally slows warming mitigation---extinction

Abadi 22 — Cameron Abadi deputy editor at Foreign Policy., “What if Democracy and Climate Mitigation Are Incompatible?,” Foreign Policy, 8-7-2021, https://foreignpolicy.com/2022/01/07/climate-change-democracy/, accessed 7-5-2022, WMK

In the past 14 months, the United States and Germany both held national elections that placed climate change policy squarely at the center of national debate. The fact that two of the world’s five largest economies committed to addressing the world’s most pressing crisis through public discourse followed by public voting was an unprecedented democratic experiment.

It did not work out as optimists hoped. On the one hand, the victorious parties in both countries vowed to achieve what was necessary to prevent the worst effects of climate change from occurring, in accordance with the international climate agreement unanimously approved in Paris in 2015. But on the other hand, in neither country can the resulting policies be described as fulfilling that promise.

All the major German parties (except for the far-right Alternative for Germany) said they would work to limit climate change to the 1.5 degrees Celsius above pre-industrial levels stipulated in the Paris Agreement; the Greens claimed, plausibly, that only their platform contained ideas sufficient to fulfill the promise. But even as the Greens succeeded at joining the national government (having earned a record-breaking 15 percent at the polls), few of the policy specifics found their way into the governing agenda for the next four years. The Greens claimed a higher carbon price was necessary; no mention of any such increase made it into the coalition agreement. The Greens argued that ending the domestic excavation of coal by 2030 was nonnegotiable; the government has failed to make a firm commitment to do that. The Greens claimed the country would need to invest an extra 50 billion euros ($56 billion) per year in renewable energy infrastructure; the new government has vowed instead to maintain a balanced budget.

A similar slippage between campaign ambition and watered-down governance has occurred in the United States. Democrat Joe Biden’s election platform vowed that the country’s electricity sector would be carbon-free by 2035 and that the entire U.S. economy would achieve full carbon neutrality by 2050—promises that the Biden administration has never disavowed. But the central policies intended to achieve those timelines have no realistic chance of passing Congress. The administration will receive nowhere close to the $2 trillion that Biden said would be necessary to fund renewable energy infrastructure. Meanwhile, Sen. Joe Manchin from the coal-producing state of West Virginia has refused to pass any law that explicitly disincentivizes the energy sector’s use of fossil fuels, as the Biden campaign had envisioned. At the same time, the Biden administration has openly lobbied the Middle Eastern oil-producing countries of OPEC to increase production, in hopes of lowering the price of gasoline for domestic drivers.

The climate agendas of the current U.S. and German governments—from the Biden administration’s use of tax incentives to encourage the expansion of renewable energy to the new German government’s vow to devote 2 percent of the country’s land to the generation of wind power—are not actively harmful. In sum, they will almost certainly accelerate both countries’ reduction of carbon emissions. But by any fair accounting, they are inadequate to solving climate change on the timeline implied by the Paris Agreement’s 1.5-degree commitment—namely, a 50 percent reduction of emissions by 2035 and complete global carbon neutrality by 2050. “The problem with the climate measures of this new government is the speed,” said Pauline Brünger, a spokesperson for Germany’s Fridays for Future activist group.

Representatives from the U.S. and German governments say their policies are the result of the necessary compromises demanded by the democratic process. But it’s fair to wonder whether that’s just another way of restating the problem. According to the climate science, the timelines to limit warming aren’t an expression of subjectively perceived urgency but objective measures defined by the boundary of a catastrophic climate tipping point. In a 2018 report, the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC), a U.N. group of climate scientists, declared that achieving carbon neutrality by midcentury was the only way to prevent global temperatures from rising above 1.5 degrees—beyond which, Arctic ice would melt (and ocean levels would rise) far more quickly, humans would more frequently suffer heat death, and vast numbers of species, from insects to sea coral, would end up on the verge of extinction.

In other words: Democracy works by compromise, but climate change is precisely the type of problem that seems not to allow for it. As the clock on those climate timelines continues to tick, this structural mismatch is becoming increasingly exposed. And as a result, those concerned by climate change—some already with political power, others grasping for it—are now searching for, and finding, new ways of closing the gap between politics and science, by any means necessary.

#### Warming causes extinction.

Spratt 18, \*David, Research Director, Breakthrough National Centre for Climate Restoration, \*\*Ian T. Dunlop, Chairman of Safe Climate Australia, Director of Australia 21, Deputy Convener of the Australian Association for the Study of Peak Oil and Gas, a Fellow of the Centre for Policy Development, and a member of Mikhail Gorbachev’s Climate Change Task Force ( “What Lies Beneath: The Understatement of Existential Climate Risk”, Accessible at: <https://docs.wixstatic.com/ugd/148cb0_a0d7c18a1bf64e698a9c8c8f18a42889.pdf>)

In 2016, the World Economic Forum survey of the most impactful risks for the years ahead elevated the failure of climate change mitigation and adaptation to the top of the list, ahead of weapons of mass destruction, ranking second, and water crises, ranking third. By 2018, following a year characterised by high-impact hurricanes and extreme temperatures, extreme-weather events were seen as the single most prominent risk. As the survey noted: “We have been pushing our planet to the brink and the damage is becoming increasingly clear.”29 Climate change is an existential risk to human civilisation: that is, an adverse outcome that would either annihilate intelligent life or permanently and drastically curtail its potential. Temperature rises that are now in prospect, after the Paris Agreement, are in the range of 3–5°C. At present, the Paris Agreement voluntary emission reduction commitments, if implemented, would result in planetary warming of 3.4°C by 2100,30 without taking into account “long-term” carbon cycle feedbacks. With a higher climate sensitivity figure of 4.5°C, for example, which would account for such feedbacks, the Paris path would result in around 5°C of warming, according to a MIT study.31 A study by Schroder Investment Management published in June 2017 found – after taking into account indicators across a wide range of the political, financial, energy and regulatory sectors – the average temperature increase implied for the Paris Agreement across all sectors was 4.1°C.32 Yet 3°C of warming already constitutes an existential risk. A 2007 study by two US national security think-tanks concluded that 3°C of warming and a 0.5 metre sea-level rise would likely lead to “outright chaos” and “nuclear war is possible”, emphasising how “massive non-linear events in the global environment give rise to massive nonlinear societal events”.33 The Global Challenges Foundation (GCF) explains what could happen: “If climate change was to reach 3°C, most of Bangladesh and Florida would drown, while major coastal cities – Shanghai, Lagos, Mumbai – would be swamped, likely creating large flows of climate refugees. Most regions in the world would see a significant drop in food production and increasing numbers of extreme weather events, whether heat waves, floods or storms. This likely scenario for a 3°C rise does not take into account the considerable risk that self-reinforcing feedback loops set in when a certain threshold is reached, leading to an ever increasing rise in temperature. Potential thresholds include the melting of the Arctic permafrost releasing methane into the atmosphere, forest dieback releasing the carbon currently stored in the Amazon and boreal forests, or the melting of polar ice caps that would no longer reflect away light and heat from the sun.”34 Warming of 4°C or more could reduce the global human population by 80% or 90%,35 and the World Bank reports “there is no certainty that adaptation to a 4°C world is possible”.36 Prof. Kevin Anderson says a 4°C future “is incompatible with an organized global community, is likely to be beyond ‘adaptation’, is devastating to the majority of ecosystems, and has a high probability of not being stable”.37 This is a commonly-held sentiment amongst climate scientists. A recent study by the European Commission’s Joint Research Centre found that if the global temperature rose 4°C, then extreme heatwaves with “apparent temperatures” peaking at over 55°C will begin to regularly affect many densely populated parts of the world, forcing much activity in the modern industrial world to stop.38 (“Apparent temperatures” refers to the Heat Index, which quantifies the combined effect of heat and humidity to provide people with a means of avoiding dangerous conditions.) In 2017, one of the first research papers to focus explicitly on existential climate risks proposed that “mitigation goals be set in terms of climate risk category instead of a temperature threshold”, and established a “dangerous” risk category of warming greater than 1.5°C, and a “catastrophic” category for warming of 3°C or more. The authors focussed on the impacts on the world’s poorest three billion people, on health and heat stress, and the impacts of climate extremes on such people with limited adaptation resources. They found that a 2°C warming “would double the land area subject to deadly heat and expose 48% of the population (to deadly heat). A 4°C warming by 2100 would subject 47% of the land area and almost 74% of the world population to deadly heat, which could pose existential risks to humans and mammals alike unless massive adaptation measures are implemented.”39 A 2017 survey of global catastrophic risks by the Global Challenges Foundation found that: “In high-end [climate] scenarios, the scale of destruction is beyond our capacity to model, with a high likelihood of human civilization coming to an end.”40 84% of 8000 people in eight countries surveyed for the Foundation considered climate change a “global catastrophic risk”.41 Existential risk may arise from a fast rate of system change, since the capacity to adapt, in both the natural and human worlds, is inversely proportional to the pace of change, amongst other factors. In 2004, researchers reported on the rate of warming as a driver of extinction.42 Given we are now on a 3–5°C warming path this century, their findings are instructive: If the rate of change is 0.3°C per decade (3°C per century), 15% of ecosystems will not be able to adapt. If the rate should exceed 0.4°C per decade, all ecosystems will be quickly destroyed, opportunistic species will dominate, and the breakdown of biological material will lead to even greater emissions of CO2 At 4°C of warming “the limits for adaptation for natural systems would largely be exceeded throughout the world”.43 Ecological breakdown of this scale would ensure an existential human crisis. By slow degrees, these existential risks are being recognised. In May 2018, an inquiry by the Australian Senate into national security and global warming recognised “climate change as a current and existential national security risk… defined as ‘one that threatens the premature extinction of Earth-originating intelligent life or the permanent and drastic destruction of its potential for desirable future development’”.44 In April 2018, the Intelligence on European Pensions and Institutional Investment think-tank warned business leaders that “climate change is an existential risk whose elimination must become a corporate objective”.45 However the most recent IPCC Assessment Report did not consider the issue. Whilst the term “risk management” appears in the 2014 IPCC Synthesis Report fourteen times, the terms “existential” and “catastrophic” do not appear.

### I/L Climate

#### Democracy will catastrophically delay action on climate change---authoritarianism is necessary to ensure rapid state-led transformation

Mann & Wainwright ’18 (Geoff, teaches political economy and economic geography at Simon Fraser University, where he directs the Centre for Global Political Economy, Joel *Climate Leviathan: A Political Theory of Our Planetary Future*, pp. 38-40, ME)

Relative to the institutional means currently available to capitalist liberal democracy and its sorry attempts at “consensus,” this trajectory has some distinct advantages with respect to atmospheric carbon concentration, notably in terms of the capacity to coordinate massive political-economic reconfiguration quickly and comprehensively. In light of our earlier question—how can we possibly realize the necessary emissions reductions?—it is this feature of Climate Mao that most recommends it. As the climate justice movement struggles to be heard, most campaigns in the global North are premised on an unspoken faith in a lop-sided, elite-biased, liberal proceduralism doomed to failure given the scale and scope of the changes required. If climate science is even half-right in its forecasts, the liberal model of democracy is at best too slow, at worst a devastating distraction. Climate Mao reflects the demand for rapid, revolutionary, state-led transformation today. Indeed, calls for variations on just such a regime abound on the Left. Mike Davis and Giovanni Arrighi have more or less sided with Climate Mao, sketching it as an alternative to capitalist Climate Leviathan.35 We might even interpret the renewal of enthusiasm for Maoist theory (including Alain Badiou’s version) as part of the prevailing crisis of ecological-political imagination.36 Minqi Li’s is arguably the best developed of this line of thought, and like Arrighi he locates the fulcrum of global climate history in China, arguing that Climate Mao offers the only way forward: [U]nless China takes serious and meaningful actions to fulfill its obligation of emissions reduction, there is little hope that global climate stabilization can be achieved. However, it is very unlikely that the [present] Chinese government will voluntarily take the necessary actions to reduce emissions. The sharp fall of economic growth that would be required is something that the Chinese government will not accept and cannot afford politically. Does this mean that humanity is doomed? That depends on the political struggle within China and in the world as a whole.37 Taking inspiration from Mao, Li says a new revolution in the Chinese revolution—a re-energization of the Maoist political tradition—could transform China and save humanity from doom. He does not claim this is likely; one need only consider China’s massive highway expansions, accelerated automobile consumption, and subsidized urban sprawl.38 But he is right that if an anticapitalist, planetary sovereign is to emerge that could change the world’s climate trajectory, it is most likely to emerge in China.

#### Autocracies are better suited to enact meaningful climate action

Gardels 18’ (Nathan Gardels, editor in chief of The WorldPost, Democracy may fatally slow climate action, The World Post, September 13th, 2018, https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/theworldpost/wp/2018/09/13/saving-the-planet/, ME)

In his recent book, “How Democracy Ends,” the Cambridge scholar David Runciman doubts that democracies can effectively battle oncoming challenges that have not yet fully arrived. “Climate change,” he writes, “lacks political grip on our imaginations because it is so incremental. The environmental apocalypse is only ever a creeping catastrophe. We experience it as a rumor.”In other words, the future, by definition, has no present political constituency in systems legitimated by consent of the governed. In this sense, democratic politics can disable the requisite will to act until climate calamity is already upon us. That will likely be too late. Ominous signs, such as intense storms like Hurricane Florence or this season’s wildfires, from California to the forests above the Arctic Circle in Sweden, are hopefully bringing forward a concrete awareness of what the future holds. Yet, as Barack Obama reminded Americans last week — referring to President Trump’s rollback on a wide range of policies, including on the environment — progress does not advance in a straight line. Two steps forward often entail one step back, the former president lamented. This is particularly true in democracies where partisan fever is so high that a new election can result in totally overturning a course of action that the public embraced only a few years earlier But there is no time to waste. As the Global Commission on the Economy and Climate recently reported, we are facing “a unique ‘use it or lose it’ moment.” If the world cannot reach the goal of the Paris climate accord to keep the global average temperature below 2 degrees Celsius in the next decade, the planet will heat up past the point of no return. In short, when it comes to climate change, time is an ethical dimension. Whether our species can regain the time lost during this “one step back” is the open question upon which our ability to radically adapt, or even survive, depends. In this respect, China’s one-party, long-term-oriented system presents yet another challenge to the West. Indeed, California Governor Jerry Brown warned this week that by sabotaging America’s electric car industry, Trump was handing the future of auto manufacturing to the modernizing Middle Kingdom, which is vigorously pursuing new battery technologies. China’s leaders believe in science. They have the will and capacity to take decisive and meaningful climate action on a large scale, without a break in the continuity of governance. Whether democracies can similarly rise to this challenge without resorting to authoritarian means will determine if, one dire day, the choice comes down to liberty or survival. In The WorldPost this week, we publish varying perspectives on this challenge in tandem with the Global Climate Action Summit taking place in San Francisco, co-chaired by Governor Brown, former New York Mayor Michael Bloomberg and China’s top climate negotiator, Xie Zhenhua. Christiana Figueres, who presided over the successful negotiations that led to the Paris climate accord, focuses on particulate pollutants in the air that are the consequence of our civilization’s carbon exhaust. “Global warming is not just manifesting in devastating fires, floods and heatwaves; its causes are impacting nearly every breath we take,” she writes. “Thick, heavy smog caused by the burning of fossil fuels and crops is choking cities around the world. China has been forced to close tens of thousands of factories to reduce its air pollution. Air pollution in Africa has been ruled responsible for more deaths than unsanitary water or malnutrition. Last November, Arvind Kejriwal, chief minister of India’s capital city, wrote: ‘Delhi has become a gas chamber.' Figueres, however, is optimistic that we are on the cusp of a shift. “Driven in part by the demand for and the undeniable benefits of clean, breathable air, the paradigm in which development and economic growth depend on coal in particular is rapidly being replaced,” she writes. “The truth is that addressing global warming and its causes is now the only real way to secure economic growth. That means powering it with clean, everlasting, abundant alternatives. Governments everywhere can reap enormous benefits, including saving billions of dollars on healthcare, by fostering a shift to electric transport, eliminating fossil fuel subsidies and scaling ecosystem restoration including mangroves, peat bogs and forests.” Erik Hoffner agrees on this last point. While carbon sequestration technologies are promising, he says, they are likely prohibitively expensive. The same result can be accomplished by the low-tech and far less capital-intensive alternative of agroforestry, which is “essentially a forest-mimicking agriculture that involves growing trees, shrubs and vegetables in tight assemblages.” James Redford and Adam Browning argue that what unites Americans on climate action is, ultimately, the jobs and an improved economy that clean energy can bring. In a short video, they report from their road trip through Minnesota on local communities that are building a solar-based energy grid in this northern state not known for its sunshine. Ali Hasanbeigi and Daniel Moran ponder an entirely new aspect in the climate change debate. While the Paris accord is based on measuring domestic emissions within a country’s borders, it does not count “emissions associated with the products countries import — which can often constitute significant shares of a nation’s economic activity.” As a result, “more than 25 percent of global greenhouse gas emissions are embodied in trade and flow through this glaring ‘carbon loophole,’ one of the most critical and under-discussed problems in international climate policy circles.” To close the carbon loophole, the authors call on nations and companies to “buy clean” by establishing “rules that favor the purchase of cleaner, low-carbon products and that drive clean innovation through the power of the purse.” One of the essential elements in fighting climate change is putting a worldwide price on carbon. To move toward this goal, I propose in my profile of Jerry Brown that he take on the role of a global elder statesman on the issue when he leaves office next year. He has not only made his state a leader in battling global warming; he has also strung together a global “network of the willing” to implement the Paris accord despite America’s official withdrawal. First and foremost among his tasks would be to integrate California’s sizable carbon trading market created by its “cap-and-trade” programs with similar markets in China and Europe. “The model for Brown’s elder statesman role,” I write, “is Jean Monnet, a former French official and diplomat who devised the idea of the European Coal and Steel Community implemented in the 1950s. The driving notion was that regional integration of heavy industry in the Ruhr Valley along the French-German border in the years following World War II would accelerate economic reconstruction and make war ‘not only unthinkable but materially impossible.’”Similarly, I argue, “the integration of cap-and-trade markets today would not only ultimately establish a global carbon price that would diminish reliance on fossil fuels; it would also create a bridge of common intent across boundaries to save the planet despite national conflicts arising today in trade and security matters. Tying our climate fates together would in effect serve as a kind of preemptive version of the Coal and Steel Community.”

#### Even if democratic institutions could generate pro-climate policy making – rampant corruption precludes compliance

Povitkina 18’(Marina Povitkina, Postdoctoral researcher at the Department of Political Science at the University of Oslo and Center for Collective Action Research at the University of Gothenburg, The Limits of Democracy in tackling climate change, March 2018, <https://www.researchgate.net/publication/323530041_The_limits_of_democracy_in_tackling_climate_change>, ME)

National-level carbon dioxide emissions depend on a multitude of factors, including countries’ economies, geography, demographics, and, not least, politics. The aim of this study has been to focus specifically on the political 424 M. POVITKINA determinants of CO2 emissions and revisit the findings reported in previous literature indicating that the amount of countries’ CO2 emissions is associated with their level of democracy. Here, I instead argue that while democratic institutions shape preference aggregation within a polity and favor environmental commitments, the benefits of democracy for climate change mitigation are limited in the presence of corrupt institutions, which obstruct coercive capacity, extractive capacity of the state, actors’ compliance, and pro-climate policy-making. To test this claim, I investigate whether the association between democracy and CO2 emissions is conditional on the levels of corruption. In pursuing this aim, I analyze the emitting behavior of countries across the globe over time and estimate a within-between regression, which takes into account the variation between countries and simultaneously accounts for the developments in countries over time. Such investigation brings a number of insights into the political factors behind the differences in CO2 emissions between countries and the political drivers of emission reduction within states. The results of this study show that after taking into account the common economic, geographical, and demographic explanations of CO2 emissions, political factors still make a difference. In accordance with most previous results, my findings show that more democratic countries do tend to emit less. However, this is only true for those democracies where corruption is low. When corruption is high, democracy does not seem to make a difference for the level of emissions**,** all else equal. It does not matter for the level of emissions whether a country has free elections, freedom of the press, and freedom of association if the executive, judicial and legislative branches of the state do not function well and are drenched in corruption and clientelism. In such a case, democracies do not seem to do any better than authoritarian regimes, where decision-making power is in the hands of a narrow elite. To exemplify, the results imply that it makes no difference for the national levels of CO2 emissions if a country is a democratic and corrupt Jamaica or an authoritarian and corrupt Azerbaijan. The results also show that a political system with a low level of corruption is not a universal cure. Lower corruption seems to matter only for the levels of CO2 emissions in democratic regimes and the level of corruption does not seem to play a role if a country is authoritarian. For example, being democratic and relatively non-corrupt Austria is more beneficial for lower CO2 emissions than being democratic but moderately corrupt Slovakia. However, at the same time, being an authoritarian regime with relatively low-corrupt institutions, such as Saudi Arabia, does not seem to be associated with lower emissions than being an authoritarian and corrupt regime, such as Yemen. While we can only gain insights about the associational relationship between democracy, corruption, and CO2 emissions from the between country estimates, the analysis of changes over time brings us closer to causal claims. The results from the within-part of the analysis show a similar picture to the between-part: positive changes in democracy are associated with the reduction in emission levels only when countries experience relatively low levels of corruption. When corruption levels in countries are low relative to what these countries experienced on average over the time period under investigation, steps toward democracy go together with steps toward climate change mitigation. When corruption is relatively high, more democracy does not seem to make a difference for emission control.

## DISEASE

### 1nc – Disease

#### Autocracies solve emerging pandemics – studies prove democratic failure

Kavanagh & Singh 20 – (Matthew M. Kavanagh, assistant professor of global health and visiting professor of law at Georgetown University, where he directs the Global Health Policy & Politics Initiative at the O'Neill Institute for National and Global Health Law, Renu Singh, fellow at the O’Neill Institute for National and Global Health Law at Georgetown University Law Center, “Democracy, Capacity, and Coercion in Pandemic Response—COVID 19 in Comparative Political Perspective,” 5-28-2020, Journal of Health Politics, Policy and Law, Duke University Press, <https://read.dukeupress.edu/jhppl/article/doi/10.1215/03616878-8641530/165294/Democracy-Capacity-and-Coercion-in-Pandemic>)

Is Democracy Good or Bad for Health in a Pandemic? In general, social scientists have tended to agree, albeit with caveats, that democracy is beneficial for public health. COVID-19 is raising important questions about this contention as high-profile cases show authoritarian countries winning praise for their response while leading democracies have struggled to respond. This complicates, perhaps in helpful ways, the exploration of health and of democracy. A wide literature has long debated the value of democracy for health. Electoral pressures and political freedoms of democratic regimes, it is argued, contribute to improved health and longer lives (Ruger 2005; Sen 1999). These claims have empirical support in political science (Gerring, Thacker, and Alfaro 2012; McGuire 2010; Przeworski et al. 2000; Wigley and Akkoyunlu-Wigley 2017), economics (Kudamatsu 2012), and public health (Bollyky et al. 2019)—though not without challenge, as some have shown weak or no connection (Ross 2006). A range of mechanisms have been proposed and tested for how democracy improves health including incentives—median voters desire redistribution, and a norm of equality increases support for accessible health services; information—open media and opposition ensure that information both flows to the public about health and from the public to government about how to calibrate policy; accountability—enabling voters can punish leaders who fail; and association—enabling knowledge networks and interest groups to drive good policy. The narrative of Chinese success and U.S. failure has led to concern that COVID-19 represents bad news about the value, and future, of democratic governance (Diamond 2020). Initial studies have already been conducted showing a correlation between democracy and worse outbreaks as well as less effective policy responses (Cepaluni, Dorsch, and Branyiczki 2020). Pandemic response is different from much of population health—with effective responses requiring the ability to act quickly, implement effectively, and gain public compliance. With the exception of HIV (e.g., Lieberman 2009), disease outbreaks and political institutions have been under-studied in comparative politics—with much of the literature focused on infant mortality or life expectancy, long-running trends that have far different mechanisms from a pandemic. Here, the accountability mechanisms that help democracies perform better may not be as beneficial. Political leaders with short time horizons may have relatively weak incentives to invest in pandemic preparedness and response (Dionne 2010; Healy and Malhotra 2009). And some of the benefits of associational networks and civil society can be shut down in the face of an emergency—facing, for example, stay-at-home orders. Democracies also have the added challenge of managing competing political factions and institutions, some of whom may have political incentives to undermine response. Once the outbreak broke into the public and Beijing was moved to act, China was able to quickly shut down the Wuhan market, shut down the movement of tens of millions of people, screen and isolate the sick, and even build two hospitals in a matter of days. Singapore is another autocracy that has gained praise for its quick response. The U.S., on the other hand, has struggled to respond. The Trump administration focused on travel bans to keep the “foreign” virus out rather than on mobilizing public health capacities to detect and respond—a message that aligns with the Trump administration’s election-year antiimmigrant and anti-China political frame. The President’s incentive structure has been clear, as his administration has tried to label COVID-19 the “Wuhan Virus,” continuing a trade war with China, the largest producer of medical goods needed by the U.S. Perhaps these incentives were clearest in early March when Trump resisted allowing a cruise ship with COVID-19 cases to dock because “I don’t need to have the numbers double because of one ship” (The White House 2020).

#### That causes extinction – a pandemic is imminent –newest data proves disruptions to the environmental mean it’s existential

Diamandis 2022

Eleftherios P., Professor @ University of Toronto Department of Laboratory Medicine and Pathobiology, “The mother of all battles: Viruses vs humans. Can humans avoid extinction in 50–100 years?” January 29, 2022, https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC8802343/dmr

The recent SARS-CoV-2 pandemic, which is causing COVID-19 disease, has taught us unexpected lessons about the dangers of human suffering through highly contagious and lethal diseases. As the COVID-19 pandemic is now being partially controlled by various isolation measures, therapeutics, and vaccines, it became clear that our current lifestyle and societal functions may not be sustainable in the long term. We now have to start thinking and planning on how to face the next dangerous pandemic, not just overcoming the one that is upon us now. Is there any evidence that even worse pandemics could strike us in the near future and threaten the existence of the human race? The answer is unequivocally yes. It is not necessary to get infected by viruses found in bats, pangolins, and other exotic animals that live in remote forests to be in danger. Creditable scientific evidence indicates that the human gut microbiota harbor billions of viruses that are capable of affecting the function of vital human organs such as the immune system, lung, brain, liver, kidney, or heart. It is remotely possible that the development of pathogenic variants in the gut can lead to contagious viruses, which can cause pandemics, leading to the destruction of vital organs, causing death or various debilitating diseases such as blindness, respiratory, liver, heart, and kidney failures. These diseases could result in the complete shutdown of our civilization and probably the gradual extinction of the human race. This essay will comment on a few independent pieces of scientific facts, and then combine this information to come up with some (but certainly not all) hypothetical scenarios that could cause human race misery, even extinction, in the hope that these hypothetical scenarios will trigger preventative measures that could reverse or delay the projected adverse outcomes. 1. Introduction Le Chatelier’s Principle: Named after the French chemist, Le Chatelier’s principle posits that “When an external stress (change in pressure, temperature or concentration) is applied to a system in chemical equilibrium, the equilibrium will change in such a way as to reduce the effect of the stress.” In other words, a change in a system will evoke a counter-change, which will bring the equilibrium to a new point. This principle operates with almost every human or other activity. For example, it is known that when fruit production in the Serengeti ecosystem is reduced, the number of elephants, which feed on these fruits, is reduced proportionally. In the context of this essay, I hypothesize that human-made changes in climate, the atmosphere, water, soil, and all other planet-living organisms, will likely evoke counter-changes that may be highly consequential to human life. Due to the complexity of our ecosystem, humans do not know exactly how these changes will affect them in the end. Consequently, they choose to disregard them because lifestyle adjustments may cost money and convenience or loss of well-established pleasures. 1.1. The earth is changing rapidly What is changing on the earth that could induce a potentially catastrophic counter-change? The answer is everything is changing , from the living inhabitants (humans, other species, and plants) to the atmosphere, water, soil, climate, among else. The changes caused by human activity are sometimes dramatic. For example, it has been estimated that about 1 million out of 8.5 million species of plants, animals, and other organisms are in imminent danger of extinction [1]. Other estimates show that 50% of the organisms that existed 50 years ago have already gone extinct, not to consider additional species that are gone before we even identify them. Soon, we will likely be losing more than 80% of the world’s species due to human overdevelopment and its associated consequences. The major reasons for species extinction are habitat destruction, pesticide poisoning, and illegal hunting [1]. 2. Global warming Some may choose to believe what the politicians are debating about: that climate change is a fact or fiction, but the data say that the last 6 years were the warmest on record [2]. Overall, the planet was 1.25°C warmer than in preindustrial times (in the 1950s). Warmer oceans are melting ice sheets and rising sea levels by almost 5 mm per year. In Australia, record-setting heat and drought were responsible for the bushfires that destroyed almost 25% of southeastern Australia’s forests and their living inhabitants, such as koalas. If we cannot slow down earth’s heating by reducing emissions, the current increase of about 0.2°C per decade will likely be rapidly surpassed. How will the planet react? Likely with more catastrophic fires, tsunamis, earthquakes, and floods. The human homeostatic changes to increased temperatures are very complex and include many vital organs [3]. Global warming may also cause changes in the biology of our candidate foes, the viruses, bacteria, and parasites that live in our gut and skin (see Section 2.2). 2.1. How much human-made environmental damage has been done already? Humans are now the undisputed masters of the planet and cannot be easily stopped from actively destroying it, consciously or unconsciously. An interesting question is how much damage has been claimed to be done already, and do we have the data to support these claims? Elhacham et al. have recently compared the natural biomass that exists on the earth with the human-made (anthropogenic) mass [4]. They found that each person on the globe produces a mass that is about equal to their body weight every week! Is that too little or too much? Let us first define biomass and anthropogenic mass. The majority of the earth’s biomass is represented by trees and bushes. The majority of the man-made mass is represented by buildings and infrastructure such as roads and consists of concrete, bricks, asphalt, metals, and plastic. Just consider that the total global mass of produced plastic so far is greater than the overall mass of all terrestrial and marine animals combined! So, how do we fare when comparing biomass to anthropogenic mass production? In the 1900s, the latter represented only 3% of global biomass; but now, in the 2020s, the two masses are about equal. The projection is that if we go on with more deforestation, buildings, streets, plastics, cars, and so on, by 2040, it is likely that anthropogenic mass will almost triple the earth’s biomass. Will there be enough resources and clean air and water to sustain the life of the projected 9 billion inhabitants? Anthropogenic mass production is difficult to slow down since this activity is considered part of our evolving civilization and way of living. 2.2. Human microbiome The human body consists of approximately 30 trillion cells, but the microbiota population in the human gut is estimated to be 300 trillion [5]! In addition, there is another microbiota in the skin and other organs. It was initially thought that these microbiota act locally (e.g., only in the gut or skin), but new evidence suggest that the effects of microbiota may be global, reaching every cell in the body. This can be achieved with various mechanisms, one being the transmission of signals mediated by proteins that can travel through anatomically distinct structures such as the vagus nerve. For example, a protein called curli can travel through the vagus nerve and reach the brain, where it can promote abnormal aggregation of proteins such as a-synuclein, one major pathogenetic player in Parkinson’s disease [5,6]. Another and even more likely mechanism includes the diffusion of bacterial or viral proteins (some could be toxins to various organs) or pathogenic viruses into the bloodstream. From there, they can travel around the body. This is reminiscent of cancer cell metastasis by the hematogenous route. One piece of evidence for that happening is that about half of the human metabolome (the collection of all metabolites in the blood) is derived by host bacteria [5]. Bacteria or virus-derived metabolites could also pass through the placenta and reach the fetus, including the fetal brain, possibly causing diseases such as autism. Despite skin not being as hospitable to microorganisms as the gut, a typical person may have about 1,000 species of bacteria on their skin [7]. These microbial communities continue to grow and diversify until puberty when hormonal and developmental changes reach a plateau. The balance between host and bacteria in the skin is determined by the production of skin-derived microbial nutrients, microbiome-derived skin nutrients, skin, and microbiome-derived antimicrobial peptides, and by the interaction of the microbiome with the host’s immune system. Similar as in the gut, there is a delicate balance between beneficial and potentially harmful bacteria and the host immune system. It is remotely possible that our future enemies may derive from the gut, skin, or other organs harboring microorganisms. In addition, the skin is more sensitive to environmental changes such as climate change as it is directly exposed to the environment. In conclusion, bacterial, viral, and parasite-derived proteins or pathogenic viruses thrive locally (e.g., in the gut or skin) but are capable of acting globally. 2.3. Human viruses and how they could cause disease Many strains of gut bacteria are harmless, but they can become dangerous pathogens under certain conditions, such as antibiotic use [8]. It is well known that gut bacteria can harbor many viruses (bacterial phages) [9]. If they do not immediately kill the infected bacteria, these viruses incorporate into the bacterial genome and stay latent for extended periods (they are known “prophages”). These prophages can be reactivated under certain environmental or other factors and act like pathogenic viruses. It is rather surprising that, in general, viruses are so many that they qualify as the most abundant biological entities on the planet. Sometimes, gut bacteria use their activated prophages as weapons to gain an advantage and kill other competing bacteria. Phages could also assist in bacterial evolution as the latter become more virulent [10]. The gut bacteria also seem to interact with the host immune system and can influence the efficacy of cancer immunotherapy [11,12,13]. The microbiome has been blamed for playing direct or indirect roles in many human diseases, including cancer, metabolic syndrome, diabetes, dementia, and others [14]. The outcomes regarding health and disease depend on the balance of powers among the gut/skin/other organ viruses, the gut/skin/other organ microbiomes, and the host immune system. If this balance is disturbed, a biological war between these players will be initiated, and the outcome will be unpredictable. In conclusion, scientific evidence supports the idea that phages in the mammalian intestine, skin, or elsewhere, not only can be engulfed by certain eukaryotic cells but also might escape from the gut or skin, enter the bloodstream, and make their way into other parts of the body, with as yet undiscovered consequences. 2.4. Viral variants Viruses evolve continuously, eventually leading to more transmissible variants, which sometimes can be more lethal than the original strains. The SARS-CoV-2 is an excellent contemporary example. Multiple variants of SARS-CoV-2 are rapidly spreading and are becoming dominant in certain geographic areas [15,16]. For example, the B.1.1.7 variant (United Kingdom) has 23 mutations and 17 amino acid changes; variant 501Y.V2 (South Africa) has 23 mutations and 17 amino acid changes; and P.1 variant (Brazil) has approximately 35 mutations with 17 amino acid changes. In April 2021, when this document was first written, I speculated verbatim that “new variants with additional mutations could become able to evade our currently available vaccines by weakening the ability of vaccine-induced antibodies to neutralize/block viral entry, and by strengthening the ability of the virus to enter the cells via surface receptors.” The so-called “omicron variant,” isolated in November 2021, already fulfilled this prediction. 2.5. How COVID-19 and possibly other viruses affect the brain In general, viral invasion of the central nervous system may be achieved by several routes, including transsynaptic transfer across infected neurons, entry via the olfactory nerve, infection of vascular endothelium, or leukocyte migration across the blood–brain barrier. SARS-CoV-2 invades endothelial cells via transmembrane angiotensin-converting enzyme 2 (ACE2) receptor binding and a subsequent proteolytic event, facilitated by transmembrane protease serine 2 [17]. Is there evidence that SARS-CoV-2 can enter the brain? The answer is yes [18]. As already mentioned, one route is by migrating from the cribriform plate along the olfactory tract [19] or through vagal pathways. Another route may include viral entry into brain capillary endothelial cells via the ACE2 pathway. Viral RNA was detected in the medulla and cerebellum by reverse transcription-polymerase chain reaction. However, viral proteins seem to be absent from neurons and glial cells. Consequently, the adverse events of the virus on the brain, including altered neurotransmission and neuronal damage, are likely mediated by neuroinflammation and hypoxic injury through cytokines and other proinflammatory mediators. 2.6. SARS-CoV-2 and possibly other viruses can affect the senses Viruses can affect our senses. For example, SARS-CoV-2 causes anosmia (loss of smell) and ageusia (loss of taste) in 40–70% of COVID-19 patients [20]. These effects persist, but it is unknown for how long. Other neurological symptoms include headache, stroke, impairment of consciousness, seizure, anxiety, and encephalopathy. Current evidence suggests that SARS-CoV-2-related anosmia may be a new viral syndrome specific to COVID-19. This syndrome is likely mediated by intranasal inoculation of SARS-CoV-2 into the olfactory neural circuitry. Since the olfactory sensory neurons do not express ACE2 receptor, the likely explanation for the loss of smell is the damage of accessory cells supporting these neurons. Although anosmia is not a lethal or severe disease, other neurological damage such as blindness could be devastating [21,22]. 3. Adverse scenarios Fifty years ago, one adverse scenario regarding a pandemic was presented in the film “The Andromeda strain,” which describes a pandemic caused by a pathogen of extraterrestrial origin [23]. Here, I present an alternative hypothetical scenario that involves an endogenous virus. Obviously, there is a myriad of similar scenarios, and the one given below can be currently classified as fictional but not impossible. A prophage, which was residing dormant for years in the genome of the commensal gut bacterium Bifidobacterium infantis suddenly, and without an apparent reason, has undergone induction and started to produce viral proteins, which were subsequently assembled into whole phages. After cell lysis, these phages infected other neighboring cells. This cycle was repeated many times, and millions of free virions were released, some entering the systemic circulation (viremia). Some virions reached the lung endothelium and entered the endothelial cells through an, as yet, unknown receptor and started replicating and lysing these cells. The resulting mucous caused the host to cough, thus facilitating the transfer of the virus to other humans through aerosol droplets. Soon, the virus was able to infect, first a few hundred, then thousands, then millions of other unsuspected people through coughing and sneezing. The virus was able to travel all over the world as the pulmonary manifestations were mild, and most infected individuals thought it was a common flu or a similar ailment. Scientists isolated the virus that caused this flu-like disease and determined from its genomic sequence that it was a novel member of influenza virus B, which usually causes seasonal flu. Despite the pandemic nature of the infection, nobody died, and governmental bodies were not highly concerned. Six months later, one individual reported a weakening of his vision, which, within 3 months, progressed to total blindness. This unusual form of blindness quickly spread to other people until scientists performed epidemiological studies, which linked the blindness to the previously mentioned mild flu. Soon afterward, scientists isolated and identified the virus from the brains of blind and subsequently succumbed individuals and confirmed that the sequence matched the virus that caused the unusual flu. More elaborate studies had shown that there was unusual and very severe neuroinflammation around the occipital lobe of the brain (Brodmann area 17), an area responsible for the interpretation of visual signals arriving from the optic nerve. Several therapeutics were tried, but none was proven to be effective. Twelve months into the pandemic, 10 million people lost their vision, and within 18 months, without any success in developing therapies or a vaccine, the blindness had spread to whole nations. 3.1. Blindness The selection of blindness as a chronic consequence of an acute pandemic was deliberate. In 1995, Portuguese author Jose Saramago published a fictional novel entitled “Blindness” (ISBN: 9780151002511), which contributed to him winning the Nobel Prize in literature in 1998. Blindness, as portrayed in the book, is a highly detailed story of a mysterious mass epidemic that caused blindness of a whole nation and the social breakdown that followed. The blindness pandemic, in many respects, is reminiscent of the current COVID-19 pandemic. Blindness caused widespread panic, anarchy, and government lockdowns. The life of the blind people was characterized by filthiness, aggressive manners, disrespect of others, and a struggle to survive by any possible means. The breakdown of society was near total. Law and order, social services, government, schools could no longer function. Families have been separated and could not find one another. People squat in abandoned buildings and scrounge for food. Violence, disease, and despair threaten to overwhelm human coping. One of Saramago’s quotes, describing life after blindness, is reproduced here “Perhaps humanity will manage to live without eyes, but then it will cease to be humanity, the result is obvious…” 3.2. Other ailments Acute pandemics could cause many other chronic diseases that can threaten the sustainability of our present society. Although COVID-19 causes loss of smell and taste, these are considered nonlife-threatening ailments. However, in the long run, the permanent absence of smell and taste will mean the loss of innumerable current pleasures associated with the consumption of food and drinks. Clearly, loss of hearing will not be compatible with current societal functions or human achievements. Acute viral diseases are also associated with innumerable organ-specific diseases such as heart, kidney, and reproductive failures and disturbance of other vital functions that can paralyze our current society, economy, and culture. Even a minor weakening of our memory (mild cognitive impairment) could result in chaotic situations that authors of fiction, such as Saramago, attempt to describe in detail in future books. 3.3. Epilog Humans have learned to take for granted what they currently have and enjoy. Perhaps, we did not realize that the human race’s spectacular advances are dependent on several potentially volatile abilities (senses, brain function) and that even one loss, or diminution of such abilities, could be detrimental, causing a collapse of our civilization. The COVID-19 pandemic helped us realize that we may be sitting on a time bomb, which might explode if we continue disturbing the current equilibrium between humans and other planetary partners. In addition to viruses of a rather exotic origin, such as SARS-CoV-2, billions of other viruses and other infectious agents in our gut, skin, and elsewhere are waiting for the right time to attack us. The lessons learned from COVID-19 should be a wake-up call for humans to stop disturbing the equilibrium with actions that favor the well-being of humans but put in danger the existence of other inhabitants of planet earth. Human migration, also known as “travel,” has facilitated the travel of our foes, along with us, in every conceivable corner of the world.

### I/L Disease

#### Autocracies are necessary to combat pandemics – decisions are made faster and more effectively

Cepaluni et. al. 20 – (Gabriel Cepaluni, assistant professor at São Paulo State University (UNESP), PhD from the Department of Political Science at the University of São Paulo and was a visiting researcher in the Department of Government at Georgetown University (2008-2009), Michael Dorsch, applied economist whose research and teaching interests are mainly in political economics and public economics, Ph.D., Economics, University of Illinois, Urbana-Champaign, M.A., Economics, Miami University, B.A., Economics, International Studies, French, Miami University, Réka Branyiczki, BA in International Business, Corvinus University of Budapest, BA in Psychology, Eotvos Lorand University, MA in Economic Policy in Global Markets, CEU, “Political Regimes and Deaths in the Early Stages of the COVID-19 Pandemic,” Comparative Politics, 4-27-2020, https://preprints.apsanet.org/engage/apsa/article-details/5ea7229e5d762d001217da9a)

6 Discussion and conclusions Our analysis demonstrates that in the early stages of the COVID-19 pandemic, more democratic countries experienced deaths sooner and on a larger scale. For advocates of democratic governance, these results are unsettling. We have several lines of rationalizing the findings, which we believe open up some crucial debates in political science. There may be systematic under-reporting of COVID-19 deaths in less democratic countries. In some cases, under-reporting could be a political decision. In other cases, it may reflect a lack of state capacity to perform the testing necessary to determine the real cause of death (Economist, 2020).24 We have tried to deal with this through our instrumental variable strategy and by including controls for governmental transparency, testing rates and sub-sample analyses, but it remains a concern. Centralized decision-making may be advantageous when it comes to responding to pandemics (Schwartz, 2012). Table 5 shows that more democratic countries had imposed less stringent restrictions during the first 100 days of the crisis. With fewer checks built into the policy-making process, public health policy responses can be made more quickly and perhaps more incisively in autocratic governments. Especially for policies that impinge on civil liberties and privacy, autocratic governments have a far freer hand in imposing restrictions on their citizens. The trade-off between the capacity to protect the public health and personal liberties is a central debate during, and probably well after, the COVID-19 crisis (Harari, 2020). Autocratic governments may have had an extra advantage to the extent that their citizens are more obedient to governmental decrees, especially those that may disrupt the social and business lives of citizens. Figure 3 demonstrates that more stringent policies decreased deaths in less democratic countries, but not necessarily in fully democratic ones. Whether it comes from higher public support for government initiatives (possibly, through the threat of force) or from the government’s ability to stifle debate around their decrees in the media, the greater obedience of citizens in autocracies may have had a role in the lower scale of deaths. Protests against social distancing restrictions in democracies with different institutional performances, such as Brazil and the United States, seem to reinforce this point. Finally, this paper contributes to a substantive topic that will have broad and lasting implications. It may well be many years until we have a clear understanding how the COVID-19 crisis will impact our societies. As the pandemic started in East Asia, the location of some of the best-managed autocracies, it may be that our sample disproportionately includes the autocratic governments with high state capacity. Therefore, it is an area for future research to see if our results hold when autocracies with lower state capacity are eventually included in the sample.

#### Authoritarian measures are essential to combat the spread of disease

Trofimov 20 – (Yaroslav Trofimov, Chief Foreign-Affairs Consultant at the Wall Street Journal, “Democracy, Dictatorship, Disease: The West Takes Its Turn With Coronavirus,” 3-8-2020, Wall Street Journal, https://www.wsj.com/articles/democracy-dictatorship-disease-the-west-takes-its-turn-with-coronavirus-11583701472)

Western democracies confronting the spread of the novel coronavirus are facing a test with profound implications for their future: Will they fail where authoritarian China, which is touting itself as an alternative model for the world, is succeeding? Covid-19, the respiratory illness caused by the virus, has already become the most consequential public-health crisis in generations, forcing lockdowns of entire regions, disrupting international travel and damaging the global economy —all of this just weeks since the disease has begun to spread outside China. In December and early January, when the epidemic first erupted in China's metropolis of Wuhan and the surrounding Hubei province, official secrecy and the punishment of whistleblowers contributed to the virus's proliferation. Since then, however, China has adopted draconian measures to control social interactions—a lockdown that seems to have halted the epidemic there, at least for now. China's National Health Commission Sunday reported only 44 new Covid-19 cases, far fewer than the daily toll in the new hot spots of Italy, South Korea, France —and now the United States. The Communist Party of China, or CPC, is already advertising this achievement as proof of the superiority of its model that prioritizes government control over individual freedoms. "The advantages of the Chinese system have once again been demonstrated," went one of many such commentaries in recent days, by academic Dong Yuzhen in People's Daily, the CPC's official mouthpiece. "China's battle against the epidemic showed that the CPC, as China's ruling party, is by far the political party with the strongest governance capability in human history." Europe's experience in tackling Covid-19 offers little encouragement so far, with politicians acting too little and too late, and largely failing to stem the tide. In the U.S., too, nearly 500 cases have already been diagnosed, according to data compiled by Johns Hopkins University as of Sunday afternoon, even as testing capacity lags far behind Europe or South Korea. Many epidemiologists and experts warn that drastic measures of the kind deployed by China and imposed in large parts of northern Italy on Sunday morning—measures that are so far opposed by President Trump—are now overdue. "There is a large perception gap between confirmed cases and unknown infections of Covid-19. This requires school closures, large event cancellations, and other aggressive steps," Mr. Trump's former homeland-security adviser Tom Bossert tweeted Saturday, pointing to Italy's crisis as an example of how hesitation caused by fears of hurting the economy ends up exacting an even higher economic loss, without preventing the disease spread. Back when the epidemic was mostly limited to China, many Western politicians focused on the initial failings in Wuhan, asserting that the free flow of information in democracies would give them a natural advantage during a massive public-health crisis. What is becoming evident now, however, is that such knowledge doesn't necessarily translate into meaningful action. "For a month, we thought that Chinese political values were the cause of the problem, and that our values would protect us from the virus," said Bruno Maçães, Portugal's former minister of European affairs and a scholar of China's global rise. "It was an ideological approach. You need to use technology and political power, not just trust that things will be all right because we have the right values." Italy, the first European nation where the coronavirus spread rapidly, reaching 7,375 cases and 366 deaths by Sunday, acted faster than others, barring direct flights from China in early February and rolling out tens of thousands of tests. On Feb. 21, it was the first to quarantine several towns where the virus had taken root. Yet, Italy's leaders, too, have exhibited a spectacular failure to grasp the scope of the crisis. On Feb. 27, Nicola Zingaretti, leader of one of the two main parties in Italy's government coalition and head of the Lazio region, which includes Rome, posted on Instagram a photo of himself clinking glasses with other people in a Milan pub. "Let's not lose our habits, we can't shut down Milan and Italy. Our economy is stronger than fear: Let's go out for an aperitif, a coffee or a pizza," he urged. On Saturday, Mr. Zingaretti said he had become infected with Covid-19. The next day, Prime Minister Giuseppe Conte signed an unprecedented decree that placed Milan, Venice, Parma and several other northern Italian provinces on lockdown, and banned public gatherings, concerts, sports matches and nightclubs in the entire country. Though the new rules are strict, it isn't clear to what extent Italians will comply given lax enforcement: The penalty for disobeying Mr. Conte's decree is a fine of 206 euros ($234) or imprisonment of up to three months, a trifle compared with the punishment exacted by China for breaking the quarantine. The Latest on the Coronavirus \* Deaths have been reported in Florida and Washington state, bringing the number of U.S. fatalities to 19; the total number of infections is now 376 \* Japan, Singapore and Malaysia all reported their highest single-day increases in cases \* South Korea added 483 cases for a total of 6,797 and Italy added 620 new cases and 49 fatalities in the 24 hours preceding its report Friday evening "We have a very strong sense of individual freedom, but all European citizens—and not just Italians—should understand that we are facing a great danger, and that it can be overcome only with responsible behavior by every single citizen," said Roberto Burioni, professor of microbiology and virology at the San Raffaele hospital in Milan. "I have found an extremely grave undervaluation of the risk. Until yesterday, people continued to crowd the ski resorts, the sports events. The individual citizens unfortunately have not realized how important their personal behavior is in order to stop the virus." As Italy shut down, in nearby France—which has reached 1,126 diagnosed Covid-19 cases, the same level as Italy just nine days earlier—several tens of thousands flocked to the streets on Sunday to celebrate the International Women's Day. In Germany, where cases have topped 1,000, authorities Saturday allowed a major soccer match to take place near the center of the country's main outbreak in the state of North Rhine-Westphalia. And in the U.S., public life goes on almost as normal, with few restrictions on schools, sports events, concerts or other public gatherings. Mr. Trump and his two main Democratic challengers—all men over 70, the demographic with the highest mortality from Covid-19—continue to hold mass campaign rallies across the country. "China's top-down approach seems to have done a pretty good job in terms of mobilizing the resources and capabilities needed to reign in the virus. You see the contrast with how Western countries, including the U.S., have failed to take decisive action," said Yanzhong Huang, senior fellow for global health at the Council on Foreign Relations in New York. "Many of the Chinese experience measures probably won't be replicable in this country, or actually any democracy. But our policy makers will face some tough decisions."

#### China’s A.I and technology advances aid in fight against COVID

Hessey 2020, (Hessey Elliot, “China and AI: what the world can learn and what it should be wary of”, July 1, 2020, <https://theconversation.com/china-and-ai-what-the-world-can-learn-and-what-it-should-be-wary-of-140995>)

China announced in 2017 its ambition to become the world leader in artificial intelligence (AI) by 2030. While the US still leads in absolute terms, China appears to be making more rapid progress than either the US or the EU, and central and local government spending on AI in China is estimated to be in the tens of billions of dollars. The move has led – at least in the West – to warnings of a global AI arms race and concerns about the growing reach of China’s authoritarian surveillance state. But treating China as a “villain” in this way is both overly simplistic and potentially costly. While there are undoubtedly aspects of the Chinese government’s approach to AI that are highly concerning and rightly should be condemned, it’s important that this does not cloud all analysis of China’s AI innovation. The world needs to engage seriously with China’s AI development and take a closer look at what’s really going on. The story is complex and it’s important to highlight where China is making promising advances in useful AI applications and to challenge common misconceptions, as well as to caution against problematic uses. Nesta has explored the broad spectrum of AI activity in China – the good, the bad and the unexpected. China’s approach to AI development and implementation is fast-paced and pragmatic, oriented towards finding applications which can help solve real-world problems. Rapid progress is being made in the field of healthcare, for example, as China grapples with providing easy access to affordable and high-quality services for its ageing population. Applications include “AI doctor” chatbots, which help to connect communities in remote areas with experienced consultants via telemedicine; machine learning to speed up pharmaceutical research; and the use of deep learning for medical image processing, which can help with the early detection of cancer and other diseases. Chinese AI tools are being used in the fight against COVID-19. Since the outbreak of COVID-19, medical AI applications have surged as Chinese researchers and tech companies have rushed to try and combat the virus by speeding up screening, diagnosis and new drug development. AI tools used in Wuhan, China, to tackle COVID-19 – by helping accelerate CT scan diagnosis – are now being used in Italy and have been also offered to the NHS in the UK.

#### Authoritarian Regimes lead the world in tech development

Chandran and Nicolaci da Costa 19’, (Kavita Chandran and Ana Nicolaci da Costa, “China’s drive to be a world leader in technology could accelerate as its economy slows”, CNBC, NOV 22 2019, <https://www.cnbc.com/2019/11/22/china-drive-to-be-world-tech-leader-could-accelerate-as-its-economy-slows.html>, ME)

China is on track to becoming the biggest 5G market in the world. Earlier this month, China turned on its 5G mobile networks ahead of schedule. It announced days later that it was rolling out research and development for 6G networks — even though 5G is still at its infancy. China’s 5G commercial services are available in 50 Chinese cities including Beijing, Shanghai, Guangzhou and Shenzhen, according to state-backed media Xinhua. In comparison, 5G services in the U.S. are offered only in certain cities. Wendy Liu, head of China strategy for UBS told CNBC there was greater willingness in China than elsewhere to back 5G and blockchain technologies. That’s because they are key to facilitating and managing commerce in the world’s most populous country, she said. “Due to its own needs, (China) is going to push in that direction and you see this willingness to back these technologies more so than anywhere else,” said Liu. Blockchain, a technology that underpins cryptocurrency Bitcoin, is now being used by various industries from finance to food. “Blockchain has the potential to fundamentally change the way businesses conduct business,” said Lucy Gazmararian, senior manager at PwC Hong Kong. “So, a number of areas of financial services are really able to improve significantly because of blockchain infrastructure.” China recently threw its weight behind blockchain. President Xi Jinping reportedly urged China to “seize the opportunity” offered by blockchain, and called on the country to advance development in the field. Edith Yeung, a partner at blockchain-focused venture capital fund Proof of Capital, said the Chinese government has been researching and studying the possibility of launching its own digital currency in recent years. China’s virtual currency may be rolled out within a year: Proof of Capital. She said Beijing has also identified entities for a potential rollout. A virtual yuan could become a reality “quite soon,” Yeung said, adding that it could even challenge the U.S. dollar’s global dominance. From self-driving cars to cancer detection, artificial intelligence (AI) promises to improve and speed up every business in the world. AI can be broadly defined as technology that replicates human intelligence and behavior, in areas such as problem-solving, learning and reasoning. The leadership in Beijing announced in 2017 that it wants to become the world leader in artificial intelligence by 2030. “China is absolutely leading the world in AI,” according to Frank Hester, founder of TPP, a UK-based healthtech company that has been doing business in China since 2013. “I’ve seen a change over the past 5 years (in China) … it’s almost the policy now to do business with foreigners, which is great.” According to Alain Bénichou, CEO of IBM’s Greater China business, 14% of firms in China have embraced AI technology. He said the rate of adoption in China is higher than the global average, but there is room to grow.

### ! Disease

#### Pandemics risk extinction

Yaneer Bar-Yam 16, Founding President of the New England Complex Systems Institute, “Transition to extinction: Pandemics in a connected world,” NECSI (July 3, 2016), http://necsi.edu/research/social/pandemics/transition

Watch as one of the more aggressive—brighter red — strains rapidly expands. After a time it goes extinct leaving a black region. Why does it go extinct? The answer is that it spreads so rapidly that it kills the hosts around it. Without new hosts to infect it then dies out itself. That the rapidly spreading pathogens die out has important implications for evolutionary research which we have talked about elsewhere [1–7]. In the research I want to discuss here, what we were interested in is the effect of adding long range transportation [8]. This includes natural means of dispersal as well as unintentional dispersal by humans, like adding airplane routes, which is being done by real world airlines (Figure 2). When we introduce long range transportation into the model, the success of more aggressive strains changes. They can use the long range transportation to find new hosts and escape local extinction. Figure 3 shows that the more transportation routes introduced into the model, the more higher aggressive pathogens are able to survive and spread. As we add more long range transportation, there is a critical point at which pathogens become so aggressive that the entire host population dies. The pathogens die at the same time, but that is not exactly a consolation to the hosts. We call this the phase transition to extinction (Figure 4). With increasing levels of global transportation, human civilization may be approaching such a critical threshold. In the paper we wrote in 2006 about the dangers of global transportation for pathogen evolution and pandemics [8], we mentioned the risk from Ebola. Ebola is a horrendous disease that was present only in isolated villages in Africa. It was far away from the rest of the world only because of that isolation. Since Africa was developing, it was only a matter of time before it reached population centers and airports. While the model is about evolution, it is really about which pathogens will be found in a system that is highly connected, and Ebola can spread in a highly connected world. The traditional approach to public health uses historical evidence analyzed statistically to assess the potential impacts of a disease. As a result, many were surprised by the spread of Ebola through West Africa in 2014. As the connectivity of the world increases, past experience is not a good guide to future events. A key point about the phase transition to extinction is its suddenness. Even a system that seems stable, can be destabilized by a few more long-range connections, and connectivity is continuing to increase. So how close are we to the tipping point? We don’t know but it would be good to find out before it happens. While Ebola ravaged three countries in West Africa, it only resulted in a handful of cases outside that region. One possible reason is that many of the airlines that fly to west Africa stopped or reduced flights during the epidemic [9]. In the absence of a clear connection, public health authorities who downplayed the dangers of the epidemic spreading to the West might seem to be vindicated. As with the choice of airlines to stop flying to west Africa, our analysis didn’t take into consideration how people respond to epidemics. It does tell us what the outcome will be unless we respond fast enough and well enough to stop the spread of future diseases, which may not be the same as the ones we saw in the past. As the world becomes more connected, the dangers increase. Are people in western countries safe because of higher quality health systems? Countries like the U.S. have highly skewed networks of social interactions with some very highly connected individuals that can be “superspreaders.” The chances of such an individual becoming infected may be low but events like a mass outbreak pose a much greater risk if they do happen. If a sick food service worker in an airport infects 100 passengers, or a contagion event happens in mass transportation, an outbreak could very well prove unstoppable.

## DRONES

### 1nc – Drones

#### Democracy causes drone warfare.

Kaag et al, 14 - \*John Kaag, Ph.D. Chair of Philosophy, Professor @ Umass \*\*Scott Pratt, Executive Vice Provost for Academic Affairs, Professor of Philosophy @ U of Oregon \*\*\*Sujata K. Bhatia, Former Associate, Science, Technology, and Globalization; “Democracy and the Necessity of Drones,” Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, https://www.belfercenter.org/publication/democracy-and-necessity-drones-0

But a worry lingers in the back of our minds: perhaps, far from causing a disconnect, instead there might be a necessary connection between modern democracies and drone warfare.

Most Americans hold that modern liberal democracies are worth defending. They are worth defending because these democracies, more than any other form of government, provide space for their individual citizens to pursue their own interests. Every citizen has the right to his or her own property, own form of worship, and own freedom of speech. And we recognize the intrinsic value of every individual in our democratic community. Such is the perk of being an American citizen—liberty and justice for all, each in our own particular way.

In this ideal democracy, the interests of the individual are continuous with the interests of the nation as a whole. Every citizen also has the right to vote for leaders who are elected to protect the liberal democratic institutions that Americans, for good reason, hold so dear. And protection is, unfortunately, often required. There are, after all, countries and nonstate actors who have little respect for the joys of Western liberalism and who aim to undermine it at every turn.

Protecting democracy has always been a tricky proposition. Leaders such as President Obama find themselves in a double bind. On the one hand, they must take defensive measures to guard the nation and its citizens' rights and interests from external threats. But on the other hand, leaders must develop and then adopt defensive military strategies that minimize, hopefully even eliminate, the costs that their citizens must face; it is impermissible to send [people] men and women off to die in wars that could be won without these citizens' direct and dangerous involvement. Every citizen, even soldiers, has intrinsic value.

And so Obama and his predecessors ushered in the era drone warfare and a slew of other automated technologies that would both protect citizens and shield citizen-soldiers. Drone warfare—and its collateral damage—is a necessary consequent of a certain type of modern liberal democracy. If we are good liberal democrats, the development of drone warfare should neither surprise nor disturb us. Drones are democratic weapons. There are no other options.

But drones do disturb us. The gruesome scenes of drone strikes—at funerals and birthdays and reunions half a world away—disturb us. When we have the rare misfortune of seeing these scenes, they keep us up at night.

So why?

Our intuition about the shortcomings and moral failings of drone strikes is not just a discomfort with robot warfare or carnage, but ought to be a sign that we are uncomfortable with a particular form of liberal democracy that necessitates drone warfare.

#### Drone prolif means every hotspot goes nuclear AND states will use bioweapons!

Zenko and Kreps, 14 -- \*Micah - Douglas Dillon fellow in the Center for Preventive Action at the Council on Foreign Relations, PhD in political science from Brandeis University; \*Sarah - Stanton nuclear security fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations, assistant professor in the department of government and an adjunct professor at Cornell Law School, BA from Harvard University, MSc from Oxford University, and PhD from Georgetown University; “Limiting Armed Drone Proliferation," Council on Foreign Relations, June 2014, http://aspheramedia.com/wp-content/uploads/2014/12/Limiting\_Armed\_Drone\_Proliferation\_CSR69.pdf

The inherent advantages of drones will not alone make traditional interstate warfare more likely—such conflicts are relatively rare anyway, with only one active interstate conflict in both 2012 and 2013.20 Nor will the probable type, quantity, range, and lethality of armed drones that states possess in coming decades make a government more likely to attempt to defeat an opposing army, capture or control foreign territory, or remove a foreign leader from power. However, misperceptions over the use of armed drones increase the likelihood of militarized disputes with U.S. allies, as well as U.S. military forces, which could lead to an escalating crisis and deeper U.S. involvement. Though surveillance drones can be used to provide greater stability between countries by monitoring ceasefires or disputed borders, armed drones will have destabilizing consequences. Arming a drone, whether by design or by simply putting a crude payload on an unarmed drone, makes it a weapon, and thereby a direct national security threat for any state whose border it breaches. Increased Frequency of Interstate and Intrastate Force For the United States, drones have significantly reduced the political, diplomatic, and military risks and costs associated with the use of military force, which has led to a vast expansion of lethal operations that would not have been attempted with other weapons platforms. Aside from airstrikes in traditional conflicts such as Libya, Iraq, and Afghanistan—where one-quarter of all International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) airstrikes in 2012 were conducted by drones—the United States has conducted hundreds in non-battlefield settings: Pakistan (approximately 369), Yemen (approximately 87), Somalia (an estimated 16), and the Philippines (at least 1, in 2006).21 Of the estimated 473 non-battlefield targeted killings undertaken by the United States since November 2002, approximately 98 percent were carried out by drones. Moreover, despite maintaining a “strong preference” for capturing over killing suspected terrorists since September 2011, there have been only 3 known capture attempts, compared with 194 drone strikes that have killed an estimated 1,014 people, 86 of whom were civilians.22 Senior U.S. civilian and military officials, whose careers span the pre– and post–armed drone era, overwhelmingly agree that the threshold for the authorization of force by civilian officials has been significantly reduced. Former secretary of defense Robert Gates asserted in October 2013, for example, that armed drones allow decision-makers to see war as a “bloodless, painless, and odorless” affair, with technology detaching leaders from the “inevitably tragic, inefficient, and uncertain” consequences of war.23 President Barack Obama admitted in May 2013 that the United States has come to see armed drones “as a cure-all for terrorism,” because they are low risk and instrumental in “shielding the government” from criticisms “that a troop deployment invites.”24 Such admissions from leaders of a democratic country with a system of checks and balances point to the temptations that leaders with fewer institutional checks will face. President Obama and his senior aides have stated that the United States is setting precedents with drones that other states may emulate.25 If U.S. experience and Obama’s cautionary words are any guide, states that acquire armed drones will be more willing to threaten or use force in ways they might not otherwise, within both interstate and intrastate contexts. States might undertake cross-border, interstate actions less discriminately, especially in areas prone to tension. As is apparent in the East and South China Seas, nationalist sentiments and the discovery of untapped, valuable national resources can make disputes between countries more likely. In such contested areas, drones will enable governments to undertake strike missions or probe the responses of an adversary—actions they would be less inclined to take with manned platforms. According to the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), there are approximately 430 bilateral maritime boundaries, most of which are not defined by formal agreements between the affected states.26 Beyond the cases of East Asia, other cross-border flashpoints for conflict where the low-risk proposition of drone strikes would be tempting include Russia in Georgia or Ukraine, Turkey in Syria, Sudan within its borders, and China on its western periphery. In 2013, a Chinese counternarcotics official revealed that his bureau had considered attempting to kill a drug kingpin named Naw Kham, who was hiding in a remote region in northeastern Myanmar, by using a drone carrying twenty kilograms of dynamite. “The plan was rejected, because the order was to catch him alive,” the official recalled.27 With armed drones, China might make the same calculation that the United States has made—that killing is more straightforward than capturing—in choosing to target ostensibly high-threat individuals with drone strikes. China’s demonstrated willingness to employ armed drones against terrorists or criminals outside its borders could directly threaten U.S. allies in the region, particularly if the criterion China uses to define a terrorist does not align with that of the United States or its allies. Domestically, governments may use armed drones to target their perceived internal enemies. Most emerging drone powers have experienced recent domestic unrest. Turkey, Russia, Pakistan, and China all have separatist or significant opposition movements (e.g., Kurds, Chechens, the Taliban, Tibetans, and Uighurs) that presented political and military challenges to their rule in recent history. These states already designate individuals from these groups as “terrorists,” and reserve the right to use force against them. States possessing the lower risk—compared with other weapons platforms—capability of armed drones could use them more frequently in the service of domestic pacification, especially against time-sensitive targets that reside in mountainous, jungle, or other inhospitable terrain. Compared with typical methods used by military and police forces to counter insurgencies, criminals, or terrorists—such as ground troops and manned aircraft— unmanned drones provide significantly greater real-time intelligence through their persistent loiter time and responsiveness to striking an identified target. Increased Risk of Misperception and Escalation Pushing limits in already unstable regions is complicated by questions raised regarding rules of engagement: how would states respond to an armed drone in what they contend is their sovereign airspace, and how would opposing sides respond to counter-drone tactics? Japanese defense officials claim that shooting down Chinese drones in what Japan contends is its airspace is more likely to occur than downing manned aircraft because drones are not as responsive to radio or pilot warnings, thereby raising the possibility of an escalatory response.28 Alternatively, Japan might misidentify a Chinese manned fighter as an advanced drone and fire on it, especially if the aircraft’s radar signature is not sufficiently distinctive or if combat drones routinely fly over the disputed area. Thus, the additional risks associated with drone strikes, combined with the lack of clarity on how two countries would react to an attempted downing of a drone, create the potential for miscalculation and subsequent escalation. As U.S. Air Force commanders in South Korea noted, a North Korean drone equipped with chemical agents would not have to kill many or even any people on the peninsula to terrorize the population and escalate tensions.29 This scenario points to the spiraling escalatory dynamic that could be repeated—likely intensified in the context of armed drones—in other tension-prone areas, such as the Middle East, South Asia, and Central and East Africa, where the mix of low-risk and ambiguous rules of engagement is a recipe for escalation. Not all of these contingencies directly affect U.S. interests, but they would affect treaty allies whose security the United States has an interest in maintaining. Compared with other weapons platforms, current practice repeatedly demonstrates that drones make militarized disputes more likely due to a decreased threshold for the use of force and an increased risk of miscalculation. Increased Risk of Lethality The proliferation of armed drones will increase the likelihood of destabilizing or devastating one-off, high-consequence attacks. In March 2013, Senator Dianne Feinstein (D-CA) observed of drones: “In some respects it’s a perfect assassination weapon. . . . Now we have a problem. There are all these nations that want to buy these armed drones. I’m strongly opposed to that.”30 The worst-case contingency for the use of armed drones, albeit an unlikely circumstance, would be to deliver weapons of mass destruction. Drones are, in many ways, the perfect vehicle for delivering biological and chemical agents.31 A WMD attack, or even the assassination of a political leader, another troubling though unlikely circumstance, would have tremendous consequences for regional and international stability. Deterring such drone-based attacks will depend on the ability of the United States and other governments to accurately detect and attribute them. Technical experts and intelligence analysts disagree about the extent to which this will be possible, but the difficulties lie in the challenges of detecting drones (they emit small radar, thermal, and electron signatures, and can fly low), determining who controlled it (they can be programmed to fly to a preset GPS coordinate), or assigning ownership to a downed system (they can be composed of commercial, off-the-shelf components).32 It is equally noteworthy that civilian officials or military commanders have almost always used armed drones in ways beyond their initially intended applications. Drones do not simply fulfill existing mission requirements; they create new and unforeseen ones, and will continue to do so in the future. Furthermore, U.S. officials would be misguided to view future uses of armed drones solely through the prism of how the United States has used them—for discrete military operations in relatively benign air-defense environments. The potential for misperception is compounded by the fact that few governments seeking or acquiring armed drones have publicly articulated any strategy for how they will likely use them. Conversely, the uncertainty about how other countries will use drones provides the United States with an opportunity to shape drone doctrines, especially for U.S. allies interested in procuring drones from U.S. manufacturers.

### I/L Drones

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#### Democratic strength drives aggressive drone development AND deployment.

Sauer and Schörnig, 12 - \*Dr. Frank Sauer, Senior Researcher, Bundeswehr University Munich \*\*Dr. Niklas Schörnig, Deputy Chairman of the Research Council Project Director Senior Researcher @ the Peace Research Institute Frankfurt; “Killer drones: The ‘silver bullet’ of democratic warfare?” Security Dialogue; 43(4); p. 363–380;

Today, it is commonly believed that 40 or more countries are developing military unmanned systems (Singer, 2009: 241). Much of the data behind such a claim is hearsay and quite tough to verify. However, the most recent edition of Military Balance, published annually by the International Institute for Strategic Studies, can serve as a guidepost and a first handle on numbers. Here, 34 countries are listed as holding either medium- or heavy-sized UAVs (IISS, 2011: 24–6). The list of UAV holders reveals a peculiarity: two-thirds of these countries are democratic states. While the ‘drone hype’ is commonly said to be driven mainly by the United States and Israel, it seems that democracies in general have been the first to jump on the un~~man~~ned bandwagon. Democracy indices – such as Polity IV, on which we draw here – need to be taken with an appropriate grain of salt, yet they can be helpful in systemizing and corroborating this first impression. With Polity IV ranging from 10 (strongly democratic) to –10 (strongly autocratic), 24 of those 34 countries listed in Military Balance turn out to have a polity score of 6 or higher – in other words, they can safely be called democratic. So, why are democracies in the driving seat of this development? Some might point to a fairly obvious answer: because they can be. The financial and technological resources required for pursuing drone warfare are most readily available to wealthy states, the majority of which are democracies. Adhering to the ‘technological imperative’ (for a concise summary, see Reppy, 1990: 102–3), so this theoretical argument goes, they employ these superior resources to build the best technology and arm their militaries with it, simply because it is possible for them to do so. Yet, no country’s defense budget, not even that of the USA, is limitless. Consequently, political decisions about how to allocate resources have to be made, all while maintaining the technological edge. So, for instance, why did the US Army abandon its ‘Comanche’ advanced helicopter project in 2004, thereby swapping a fast and stealthy hi-tech helicopter for what were then technologically inferior, slow, and non-stealthy drones (Fulghum and Wall, 2004)? The simplistic argument according to which technology is the sole driver, while commonplace and not entirely implausible, obviously carries only so far. We are not the first scholars to raise the question of why democracies are so intrigued by unmanned weapon systems and particularly drones at the moment, but a review of the burgeoning literature on military use of unmanned systems shows that the issue has hitherto only been dealt with cursorily and in passing. There is currently no general, systematic, and theory-driven study seeking to probe the peculiar nexus of democracy and the use of unmanned systems.3

#### Democracies will increasingly rely on drone and cyber technologies to reap the political benefits from conflict and avert the costs

Ignatieff 12 – (Michael Ignatieff, Senior Resident of the University of Toronto’s Massey College, where he teaches courses in law and political science for the Munk School of Global Affairs, the School of Public Policy and Governance, and the Faculty of Law, “Drones give democracies no cause for war,” 6-12-2012, Financial Times, https://www.ft.com/content/10a03278-b3b3-11e1-a3db-00144feabdc0)

Dictatorships and tyrannies may be casual about spilling their people’s blood, but not democracies. When the people get to decide whether to go to war, they rarely do so willingly. This was why Immanuel Kant said the spread of democracy was the best guarantee of world peace. As he wrote in 1795, “if the consent of the citizens is required in order to decide that war should be declared nothing is more natural than that they would be very cautious in commencing such a poor game”. When contemporary thinkers such as Michael Doyle have tested Kant’s intuition, they have had to add a significant caveat: democracies may not like fighting each other – which is why war has become unthinkable between EU and Nato countries – but they can be very warlike indeed towards tyrants and ethnic cleansers. Drones and cyberwarfare, the latest revolution in military technology, will force us to revise still further Kant’s connection between democracy, peace and war. Virtual technologies make it easier for democracies to wage war because they eliminate the risk of blood sacrifice that once forced democratic peoples to be prudent. Virtual war in Kosovo meant piloted F-18s and precision air strikes. In Afghanistan, too, the Taliban was routed initially with precision air strikes guided by forward air controllers. Libya was the same story. Now democracies do not even have to put their pilots in harm’s way. Cyberwar and drones offer Nato democracies enticing prospects of cheap, risk-free warfare – and not just democracies. A new arms race is already under way. Before succumbing to these technologies, leaders should remember how little virtual war has actually accomplished. Kosovo is still a corrupt ethnic tyranny; Libya will take years to put itself back together; and no one can see a stable state in sight in Afghanistan. Virtual war turned out to be the easy part. Democracies have little staying power for the hard part. Looking at the options in Syria, drone attacks on regime tank formations and a cybercampaign to immobilise Bashar al-Assad’s command and control would be the easy part. Creating a Syria free of sectarian warfare and ethnic political domination would be very hard. If war is the continuation of politics by other means, the chief factor limiting the use of these new weapons will be whether they help leaders to attain their political ends. Where these ends seem unattainable or futile, as in Syria, the weapons will remain unused. The larger problem is that these new weapons are bound to escape political, and therefore democratic, control. Previous revolutions in military affairs, such as the coming of nuclear weapons, strengthened the hand of presidents and prime ministers. Drones and cyberwar technologies are so cheap that it will be impossible to keep them under the lock and key of the sovereign. The age of the super-empowered, and therefore super-dangerous, individual has arrived. In deciding how to control drone and cybertechnologies, it is worth remembering that democracies are resilient because they are free. Our cybersystems are now under constant attack and it is in responding to these attacks that they become more secure. States will have to allow the global community of coders and engineers who built and maintain the internet the freedom to keep the malware at bay and keep the system open for the rest of us. The new technologies are so easy and cheap to produce that the best international law and state action can hope for is to generate a limited set of shared norms to prohibit their most harmful uses. Even with these in place, drones and malware will fight our wars for us and serve our eternal human desire to inflict harm without consequences. They will be the mercenaries of the 21st century. In thinking about what can keep these technologies under control, we need to remember Kant’s original bet on human prudence. Kant’s insight was that human beings who can freely choose and reason know full well that if you inflict harm, it will come back to hurt you. Everything must be paid for. If you hit Iran with Stuxnet, you render your own nuclear systems vulnerable to the next hacker, individual or state. If you perfect the killing of individuals with drones, you had better confine your acts to bona fide enemies of your state; otherwise you expose your population as a whole to the same heaven-sent vengeance. These new technologies promise harm without consequence. Kant tells us there is no such thing. In this shared human understanding, even between adversaries, lies prudence, and in prudence – caution, care and restraint – lies hope.

### ! Drones – Escalates – No Checks

#### Drones circumvent institutional checks---takes out all of their democracy restrains arguments

Potter, 16 - Assistant Professor in the Department of Politics at the University of Virginia (Philip B.K. Potter, "Four Trends That Could Put the Democratic Peace at Risk," *Political Violence at a Glance*, 10-14-2016,

The point is that it’s not democracy alone that matters. Rather it is the limits that these regimes can put on their leaders to force them to be careful and selective when doing things like making threats and starting fights. This also means it’s not a baked-in advantage that a democracy can take lightly – even well-meaning leaders in democracies have every incentive to figure out how to slip these constraints. Limits yield long-term advantages, but in the immediate term they tie leaders’ hands, preventing them from engaging with the international problems or opportunities that they feel they should. There are four trends that indicate this process is well under way and is putting the “democratic advantage” at risk. Militaries are less closely tied to voters Democratic advantages in conflict are commonly traced to the nature of democratic militaries and their relationship with political power. Going all the way back to Kant, there has been the notion that societies with citizen soldiers and the vote are not going to support unnecessary wars when they are going to bear the costs. The problem is that Kant’s vision isn’t what modern armies look like, and they’re intentionally moving away from the target rather than toward it. In the US, military service is all-volunteer, and the recruits are increasingly drawn from concentrated segments of society. This divorces the consequences of fighting from the day-to-day experience of most voters. Increasingly, this is a limited force supplemented by private sector contractors, placing even more distance between the individual with the gun and the democratic process. The emphases on covert operations, Special Forces, and technological superiority further water down the link between society and soldiers. This was, in fact, part of the point of moving to an all-volunteer force and one of the rationales for investments in stealth, information technology, and precision guided munitions, e.g. the precision strike complex. By replacing bodies with dollars, planners have consistently sought to increase the flexibility that the US has in its use of force. In the immediate term, that goal makes sense – it allows policy makers to do what they believe needs to be done without having to worry about a fickle public. But over the long term, it has the potential to lead to less caution and selectivity when engaging in conflicts. Adversaries are proliferating and changing The emergence of non-state actors as a primary threat has further loosened constraints on leaders. The shift from the possibility of total war with the Soviet Union to myriad smaller-scale challenges accelerated the transition from a mass military to an elite, highly specialized force more isolated from society. Compounding the challenge, this type of adversary and conflict leads to more significant informational advantages for leaders, which make democratic constraints less binding. Citizens and political opposition are always playing catch-up with the executive when it comes to foreign policy information, but the challenge is harder when the adversaries are less familiar, the engagements shorter, and the issues more complex. Technology is reducing constraint New technologies are driving citizens and political opposition ever further out of the loop. The extraordinary rise of unmanned vehicles in combat reduces the risk of casualties and extends the range for projecting force. This has undeniable strategic advantages, but there is less visibility and, accordingly, less accountability associated with the use of this technology. This means leaders worry less about the ex-post constraints and costs that typically come with casualties. Institutions and practices increasingly favor the president The recent nuclear agreement with Iran was an executive agreement rather than a treaty. This is the norm – most international agreements are now unilateral actions of the president. A polarized Congress is ever more cautious in its exercise of what little foreign policy power it has; two years into the campaign against Islamic State and Congress still hasn’t weighed in one way or the other. In the US this is an expansion of the widely accepted argument that there are two presidencies – a constrained one in domestic politics and a relatively autonomous one abroad. What’s unappreciated is that this growing presidential autonomy (which may well be needed to run a Superpower) also decreases constraint and with it the foreign policy “advantages” we associate with democracy. While these advantages are real, they are also fragile. Key institutional constraints – such as a robust political opposition and a knowledgeable citizenry – are susceptible to seemingly minor changes in institutions and/or practices that loosen the limits of leaders’ foreign policy decisions. As technologies advance, threats shift, and institutional constraints wax and wane, the foreign policy advantages embedded within democratic systems may begin to erode. The potential for such a shift is a possibility that should not be taken lightly.

#### Drones collapse democratic checks against war AND cause foreign policy failures.

Singer, 1-22-2012 - Peter W., strategist and senior fellow at New America, director of the Center for 21st Century Security, and Intelligence and a senior fellow in Foreign Policy at Brookings; "Do Drones Undermine Democracy?," *Brookings*, https://www.brookings.edu/opinions/do-drones-undermine-democracy/

For the first 200 years of American democracy, engaging in combat and bearing risk — both personal and political — went hand in hand. In the age of drones, that is no longer the case. Today’s unmanned systems are only the beginning. The original Predator, which went into service in 1995, lacked even GPS and was initially unarmed; newer models can take off and land on their own, and carry smart sensors that can detect a disruption in the dirt a mile below the plane and trace footprints back to an enemy hide-out. There is not a single new manned combat aircraft under research and development at any major Western aerospace company, and the Air Force is training more operators of unmanned aerial systems than fighter and bomber pilots combined. In 2011, unmanned systems carried out strikes from Afghanistan to Yemen. The most notable of these continuing operations is the not-so-covert war in Pakistan, where the United States has carried out more than 300 drone strikes since 2004. Yet this operation has never been debated in Congress; more than seven years after it began, there has not even been a single vote for or against it. This campaign is not carried out by the Air Force; it is being conducted by the C.I.A. This shift affects everything from the strategy that guides it to the individuals who oversee it (civilian political appointees) and the lawyers who advise them (civilians rather than military officers). It also affects how we and our politicians view such operations. President Obama’s decision to send a small, brave Navy Seal team into Pakistan for 40 minutes was described by one of his advisers as “the gutsiest call of any president in recent history.” Yet few even talk about the decision to carry out more than 300 drone strikes in the very same country. I do not condemn these strikes; I support most of them. What troubles me, though, is how a new technology is short-circuiting the decision-making process for what used to be the most important choice a democracy could make. Something that would have previously been viewed as a war is simply not being treated like a war. The change is not limited to covert action. Last spring, America launched airstrikes on Libya as part of a NATO operation to prevent Col. Muammar el-Qaddafi’s government from massacring civilians. In late March, the White House announced that the American military was handing over combat operations to its European partners and would thereafter play only a supporting role. The distinction was crucial. The operation’s goals quickly evolved from a limited humanitarian intervention into an air war supporting local insurgents’ efforts at regime change. But it had limited public support and no Congressional approval. When the administration was asked to explain why continuing military action would not be a violation of the War Powers Resolution — a Vietnam-era law that requires notifying Congress of military operations within 48 hours and getting its authorization after 60 days — the White House argued that American operations did not “involve the presence of U.S. ground troops, U.S. casualties or a serious threat thereof.” But they did involve something we used to think of as war: blowing up stuff, lots of it.

#### Drone proliferation is rapid and escalates without checks

Altmann & Sauer 17 – (Jürgen Altmann, lecturer in experimental physics at Technical University of Dortmund, working on the prospective assessment of new military technologies and the analysis of preventive arms-control measures, Frank Sauer, senior research fellow and lecturer in international relations at Bundeswehr University in Munich, working on international security and arms control, “Autonomous Weapon Systems and Strategic Stability,” Global Politics and Strategy, Volume 59, 2017, Iss. 5, https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/00396338.2017.1375263?journalCode=tsur20)

Proliferation and arms-race instability As early as 2007, the US Department of Defense wrote in its Unmanned Systems Roadmap that for processor technology ‘the ultimate goal is to replace the operators with a mechanical facsimile [of] equal or superior thinking speed, memory capacity, and responses gained from training and experience’. The document also stated that the ‘primary technical challenges for weapon release from unmanned systems include the ability to reliably target the right objective’.17 The goal of weapon autonomy pervades all subsequent road maps.18 Autonomous weapon-system functions have since been tested on land, under water, on the sea and, most notably, in the air. In fact, current trends with respect to unmanned combat aerial vehicles (UCAVs or ‘combat drones’) provide indicators for what to expect with regard to AWS. Unlike today’s high-profile UCAVs, such as the Reaper, which are propeller driven, slow, carry comparably small payloads and have few to no capabilities for operating in contested airspace, future systems will be less dependent on human control, faster, stealthy and capable of delivering bigger payloads. The X-47B, for instance, has demonstrated autonomous take-off from and landing on an aircraft-carrier deck, as well as autonomous aerial refuelling. This technology demonstrator was developed by the US Navy’s Unmanned Carrier-Launched Airborne Surveillance and Strike programme (UCLASS). Similarly, the British Taranis UCAV was described by the UK Ministry of Defence as ‘fully autonomous’ and able to ‘defend itself against manned and other unmanned enemy aircraft’ with ‘almost no need for operator input’.19 However, the ministry also stated that ‘the operation of weapons systems will always be under human control’.20 While AWS test beds such as Taranis and the X-47B rely on familiar designs, in this case the airframes of a fast, stealthy, next-generation drone with substantial payload capabilities, future systems will display an autonomous swarming capability, and thus AWS will also come in much smaller sizes. In October 2016, for instance, the US Department of Defense demonstrated a swarm of 103 Perdix micro drones capable of ‘advanced swarm behaviors such as collective decision-making, adaptive formation flying, and self-healing’.21 In the future, such micro drones are to be 3D printed in large batches and deployed from (manned) flying systems. This dispensing method has already been successfully tested at Mach 0.6 speed by two F/A-18 Super Hornets releasing a Perdix drone swarm. The US Navy’s LOCUST programme is also seeking to develop swarming, disposable unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs).22 The overall goal for this new ecosystem of flying assets is to replace not just the old generation of drones but also manned aircraft, thus continuing the trend towards keeping human pilots out of harm’s way and providing superior unmanned air-to-ground and air-to-air capabilities across the board.23 In air-to-air combat, the big, fast autonomous drones currently envisioned will be able to fly high-g manoeuvres no human pilot would be able to endure. More importantly, they would ensure much shorter reaction times. On-board sensors combined with artificial ‘intelligence’ – either located onboard or distributed in the swarm and based on decision-making algorithms endowed with the authority to initiate an attack without awaiting human input – are to make these weapons autonomous and hence provide a decisive edge over remotely controlled and human-piloted adversary systems alike. While the development of AWS is currently most advanced in the air and under water – that is, in less cluttered environments – the example of autonomous (swarms of) UCAVs demonstrates the generally valid proposition that for future unmanned systems, operational speed will reign supreme, regardless of the domain. In that sense, technological developments in AI and robotics, as well as current expectations regarding future armed conflict (and the need for speed), jointly point towards AWS. In fact, US deputy secretary of defense Bob Work stated in March 2016 that even the final delegation of lethal authority to autonomous systems will inexorably happen as a result of this race for speed.24 According to Work, the United States ‘will not delegate lethal authority for a machine to make a decision … The only time we’ll delegate authority is in things that go faster than human reaction time, like cyber or electronic warfare.’ Yet, he conceded that such self-restraint may be unsustainable if an authoritarian rival acts differently. ‘We might be going up against a competitor who is more willing to delegate authority to machines than we are and, as that competition unfolds, we’ll have to make decisions on how we can best compete’, Work said. ‘It’s not something that we have fully figured out, but we spend a lot of time thinking about it.’25 To further deepen our understanding of AWS, it is useful to take a step back and underline that they need not necessarily take the shape of a specific weapon system akin to, for instance, a drone or a missile. AWS also do not require a specific military-technology development path, the way nuclear weapons do, for example. As AI, autonomous systems and robot technologies mature and begin to pervade the civilian sphere, militaries will increasingly be able to make use of them for their own purposes, as the development of information and communication technology suggests. Naturally, any military adaptation of a dual-use technology will need to fulfil specific military requirements that do not exist in a civilian environment, or are less relevant for mass markets. Nevertheless, AWS development will profit from the implementation or mirroring of a variety of civilian technologies (or derivatives thereof) and their adoption for military purposes, technologies which are currently either already available or on the cusp of becoming ready for series production in the private sector. This trend is already observable in the case of armed drones. Light detection and ranging (LIDAR) systems are another example. These are the optical sensors used by the automotive industry to give self-driving cars a 360-degree picture of their surroundings. LIDAR prices have recently dropped from five figures to a few hundred dollars. The units have also become more rugged and much smaller.26 Given that these components, which are necessary for endowing mobile systems with autonomy, are now cheaply and readily available off the shelf, there is every reason to expect the military to adapt, and, if required, adjust and refine, them for their own purposes.27 It is clear that the research and development for AWS-relevant technology is well under way and distributed across countless university laboratories and, especially, commercial enterprises that are making use of economies of scale and the forces of the free market to spur competition, lower prices and shorten innovation cycles. This renders the military research and development effort in the case of AWS different from those of past high-tech conventional weapon systems (the F-35 comes to mind), let alone nuclear weapons. So while the impact of AWS might be revolutionary in terms of their implications for warfare, their development within the context of the military is best described as evolutionary: the military is merely continuing and, with outside help and technology lifted from the private sector, accelerating an already existing trend to replace labour with capital and automate dull, dirty and dangerous military tasks.28 For example, former secretary of defense Ashton Carter sought closer ties with Silicon Valley to hasten the incorporation of technological innovations into the US military after the US officially declared AI and robotics cornerstones of its new ‘third offset’ strategy to counter rising powers.29 Thus, AWS are easy to obtain compared with other paradigm-shifting weapons, such as nuclear weapons, which even now require the Herculean effort of a state-run, focused politico-military effort to produce. AWS do not require ores, centrifuges, high-speed fuses or other comparably ‘exotic’ components to be assembled and tested in a clandestine manner. Consequently, while nuclear technologies can be – and are – proliferation controlled, AWS are much harder to regulate. With comparatively fewer choke points that might be targeted by non-proliferation policies, AWS are potentially available to a wide range of state and non-state actors, not just those nation-states that are willing and able to muster the considerable resources needed for the robotic equivalent of the Manhattan Project. 30 This carries significant implications for arms control. There will of course be differences in quality. Sophisticated AWS will have to meet the same or similar military standards that current weapon systems, such as main battle tanks or combat aircraft, do. Moreover, technologically leading nations such as the US and Israel are carrying out research to produce autonomous systems that comply with international humanitarian law. Less scrupulous actors, however, will find AWS development much easier. Comparably crude AWS which do not live up to the standards of a professional military in terms of reliability, compliance with international humanitarian law or the ability to go head-to-head with systems of a near-peer competitor could, in fact, be put together with technology available today by second- or third-tier state actors, and perhaps even non-state actors. Converting a remotely controlled combat drone to autonomously fire a weapon in response to a simple pattern-recognising algorithm is already doable. Even the technological edge displayed by sophisticated AWS is unlikely to be maintained over the longer term. While sensor and weapon packages to a large degree determine the overall capabilities of a system, implementing autonomy ultimately comes down to software, which is effortlessly copied and uniquely vulnerable to being stolen via computernetwork operations. Thus, while the development of AWS clearly presents a challenge to less technologically advanced actors, obtaining AWS with some degree of military capability is a feasible goal for any country already developing, for example, remotely controlled armed UAVs – the number of which rose from two to ten between 2001 and 2016.31 Admittedly, the US and Israel are still in the lead with regard to developing unmanned systems and implementing autonomous-weapon functionality – China only recently test-fired a guided missile from a drone via satellite link for the first time.32 But considering that drone programmes can draw from the vibrant global market for unmanned aerial vehicles of all shapes and sizes, the hurdles regarding AWS are much lower than those of other potentially game-changing weapons of the past. Proliferation of AWS could of course also occur via exports, including to the grey and black markets. In this way, autonomous systems could fall not only into the hands of technologically inferior state actors, but also those of non-state actors, including extremist groups. Hamas, Hezbollah and the Islamic State have already deployed and used armed drones. As sensors and electronics are increasingly miniaturised, small and easily transportable systems could be made autonomous with respect to navigation, target recognition, precision and unusual modes of attack.33 Terrorist groups could also gain access to comparably sophisticated systems that they could never develop on their own. Again, autonomy in this context does not necessarily require military-grade precision – a quick and dirty approach would suffice for these actors. In fact, it stands to reason that terrorist groups would use autonomous killing capabilities indiscriminately in addition to using them, if possible, in a precise fashion for targeted assassinations. It is still unclear how the development of unmanned systems on the one hand and specific countermeasures on the other will play out. Traditional aircraft-sized drones such as the X-47B or Taranis, to stick with these examples, are obviously susceptible to existing anti-aircraft systems. As for smaller-sized systems, various tools, from microwaves to lasers to rifle-sized radio jammers for disrupting the control link, are currently being developed as countermeasures. Simpler, less exotic methods such as nets, fences or even trained hunting birds might also prove effective for remotely controlled and autonomous systems alike. It is clear, however, that saturation attacks have been identified as a key future capability for defeating a wide range of existing and upcoming defensive systems – both human-operated and automatic.34 The latter are a particular focus of research into swarming as a potential solution.35 And military systems operating at very high speeds and in great numbers or swarms are bound to generate new instabilities, to which we will turn in our next section. To first sum up our argument so far, there are obvious dual-use problems and an unusually high risk of proliferation when it comes to AWS. Should one of the technologically leading nation-states go forward with the deployment of AWS, it would be comparably easy – and thus very likely – that others would follow suit.36 In that sense, the development of AWS could well trigger a destabilising arms race. Crisis instability and escalation Increasing operational speeds mean that human involvement in AWS would be limited to, at best, general oversight and decision-making in instances where communication delays of up to a few seconds – and thinking and deliberation times of a few minutes – could be deemed acceptable, meaning they would not result in defeat or the loss of systems. Many situations would not allow for the luxury of human pondering, however. In such cases, the actions and reactions of individual AWS, as well as AWS swarms, would have to be controlled autonomously by algorithms – in other words determined only by programming software in advance and possibly through the adaptation and learning of the systems themselves. After all, as Paul Scharre put it, ‘winning in swarm combat may depend upon having the best algorithms to enable better coordination and faster reaction times, rather than simply the best platforms’.37 One such swarm-combat situation could be a severe political crisis in which adversaries believe that war could break out. With swarms deployed in close proximity to each other, control software would have to react to signs of an attack within a split-second time frame – by evading or, possibly, counter-attacking in a use-them-or-lose-them situation. Even false indications of an attack – sun glint interpreted as a rocket flame, sudden and unexpected moves of the adversary, or a simple malfunction – could trigger escalation. The nature of military conflict is such that these kinds of interactions could not be tested or trained for beforehand. In addition, it is, technically speaking, impossible to fathom all possible outcomes in advance. Clearly, the interaction of swarms, if fully autonomous, would be unpredictable, and could potentially result in an escalation from crisis to war, or, within armed conflict, to higher levels of violence. This is not a theoretical proposition deduced solely from systems theory and the argument of unavoidable ‘normal accidents’.38 On the contrary, comparable runaway interactions between algorithms are already happening in the civilian sphere on a regular basis. In April 2011, the price of an out-of-print biology textbook rose within weeks to $23.7 million on the Amazon marketplace due to the price-setting algorithms of two vendors interacting with each other.39 Eventually one of the vendors intervened; no damage was done because nobody purchased the book at this absurd price. Greater havoc was caused in the New York Stock Exchange ‘flash crash’ of 6 May 2010 in which computerised highfrequency trading played an essential role, and during which stock indices and important industry stocks collapsed.40 In this case ‘circuit breakers’ established by monitoring authorities set in, suspending high-speed trading and preventing further avalanche effects. These oversight and intervention mechanisms have been improved since then, but debate continues as to whether they are sufficient to prevent another significant flash crash; minicrashes and interventions occur daily.41 During the Cold War, and even afterwards, both the US and the Soviet Union received erroneous indications of nuclear attack on multiple occasions.42 These varied from sunlight reflected off clouds to magnetic training tapes fed into the early-warning system by accident. In all these cases, human reasoning led to restraint instead of escalation; double checks revealed that the alarm had been false. At the time, double checking and reconsideration were possible due to flight times of between several hours (in the case of bombers and cruise missiles) and 10–30 minutes (for ballistic missiles launched from submarines or those covering intercontinental ranges), as well as systems for preventing unwanted crisis escalation, such as the ‘hotline’ for communication between Moscow and Washington established after the Cuban Missile Crisis. Humans, or rapid-reaction mechanisms preprogrammed by humans, can also act as a fail-safe in instances where an overarching authority exists to enforce a shared set of rules, as in the stockexchange example – unlike in international politics. With the goal of improved military effectiveness providing a strong incentive to increase operational speeds, and thus to allow AWS to operate without further human intervention, tried and tested mechanisms for double-checking and reconsideration that allow humans to function as fail-safes or circuit-breakers are discarded. This, in combination with unforeseeable algorithm interactions producing unforeseeable military outcomes, increases crisis instability and is unpleasantly reminiscent of Cold War scenarios of accidental war. Setting aside the increasing risk of unwanted escalation, AWS are also bound to introduce stronger incentives for premeditated (including surprise) attacks. This is because of a combination of three factors: casualty avoidance, cost reduction and, once again, swarming. Firstly, unmanned systems, generally speaking, keep soldiers out of harm’s way – which is positive, but which also reduces the political risk of military endeavours, especially in democracies.43 Referring to the current generation of combat drones, Christof Heyns, the United Nations Special Rapporteur on extrajudicial, summary or arbitrary executions, put it this way: ‘[Drones] make it easier for States to deploy deadly and targeted force on the territories of other States.’44 As unmanned systems become faster and smaller, as well as, eventually, autonomous – which will also make them stealthier due to radio silence, and allow them to become ‘swarmier’ – the resulting room for manoeuvre in political and military terms increases. Secondly, the example of Perdix demonstrates that AWS need not be big, costly or high-tech. Instead, such systems can be cheap and disposable, produced using 3D printers and gaining strength from numbers, their ‘intelligence’ residing in a distributed fashion in the swarm or, if external communication is an option, at some higher level within the military ‘system of systems’ at large. A closely related third consideration is that swarms would make mounting a successful defence especially difficult due to their resilience and their ability to attack from many directions, simultaneously, in an overwhelming fashion. Small and very small AWS (those measuring tens of centimetres at most) would suffer from limited power supply on board, but could be brought closer to the target by riding along on ‘motherships’, as has been demonstrated with Perdix. With payloads weighing a few hundred grams at most, the amount of destructive power of small drones would be limited too. But if directed at political or military leaders or sensitive military infrastructure, they would produce relevant damage and provide entirely new means for carrying out assassinations and decapitation strikes.45 None of these points in isolation would introduce a radically novel element to military decision-making. After all, the fact that a weapon is cheap does not necessarily render it more likely to be used.46 However, the combination of these three factors – brought about mainly by the development of hard-to-defend-against autonomous swarms – presents a strong incentive to seize the advantage of being the first on the offensive. Considering the current climate between Russia and NATO, it stands to reason that old mechanisms of threat perception and worst-case thinking might see a comeback in the wake of AWS deployment.47 Russia was reportedly alarmed when the idea of using stealthy drones for missile defence was floated in the US.48 Swarms of AWS could be used to attack nuclear-weapon delivery systems, command and control systems, and sensitive infrastructure components such as antennas, sensors or air intakes. Even though an attacker might have little interest or confidence in the success of a disarming first strike of this type, the fact that such strikes were now possible would in itself increase nervousness and distrust between nuclear-armed adversaries. This overlap between the conventional and the nuclear realm is not new, of course. It emerged with precision munitions and bunker-busting (or possibly electromagnetic-pulse) warheads during the 1990s and 2000s,49 and is also documented in the New START treaty, the preamble of which states that the US and Russia are ‘mindful of the impact of conventionally armed ICBMs and SLBMs on strategic stability’.50 But AWS will likely perpetuate and intensify this trend, not least by opening up new possibilities for holding nuclear submarines carrying ballistic missiles at risk.51 Thus, when nuclear weapons or strategic command and control systems are, or are perceived to be, at greater risk, conventional capabilities end up increasing instability at the strategic level. Today’s unmanned systems have already increased the risk that military force will be used in scenarios where manned systems would previously have presented decision-makers with bigger, caution-inducing hurdles – a connection recently confirmed in war-gaming exercises.52 Of course, swarming AWS need not necessarily lead to escalation under all conditions. In asymmetric scenarios involving adversaries who lack AWS capabilities, the escalatory mechanisms developed above would not take effect. In symmetric settings, by contrast, they would certainly exacerbate the overall development toward an increased risk of crisis instability and escalation.

### ! Drones– Qualitatively Worse

#### Capital intensive wars will be more qualitatively worse – Jevons paradox

**Shay 16** - Christopher Shay is a PhD student at the University of Denver’s Josef Korbel School of International Studies., The Jevons Paradox and the Economy of Drone Strikes, <https://politicalviolenceataglance.org/2016/06/24/the-jevons-paradox-and-the-economy-of-drone-strikes/)>

William Stanley Jevons first described his dilemma (also referred to as the Jevons Paradox) in 1865 at a time when many British scholars feared the exhaustion of natural coal reserves, a strategic resource on which the British Navy depended. Some industrialists argued that advances in coal-burning technology would progressively diminish coal consumption, and thereby increase effective reserves. Jevons, however, observed that demand for coal was elastic: as technology made coal consumption more efficient, demand for coal increased drastically, and so did absolute levels of consumption. Since 1865, economists have creatively applied Jevons’ logic to environmental economics. For example, they show that staggering advances in lighting technology since the Stone Age have resulted in even greater total energy consumption. A similar pattern has been studied in the automotive industry. This same logic shows that drone technology, though increasingly discriminate, may nevertheless increase total civilian fatalities in the long run. The advantage of drone strikes lies in their accuracy and precision – just as coal-burning engines were made to produce more energy with less coal, drones produce more militant deaths at the expense of fewer civilian deaths. In other words, as strikes kill fewer civilians per militant, they become more efficient and less costly. Conventional wisdom on terrorism suggests that insurgencies like the Taliban use terror tactics to provoke a violent, indiscriminate overreaction on the part of governments they attack. This violent overreaction is expected by militants to disproportionately affect civilians, who will subsequently mobilize to support the insurgency. This provocation trap would, of course, undermine the counter-insurgency and support insurgents’ long-term goals. The conventional view on drone warfare is that the efficiency of drone strikes offers policymakers a means of punishing insurgents without producing a disproportionate effect on civilians. That is, drones supposedly help US counter-insurgency efforts to evade the provocation trap. Do they? The Jevons Dilemma subjects this claim to some skepticism by suggesting that the increasing efficiency of drone technology makes policymakers disproportionately more likely to employ it. This could be problematic from a strategic standpoint. Just as decreases in the cost of coal consumption increased consumption of coal, the reduced cost of counter-terror strikes may increase their perceived utility and, subsequently, the readiness with which American policymakers and commanders use them. In essence, because the tactic now appears more efficient, leaders will be tempted to utilize it with excessive regularity. To use an example, a hypothetical cruise missile strike may kill a high-profile militant leader at the cost of 20 civilian lives. A drone strike would kill the same militant at the cost of only 10 civilians. US leaders therefore use the drone, rather than the missile, and kill the target while sparing 10 civilians. However, because the drone renders individual militants less costly to kill, US leaders decide to kill the original target and additional, lower-profile militants who they would not previously have targeted. This is the (postulated) elasticity of demand amongst US leaders for strikes against militants. This elasticity exerts a system-level effect: leaders are tempted to authorize more and more strikes until the original savings in civilian lives become more than offset by costs incurred from additional (at least three, in this case) strikes — strikes that would not have been launched in the first place without drone technology. Presumably, civilian populations do not care that drones increase the efficiency of counter-insurgency operations per strike; rather, they care that civilian deaths have occurred as a result of those strikes. As the absolute number of civilian deaths rises — and insurgents will ensure civilians are aware of this rise — drone strikes will eventually exhaust the forbearance of the public and increase mobilization into the insurgency. In countries where civilians resent drone strikes as assaults on their national sovereignty, the sheer number of strikes may also work to exhaust the public’s forbearance.

## TERRORISM

### 1nc – Terrorism

#### Democracy promotion causes terrorism---prefer a holistic analysic of US counter terror policy

Morris et al. 20 — Morris, N. A., LaFree, G., &amp; Karlidag, E. (2020). Counter‐terrorism policies in the Middle East: Why democracy has failed to reduce terrorism in the Middle East and why protecting human rights might be more successful. Criminology &amp; Public Policy, 20(1), 153–175. <https://doi.org/10.1111/1745-9133.12532> WMK

Much of US foreign policy aimed at reducing terrorism in the Middle East following the 9/11 attacks emphasized increasing the strength of democratic institutions in the region. In particular, this was a cornerstone of President George W. Bush's policy in the Middle East. By contrast, while state-based human rights violations sometimes provoke a negative response from US officials, they are rarely seen as an important avenue for achieving regional stability and decreasing terrorism. In several speeches President Barack Obama pointed out the importance of state-based human rights violations, but did not provide a systematic policy advancing the reduction of human rights violations as a counter terrorism measure in the Middle East. President Donald Trump has shown little interest in the records of Middle Eastern countries in terms of either democracy or state-based human rights violations (Washington Post, 2020). Indeed, the Trump administration has generally seen enforcing sanctions against Middle Eastern countries for human rights violations as a barrier to trade and therefor inadvisable (New York Times, 2017).

Although a growing number of worldwide studies examine the relationship between democracy, human rights violations and terrorist attacks, few studies focus exclusively on the countries of the Middle East. Based on prior research we hypothesized that because the Middle East is characterized by exceptionally weak democracies, within-country increases in the strength of democracy in the Middle East will lead to increases in terrorist attacks (Hypothesis 1). We also hypothesized that because Middle Eastern countries are concentrated in the lower half of strength of democracy measures, we will not find a curvilinear effect of democracy on country-level terrorist attacks for this region (Hypothesis 2). Furthermore, we hypothesized that state-based human rights violations in the Middle East may well be more important than strength of democracy and hypothesized that human rights violations will be associated with increases in terrorist attacks in that region (Hypothesis 3). Our results show consistent support for all three hypotheses.

We found that from 1980 to 2016, increases in the strength of democracy are associated with significant increases in terrorist attacks among Middle Eastern countries. Also, as hypothesized, but in contrast to some recent worldwide studies of terrorism (e.g., Gaibulloev et al., 2017; Sandler, 2014), we find no significant support for a curvilinear relationship between democracy strength and terrorist attacks among Middle Eastern countries. We argue that this outcome is a likely consequence of the fact that most previous studies of terrorist attacks have examined worldwide samples with large numbers of mature democracies. By contrast, our descriptive data on 18 Middle Eastern countries shows that most are autocratic or anocratic.

#### Terrorism goes nuclear.

Arguello 18, founder and chair of the NPSGlobal Foundation, and head of the secretariat of the Latin American and Caribbean Leadership Network. She holds a degree in physics, a Master’s in business administration, and completed graduate studies in defense and security. Arguello previously worked on nuclear projects for the Argentine National Atomic Energy Commission. (Irma, “The global impacts of a terrorist nuclear attack: What would happen? What should we do?”, *Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists*)

Though hard to accept, the detonation of a nuclear device – by states or non-state actors – is today a plausible scenario. And while much of the world’s focus has been on the current nuclear weapons arsenals possessed by states – about 14,550 warheads, all of which carry the risk of intentional or unintentional use – the threat of nuclear terrorism is here and increasing. For more than a decade, Al Qaeda, Aum Shinrikyo, and other terrorist groups have expressed their desire to acquire fissile material to build and detonate an improvised nuclear bomb. None of them could fulfill that goal – so far. But that does not mean that they will not succeed in the future. Making matters worse, there is evidence of an illicit market for nuclear weapons-usable materials. There are sellers in search of potential buyers, as shown by the dismantlement of a nuclear smuggling network in Moldova in 2015. There certainly are plenty of sites from which to obtain nuclear material. According to the 2016 Nuclear Security Index by the Nuclear Threat Initiative, 24 countries still host inventories of nuclear weapons-usable materials, stored in facilities with different degrees of security. And in terms of risk, it is not necessary for a given country to possess nuclear weapons, weapons-usable materials, or nuclear facilities for it to be useful to nuclear terrorists: Structural and institutional weaknesses in a country may make it favorable for the illicit trade of materials. Permeable boundaries, high levels of corruption, weaknesses in judicial systems, and consequent impunity may give rise to a series of transactions and other events, which could end in a nuclear attack. The truth is that, at this stage, no country in possession of nuclear weapons or weapons-usable materials can guarantee their full protection against nuclear terrorism or nuclear smuggling. Because we live in a world of growing insecurity, where explicit and tacit agreements between the relevant powers – which upheld global stability during the post-Cold War – are giving way to increasing mistrust and hostility, a question arises: How would our lives be affected if a current terrorist group such as the Islamic State (ISIS), or new terrorist groups in the future, succeed in evolving from today’s Manchester style “low-tech” attacks to a “high-tech” one, involving a nuclear bomb, detonated in a capital city, anywhere in the world? We attempted to answer this question in a report developed by a high-level multidisciplinary expert group convened by the NPSGlobal Foundation for the Latin American and Caribbean Leadership Network. We found that there would be multiple harmful effects that would spread promptly around the globe (Arguello and Buis 2016); a more detailed analysis is below, which highlights the need for the creation of a comprehensive nuclear security system. The consequences of a terrorist nuclear attack A small and primitive 1-kiloton fission bomb (with a yield of about one-fifteenth of the one dropped on Hiroshima, and certainly much less sophisticated; cf. Figure 1), detonated in any large capital city of the developed world, would cause an unprecedented catastrophic scenario. An estimate of direct effects in the attack’s location includes a death toll of 7,300-to-23,000 people and 12,600-to-57,000 people injured, depending on the target’s geography and population density. Total physical destruction of the city’s infrastructure, due to the blast (shock wave) and thermal radiation, would cover a radius of about 500 meters from the point of detonation (also known as ground zero), while ionizing radiation greater than 5 Sieverts – compatible with the deadly acute radiation syndrome – would expand within an 850-meter radius. From the environmental point of view, such an area would be unusable for years. In addition, radioactive fallout would expand in an area of about 300 square kilometers, depending on meteorological conditions (cf. Figure 2). But the consequences would go far beyond the effects in the target country, however, and promptly propagate worldwide. Global and national security, economy and finance, international governance and its framework, national political systems, and the behavior of governments and individuals would all be put under severe trial. The severity of the effects at a national level, however, would depend on the countries’ level of development, geopolitical location, and resilience. Global security and regional/national defense schemes would be strongly affected. An increase in global distrust would spark rising tensions among countries and blocs, that could even lead to the brink of nuclear weapons use by states (if, for instance, a sponsor country is identified). The consequences of such a shocking scenario would include a decrease in states’ self-control, an escalation of present conflicts and the emergence of new ones, accompanied by an increase in military unilateralism and military expenditures.

### I/L Terrorism

#### **Democracy causes terrorism**

Savun, Poli Sci Prof @ Pitt, 9

(Burcu, Democracy, Foreign Policy, and Terrorism, Journal of Conflict Resolution Volume XX Number X, pp. online)

Many scholars, particularly within the past decade, have argued that democratic states are more likely to be targets of transnational terrorism. According to this camp, there are various aspects of the democratic regimes that facilitate terrorism. First, democracies, by providing freedom of organization, expression, and movement for their citizens, enable terrorist groups to undertake their illegal activities with relative ease (Engene 2004; Hamilton and Hamilton 1983). The commitment to civil liberties in democratic societies can be used by terrorist groups to organize and carry out their attacks without being noticed (Eubank and Weinberg 1994, 2001). Repressive regimes reduce the ability of terrorist groups to organize and carry out their activities, whereas democracies provide a permissive environment. Second, institutional constraints imposed on democratic governments are usually higher than the ones on other types of regimes. Although these constraints are intended to protect the citizens of democracies from the undue exercise of power by their leaders, they also limit the actions and ability of democratic governments to fight terrorism (Schmid 1992; Li 2005; Wilkinson 1986, 2006). Terrorist groups perceive democracies as soft targets that can be pressured to give into their demands due to the sensitivity of democracies to costs. Pape (2003, 2005) shows that terrorist groups tend to target democracies more frequently because they know that liberal democracies usually accede to their demands. Freedom of press is another factor that is argued to encourage transnational terrorism in democracies. A free press serves the interests of terrorist groups whose main goal is to advertise their cause to a wide audience and gain publicity and recognition (Crenshaw 1981). Unlike in repressive regimes, terrorist incidents are more likely to be reported in detail by the free press in democratic societies. Therefore, press freedom in democracies gives a valuable opportunity to publicity-hungry terrorists to create widespread fear (Li 2005; Nacos 1994).

#### Prefer our stats – theirs are based on all democracies – ours assume the unique vulnerabilities created by transitioning regimes which is what we are impact turning

Lutz, Poli Sci Prof @ Indiana, 10

(James, Democracy and Terrorism, Perspectives on Terrorism 4.1 p. online)

A number of factors may help to explain these mixed results. Somewhat limited number of international incidents, compared to domestic attacks (which outnumber international incidents by a factor of seven or more), has meant that singular events with high casualties are statistical outliers that could have affected the results. In addition, if regimes in transition are actually more vulnerable, the presence of changes in the political system could be a confounding factor. A transition from one authoritarian regime to another (military regime to a one-party system or vice versa) could increase opportunities for terrorism that would not necessarily be associated with democratization. Iran, for example, underwent a period of terrorism initiated by secular and leftist groups that lasted for 18 months. The clerical regime of the new Islamic Republic was vulnerable since it was making the transition from the partial authoritarianism of the old monarchy to the totalitarianism of the new theocracy. [30] Similarly, if new democracies are indeed more prone to terrorism, the association between terrorism and democracy could be more variable since not all democracies are equally vulnerable.

## ATs Demo Good T/s

### AT: Demo Good---Idiocracy

#### We literally don’t have the brainpower for democracy anymore---its try or die for authoritatianism to prevent existential threats

Cribb 22 — Julian Cribb is a distinguished science writer with more than thirty awards for journalism Julian Cribb "Idiocracy: is the decline in human intelligence undermining democracy?," MAHB, 2-24-2022, https://mahb.stanford.edu/blog/idiocracy-is-the-decline-in-human-intelligence-undermining-democracy/, accessed 7-9-2022, WMK

The early 21st Century has been noteworthy for a marked increase in the number of governments willing to act against the interests of their electors – and the number of electors prepared to vote against their own best interests and choose such governments. Since an educated, thoughtful and responsible electorate is indispensable to any democracy that wishes to choose a safe, rational and, healthy future for itself it is fair to conclude that, if this trend persists, the three-century-long worldwide democratic experiment will fail.Whether the failure is attributable to large-scale corruption of the democratic process by global corporates of rising wealth and power, to increased selfishness in politics and society, or to rising stupidity on the part of 21st Century Homo sapiens both in politics and in the general community is still open to debate. In Earth Detox, (Cambridge University Press 2021) I explore evidence for the latter hypothesis – that humans are, in fact, becoming progressively less intelligent. So dumb, in fact, that most do not grasp we are in mortal danger from ten vast, interconnected mega threats. Consequently, voters now frequently choose governments that either increase these threats – or which are too slothful or corrupt to abate them.The missing piece of information is that all humanity is now engulfed, 24/7, in a flooding tide of toxic chemistry – a tide five or six times larger than our climate emissions, and more deadly than any previous threat to human existence. An environmental threat that, according to WHO, kills over thirteen million people every year – the worst death toll from a single cause in human history – and disables 600 million more. Why electors should vote for such an outcome for themselves and their children demands explanation. One explanation may be that our intelligence, the quality that humans have most prided themselves on down the ages, is in decline.After a marked increase in human intelligence during the first three-quarters of the twentieth century – a phenomenon known as the Flynn Effect, after the NZ psychologist who discovered it – recent scientific research points to a clear downturn in human brainpower since 1975.The average rate of decline has been around three IQ points a decade, amounting to the loss of about 13.5 percent in average intelligence between 1975 and 2020. Results from separate studies carried out in seven different countries describe a general loss of intelligence. So far, researchers have been unable to confidently assign a cause to this noteworthy decline, saying only that it is not genetic and must therefore be due to something in society’s living environment. The great question is: what has changed so much in society’s living conditions as to cause such extensive brain damage during the past 45 years in particular? Increasingly, science suspects the 2.3 billion tonnes per year of man-made chemicals – many of them nerve poisons – which industrial society has unleashed on itself during this period and which now permeate our air, our food, our water, our homes, workplaces, our bodies, and our genes on a daily basis. Substances to which, such is their universal distribution around the planet, almost all humans are now exposed every moment of their existence from conception to expiry and which are, for the most part, unavoidable. The impact of these nerve poisons is compounded by a second, related, chemical flood – the endocrine disruptors (EDCs), industrial chemicals which affect basic processes like our growth, development, gender, ability to reproduce, obesity, and cancer risk. Nerve poisons are now thought by medical scientists to play a significant role in the pandemic of brain diseases that have become more prevalent in recent decades – conditions such as autism and ADHD, Alzheimer’s and Parkinson’s, depression, and other mental disorders, retarded development and the loss of intelligence. According to various studies, mental conditions now affect 800 million human beings – one in ten – imposing a vast and growing cost on the world economy for the care of the disabled. Brain damage caused by nerve poisons has been known since ancient Rome and well understood by science for decades. Lead and mercury used to be the chief offenders, but in recent times they have been supplanted by certain pesticides and domestic chemicals, such as flame retardants and plastics. These are now found in the blood and brains of unborn babies as well as much of the population. A decline of seven IQ points translates the average citizen to the intelligence level of the average juvenile delinquent. It is therefore probable that the decline in human intelligence is being accompanied by an increase in rates of murder, rape, and violent assault – as well as a lack of forethought at the ballot box. Proving that nerve poisons are responsible for the decline in democracy is no easier than proving that cigarettes cause cancer – but the connections are now evident for all who care to look. William of Occam would note that human IQ is falling at the same time as the toxic load on society is redoubling – and we are witnessing tens of millions of voters without the ability to grasp their responsibility, the needs of their society, or even themselves. Voters who may, on occasion, incoherently seek to overthrow or sabotage through misinformation the very system they do not comprehend. Voters who are increasingly susceptible to the misinformation circulated by vested interests, such as the petro lobby. Occam would advise us to look a lot more carefully at the most likely explanation, first – a task that science has yet to undertake. Democracies have long asserted a moral as well as governmental superiority over autocracies, but with the decay in voter intelligence, that advantage is becoming far less clear. If democracy is to endure as a form of self-governance, then the need to remedy the dumbing-down of democracy by ceasing to poison the minds that uphold it is both imperative and urgent.

### AT: Terrorism !

#### No nuke terror.

Christopher J. Fettweis 19. Associate professor of political science at Tulane University. “Pessimism and Nostalgia in the Second Nuclear Age.” *Strategic Studies Quarterly* 13.1

Finally, despite the string of bleak and terrifying projections from a variety of experts, nuclear weapons have remained well beyond the capabilities of the modern apocalyptic terrorist. The great fear of the SNA literature, that scientific knowledge and technology would gradually become more accessible to nonstate actors, has remained only a dream. Nor does there appear to be a great reservoir of fissile material in the world’s various black markets waiting to be weaponized.58 Just because something has not yet occurred does not mean that it cannot or will not occur eventually. However, it is worth noting that the world has not experienced any close calls regarding nuclear terrorism. Forecasting future unique events is a necessarily dicey enterprise, but one way to improve accuracy is to examine events that have already or almost happened. Given the many complexities involved with nuclear weapons, especially for amateurs as any terrorists would almost certainly be, it is not unreasonable to expect a few failures, or near misses, to precede success. While it is possible that we might not know about all the plots disrupted by international law enforcement, keeping the lid on nuclear near misses would presumably be no small task. As of this writing, the public is aware of no serious attempts to construct, steal, or purchase nuclear weapons, much less smuggle and detonate one. “Leakage” does not seem to be a problem, yet.59 The uniformly pessimistic projections about the second nuclear era have not, at least thus far, been borne out by events. Post–Cold War trends have instead been generally moving in directions opposite to these expectations, with fewer nuclear weapons in the hands of the same number of countries and none pursuing more. Why, then, doesnuclear pessimism persist? What are the roots of the current fashionable unwillingness—or even inability—to detect positive patterns in nuclear security?

### AT: Authoritarian AI

#### No unregulated tech impact

Michael **Shermer 17**. Publisher of Skeptic magazine, a monthly columnist for Scientific American, and a Presidential Fellow at Chapman University. “Why Artificial Intelligence Is Not an Existential Threat” April 2017. Skeptic. Vol. 22, no. 2, pp. 29-35.

Why AI is not an Existential Threat First, most AI doomsday prophecies are grounded in the false analogy between human nature and computer nature, or natural intelligence and artificial intelligence. We are thinking machines, but natural selection also designed into us emotions to shortcut the thinking process because natural intelligences are limited in speed and capacity by the number of neurons that can be crammed into a skull that has to pass through a pelvic opening at birth, whereas artificial intelligence need not be so restricted. We don't need to compute the caloric value of foods, for example, we just feel hungry. We don't need to calculate the waist-to-hip ratio of women or the shoulder-to-waist ratio of men in our quest for genetically healthy potential mates; we just feel attracted to someone and mate with them. We don't need to work out the genetic cost of raising someone else's offspring if our mate is unfaithful; we just feel jealous. We don't need to figure the damage of an unfair or non-reciprocal exchange with someone else; we just feel injustice and desire revenge. Emotions are proxies for getting us to act in ways that lead to an increase in reproductive success, particularly in response to threats faced by our Paleolithic ancestors. Anger leads us to strike out, fight back, and defend ourselves against danger. Fear causes us to pull back, retreat, and escape from risks. Disgust directs us to push out, eject, and expel that which is bad for us. Computing the odds of danger in any given situation takes too long. We need to react instantly. Emotions shortcut the information processing power needed by brains that would otherwise become bogged down with all the computations necessary for survival. Their purpose, in an ultimate causal sense, is to drive behaviors toward goals selected by evolution to enhance survival and reproduction. AIs -- even AGIs and ASIs -- will have no need of such emotions and so there would be no reason to program them in unless, say, terrorists chose to do so for their own evil purposes. But that's a human nature problem, not a computer nature issue. To believe that an ASI would be "evil" in any emotional sense is to assume a computer cognition that includes such psychological traits as acquisitiveness, competitiveness, vengeance, and bellicosity, which seem to be projections coming from the mostly male writers who concoct such dystopias, not features any programmer would bother including, assuming that it could even be done. What would it mean to program an emotion into a computer? When IBM's Deep Blue defeated chess master Garry Kasparov in 1997, did it feel triumphant, vengeful, or bellicose? Of course not. It wasn't even "aware" -- in the human sense of self-conscious knowledge -- that it was playing chess, much less feeling nervous about possibly losing to the reigning world champion (which it did in the first tournament played in 1996). In fact, toward the end of the first game of the second tournament, on the 44th move, Deep Blue made a legal but incomprehensible move of pushing its rook all the way to the last row of the opposition side. It accomplished nothing offensively or defensively, leading Kasparov to puzzle over it out of concern that he was missing something in the computer's strategy. It turned out to be an error in Deep Blue's programming that led to this fail-safe default move. It was a bug that Kasparov mistook as a feature, and as a result some chess experts contend it led him to be less confident in his strategizing and to second-guess his responses in the subsequent games. It even led him to suspect foul play and human intervention behind Deep Blue, and this paranoia ultimately cost him the tournamentt.[ 13] Computers don't get paranoid, the HAL 9000 computer in 2001 notwithstanding. Or consider Watson, the IBM computer built by David Ferrucci and his team of IBM research scientists tasked with designing an AI that could rival human champions at the game of Jeopardy! This was a far more formidable challenge than Deep Blue faced because of the prerequisite to understand language and the often multiple meanings of words, not to mention needing an encyclopedic knowledge of trivia (Watson had access to Wikipedia for this). After beating the all-time greatest Jeopardy! champions Ken Jennings and Brad Rutter in 2011, did Watson feel flushed with pride after its victory? Did Watson even know that it won Jeopardy!? I put the question to none other than Ferrucci himself at a dinner party in New York in conjunction with the 2011 Singularity Summit. His answer surprised me: "Yes, Watson knows it won Jeopardy!" I was skeptical. How could that be, since such self-awareness is not yet possible in computers? "Because I told it that it won," he replied with a wry smile. Sure, and you could even program Watson or Deep Blue to vocalize a Howard Dean-like victory scream when it wins, but that is still a far cry from a computer feeling triumphant. This brings to mind the "hard problem" of consciousness -- if we don't understand how this happens in humans, how could we program it into computers? As Steven Pinker elucidated in his answer to the 2015 Edge Question on what to think about machines that think, "AI dystopias project a parochial alpha-male psychology onto the concept of intelligence. They assume that superhumanly intelligent robots would develop goals like deposing their masters or taking over the world." It is equally possible, Pinker suggests, that "artificial intelligence will naturally develop along female lines: fully capable of solving problems, but with no desire to annihilate innocents or dominate the civilization."[ 14] So the fear that computers will become emotionally evil are unfounded, because without the suite of these evolved emotions it will never occur to AIs to take such actions against us. What about an ASI inadvertently causing our extinction by turning us into paperclips, or tiling the entire Earth's surface with solar panels? Such scenarios imply yet another emotion -- the feeling of valuing or wanting something. As the science writer Michael Chorost adroitly notes, when humans resist an AI from undertaking any form of global tiling, it "will have to be able to imagine counteractions and want to carry them out." Yet, "until an AI has feelings, it's going to be unable to want to do anything at all, let alone act counter to humanity's interests and fight off human resistance." Further, Chorost notes, "the minute an A.I. wants anything, it will live in a universe with rewards and punishments -- including punishments from us for behaving badly. In order to survive in a world dominated by humans, a nascent A.I. will have to develop a humanlike moral sense that certain things are right and others are wrong. By the time it's in a position to imagine tiling the Earth with solar panels, it'll know that it would be morally wrong to do so."[ 15] From here Chorost builds on an argument made by Peter Singer in The Expanding Circle (and Steven Pinker in The Better Angels of Our Nature[ 16] that I also developed in The Moral Arc[ 17] and Robert Wright explored in Nonzero[ 18]), and that is the propensity for natural intelligence to evolve moral emotions that include reciprocity, cooperativeness, and even altruism. Natural intelligences such as ours also includes the capacity to reason, and once you are on Singer's metaphor of the "escalator of reason" it can carry you upward to genuine morality and concerns about harming others. "Reasoning is inherently expansionist. It seeks universal application," Singer notes.[ 19] Chorost draws the implication: "AIs will have to step on the escalator of reason just like humans have, because they will need to bargain for goods in a human-dominated economy and they will face human resistance to bad behavior."[ 20] Finally, for an AI to get around this problem it would need to evolve emotions on its own, but the only way for this to happen in a world dominated by the natural intelligence called humans would be for us to allow it to happen, which we wouldn't because there's time enough to see it coming. Bostrom's "treacherous turn" will come with road signs ahead warning us that there's a sharp bend in the highway with enough time for us to grab the wheel. Incremental progress is what we see in most technologies, including and especially AI, which will continue to serve us in the manner we desire and need. Instead of Great Leap Forward or Giant Fall Backward, think Small Steps Upward. As I proposed in The Moral Arc, instead of Utopia or dystopia, think protopia, a term coined by the futurist Kevin Kelly, who described it in an Edge conversation this way: "I call myself a protopian, not a Utopian. I believe in progress in an incremental way where every year it's better than the year before but not by very much -- just a micro amount."[ 21] Almost all progress in science and technology, including computers and AI, is of a protopian nature. Rarely, if ever, do technologies lead to either Utopian or dystopian societies. Pinker agrees that there is plenty of time to plan for all conceivable contingencies and build safeguards into our AI systems. "They would not need any ponderous 'rules of robotics' or some newfangled moral philosophy to do this, just the same common sense that went into the design of food processors, table saws, space heaters, and automobiles." Sure, an ASI would be many orders of magnitude smarter than these machines, but Pinker reminds us of the AI hyperbole we've been fed for decades: "The worry that an AI system would be so clever at attaining one of the goals programmed into it (like commandeering energy) that it would run roughshod over the others (like human safety) assumes that AI will descend upon us faster than we can design fail-safe precautions. The reality is that progress in AI is hype-defyingly slow, and there will be plenty of time for feedback from incremental implementations, with humans wielding the screwdriver at every stage."[ 22] Former Google CEO Eric Schmidt agrees, responding to the fears expressed by Hawking and Musk this way: "Don't you think the humans would notice this, and start turning off the computers?" He also noted the irony in the fact that Musk has invested $1 billion into a company called OpenAI that is "promoting precisely AI of the kind we are describing."[ 23] Google's own DeepMind has developed the concept of an AI off-switch, playfully described as a "big red button" to be pushed in the event of an attempted AI takeover. "We have proposed a framework to allow a human operator to repeatedly safely interrupt a reinforcement learning agent while making sure the agent will not learn to prevent or induce these interruptions," write the authors Laurent Orseau from DeepMind and Stuart Armstrong from the Future of Humanity Institute, in a paper titled "Safely Interruptible Agents." They even suggest a precautionary scheduled shutdown every night at 2 AM for an hour so that both humans and AI are accustomed to the idea. "Safe interruptibility can be useful to take control of a robot that is misbehaving and may lead to irreversible consequences, or to take it out of a delicate situation, or even to temporarily use it to achieve a task it did not learn to perform or would not normally receive rewards for this."[ 24] As well, it is good to keep in mind that artificial intelligence is not the same as artificial consciousness. Thinking machines may not be sentient machines. Finally, Andrew Ng of Baidu responded to Elon Musk's ASI concerns by noting (in a jab at the entrepreneur's ambitions for colonizing the red planet) it would be "like worrying about overpopulation on Mars when we have not even set foot on the planet yet."[ 25] Both Utopian and dystopian visions of AI are based on a projection of the future quite unlike anything history has given us. Yet, even Ray Kurzweil's "law of accelerating returns," as remarkable as it has been has nevertheless advanced at a pace that has allowed for considerable ethical deliberation with appropriate checks and balances applied to various technologies along the way. With time, even if an unforeseen motive somehow began to emerge in an AI we would have the time to reprogram it before it got out of control. That is also the judgment of Alan Winfield, an engineering professor and co-author of the Principles of Robotics, a list of rules for regulating robots in the real world that goes far beyond Isaac Asimov's famous three laws of robotics (which were, in any case, designed to fail as plot devices for science fictional narratives).26 Winfield points out that all of these doomsday scenarios depend on a long sequence of big ifs to unroll sequentially: "If we succeed in building human equivalent AI and if that AI acquires a full understanding of how it works, and if it then succeeds in improving itself to produce super-intelligent AI, and if that super-AI, accidentally or maliciously, starts to consume resources, and if we fail to pull the plug, then, yes, we may well have a problem. The risk, while not impossible, is improbable."[ 27]

#### Chinese AI leadership is fine

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Beijing’s AI policy priorities are clear. The “Next Generation Artificial Intelligence Development Plan,” announced by China’s State Council in July 2017, called for China to catch up on AI technology and applications by 2020, and to become a global AI innovation hub by 2030. Chinese President Xi Jinping hammered the point home in his 19th Party Congress speech in October, when he mentioned the development of advanced manufacturing and the promotion of further integration of the Internet, big data and artificial intelligence with the real-world economy. Beijing has placed huge bets on AI for a host of political and economic reasons, from improving governance capacity to improving policy development and surveillance. The plan calls for China to lead the way in developing a regulatory environment to both encourage AI development and to mitigate the potential downsides of AI. A few months after the national plan’s announcement in July, the Ministry of Science and Technology (MOST) designated Baidu to lead the autonomous vehicle platform, Tencent for medical, Alibaba for Smart Cities, and iFlyTek for speech interfaces. These plans should be taken seriously, as the Chinese government has shown a strong track record in delivering results. For example, Beijing announced in 2010 that China would become the world’s leader in adopting high-speed rail (HSR). Today it has 60% of the world’s HSR market. In 2014, the Chinese government announced the “Mass Entrepreneurship and Innovation Plan.” Today there are business 8000 incubators in China, compared to 1400 in 2014. These plans have teeth, both due to the deadlines and metrics set out at the national level, as well as the local companies that are likely to take these directions as top priorities. We can expect a similar trajectory for China’s AI policies. Historically, the Chinese government has been open-minded towards technology development. When a new technology comes out, the government will give it the benefit of doubt and let it grow, rather than stifle it with policy or endless debates. Also, the environment in China is more conducive to fast launch and iteration. There is a general belief that it is better to launch something and then get it approved later. This allows Chinese businesses to generate real data at scale, which in turn allows technology to improve over a shorter period of time, particularly once AI is introduced into the equation. For example, while in the US, truckers’ unions are petitioning the Department of Transportation to delay autonomous truck testing, in China, the Xiong’an New Area, a planned smart city development southwest of Beijing, is being designed from the ground up with full autonomy in mind. Various highway authorities are willing to develop road augmentation, special lanes, or move warehouses near highway exits, all to facilitate faster deployment of autonomous trucks. We also see major initiatives in cities, following the central government’s call to action. Shanghai, Nanjing, Wuhan, and Tianjin are but a few of the cities coming out with their own AI initiatives. As with past policies, much of the resources will be applied at the provincial and city government levels. The types of resources may include subsidies for top talent (especially overseas talent); guidance for top VC funds, with the government playing the role of limited partner (LP) but offering some of its upside to the general partners (GPs) of the funds; special programs for top AI companies and start-ups (free rent, subsidy for local hiring, housing and private school for top talents); and technical awards for companies and individuals. Finally, the US, EU, and China will also compete to be out in front on developing a regulatory regime around AI technologies and applications. The National Plan’s explicit recognition of the need for regulatory, legal, and ethical principles for AI development and use represents an uncommonly foresighted approach. Of course, the government’s approach to AI regulation, ethics, and economic adjustment will reflect Beijing’s broader model of governance and ideology. Given its preference for a state-centric approach to international issues, for example, it is possible China will launch an initiative via the UN to establish first an automation/AI-related “code of conduct,” or basic regulatory approach, followed by a special committee on the topic and eventually an oversight body operating within a UN framework. Such an initiative would put China at the forefront of developing a global approach to these issues. Beijing has attempted a similar approach on cybersecurity issues, which it argues have a global impact and require a global regulatory response.

#### Thousands of years off, if possible

Daniel C. **Dennett 19**. University Professor and Austin B. Fletcher Professor of Philosophy and director of the Center for Cognitive Studies at Tufts University. “Is Superintelligence Impossible? On Possible Minds: Philosophy and AI.” The Edge. 4-10-2019. https://www.edge.org/conversation/david\_chalmers-daniel\_c\_dennett-is-superintelligence-impossible

Let’s talk about "possible" for the moment. There are lots of things that are possible, and philosophers love to talk about what’s possible, but many things that are obviously possible are never going to be actual. It’s possible to build a bridge across the Atlantic. We’re not going to do it, not now, not in a hundred years, not in a thousand years. It would cost too much money and would be a foolish endeavor. A lot of the imagined AI projects that are perfectly possible in principle are not worth doing. In fact, some of them are definitely things that we shouldn’t do because they’ll make more problems for us than they'll solve. Just bear that in mind. Somebody said that the philosopher is the one who says, "We know it’s possible in practice, we’re trying to figure out if it’s possible in principle." Unfortunately, philosophers sometimes spend too much time worrying about logical possibilities that are importantly negligible in every other regard. So, let me go on the record as saying, yes, I think that conscious AI is possible because, after all, what are we? We’re conscious. We’re robots made of robots made of robots. We’re actual. In principle, you could make us out of other materials. Some of your best friends in the future could be robots. Possible in principle, absolutely no secret ingredients, but we’re not going to see it. We’re not going to see it for various reasons. One is, if you want a conscious agent, we’ve got plenty of them around and they’re quite wonderful, whereas the ones that we would make would be not so wonderful.

# DEMOCRACY GOOD

### 2ac – TL

#### Democracy solves extinction.

Twining 21, PhD, president of the International Republican Institute, former director of the Asia Program at the German Marshall Fund. (Daniel, 10-10-2021, "America must double down on democracy", *The Hill*, <https://thehill.com/opinion/campaign/575693-america-must-double-down-on-democracy>) \*language edited

The hard truth is that a world that is less free is one that is less secure, stable and prosperous. The greatest dangers to the American way of life emanate from hostile autocracies. There are no quick fixes, but the best antidotes to the challenges of great-power conflict, terrorism and mass migration of desperate refugees lie in the building of inclusive democratic institutions — and working with allied democracies to sustain the free and open order that China, in particular, wishes to replace with a world that’s safe for autocracy. The conventional wisdom that authoritarianism has popular momentum is wrong. No one anywhere is taking to the street to demand more corrupt governance, the adoption of one-man rule, a stronger surveillance state, or greater intervention by malign foreign powers. Democratic freedoms are unquestionably under assault in many nations. Autocrats are aggressive precisely because of the growing demands for change in their more modern, connected societies — and the rising risk that middle classes in nations such as China and Russia will not be willing forever to forfeit political rights for prosperity. American retrenchment and isolationism compound the danger. It would be nice to live in a world where failed states and dictatorships were a problem for someone else to worry about. But rather than producing stability, Western retreat only emboldens autocrats in ways that amplify dangers to American national security. We know that violent extremism flourishes under state failure and dictatorship. Broken states become breeding grounds for extremist groups because they leave vacuums that terrorists are only too happy to fill. In nations without democratic accountability, citizens become drawn to the only forms of expression available to them, which are often violent and extreme. The good news is that we have billions of allies around the world: citizens on every continent chafing for greater freedom and dignity. They do not want U.S. military-led nation-building. They want peaceful support for their independent efforts to create democratic space in systems distorted by overweening government control, dangerous governance gaps and foreign malign influence. The free world cannot be neutral in the face of autocracy’s resurgence. Rather, it should play to its strengths. The appeal of democratic opportunity is a strategic asset for the United States — despite our own shortcomings — because people around the world similarly aspire to live in societies that guarantee justice, rights and dignity. America’s closest allies are democracies. Democracies don’t fight each other, export violent extremism, or produce the conflicts that drive mass migration. Democracies are better partners in fighting terrorism, human trafficking and poverty, as well as establishing reliable trading relationships. Open societies incubate the technologies that will help solve the world’s most pressing problems, including climate change. Citizens can hold leaders accountable when they fall short, and democratic institutions are stronger than any [individual] ~~man~~ — as America itself witnessed after the assault on the U.S. Capitol on Jan. 6.

### XT: War

#### Decline triggers global war quickly

Diamond 19, PhD in Sociology, professor of Sociology and Political Science at Stanford University (Larry, “Ill Winds: Saving Democracy from Russian Rage, Chinese Ambition and American Complacency,” Kindle Edition)

In such a near future, my fellow experts would no longer talk of “democratic erosion.” We would be spiraling downward into a time of democratic despair, recalling Daniel Patrick Moynihan’s grim observation from the 1970s that liberal democracy “is where the world was, not where it is going.” 5 The world pulled out of that downward spiral—but it took new, more purposeful American leadership. The planet was not so lucky in the 1930s, when the global implosion of democracy led to a catastrophic world war, between a rising axis of emboldened dictatorships and a shaken and economically depressed collection of self-doubting democracies. These are the stakes. Expanding democracy—with its liberal norms and constitutional commitments—is a crucial foundation for world peace and security. Knock that away, and our most basic hopes and assumptions will be imperiled. The problem is not just that the ground is slipping. It is that we are perched on a global precipice. That ledge has been gradually giving way for a decade. If the erosion continues, we may well reach a tipping point where democracy goes bankrupt suddenly—plunging the world into depths of oppression and aggression that we have not seen since the end of World War II. As a political scientist, I know that our theories and tools are not nearly good enough to tell us just how close we are getting to that point—until it happens.

#### Democratic backsliding leads to nuke war and threat-multiplication

Kendall-Taylor 19, Senior Fellow and Director of the Transatlantic Security Program at the Center for a New American Security (CNAS) (Andrea, February 26th, “Autocracy’s Advance and Democracy’s Decline: National Security Implications of the Rise of Authoritarianism Around the World”, <https://www.cnas.org/publications/congressional-testimony/testimony-before-the-house-permanent-select-committee-on-intelligence-1>, accessed 7/21/19)

The growing prevalence of personalized autocracies is cause for concern because they tend to produce the worst outcomes of any type of political regime: they tend to produce the most risky and aggressive foreign policies; the most likely to invest in nuclear weapons;7 the most likely to fight wars against democracies;8 and the most likely to initiate interstate conflicts.9 As the adventurism of Iraq’s Saddam Hussein, Uganda’s Idi Amin, and North Korea’s Kim Jong-un suggests, a lack of accountability often translates into an ability to take risks that other dictatorial systems simply cannot afford.

Russia underscores the link between rising personalism and aggression. Although Putin’s actions in Crimea and Syria were designed to advance a number of key Russian goals, it is also likely that Putin’s lack of domestic constraints increased the level of risk he was willing to accept in pursuit of those goals. Putin’s tight control over the media ensures that the public receives only the official narrative of foreign events. Limited access to outside information makes it difficult for Russians to access unbiased accounts of the goings-on in the rest of the world and gauge Putin’s success in the foreign policy arena. Putin’s elimination of competing voices within his regime further ensures that he faces minimal accountability for his foreign policy actions.

Politics in China show many of these same trends. Xi’s increasingly aggressive posture in the South China Sea has occurred alongside the rising personalization of the political system. Xi has amassed substantial personal power since coming to office in 2012 and continues to roll back the norms of the post-Mao collective leadership system. If Xi further consolidates control and limits accountability—particularly over military and foreign policy bodies—research suggests that he, too, could feel free to further escalate his aggressive rhetoric and actions in the South China Sea.

Not only do personalist dictatorships pursue aggressive foreign policies—they are also often difficult and unpredictable partners. Research underscores that, thanks to limited constraints on decisionmaking, personalist leaders generally have the latitude to change their minds on a whim, producing volatile and erratic policies.10 Moreover, personalist leaders—think Putin, Bolivian President Evo Morales, and Venezuelan President Nicolás Maduro—are among those autocrats who are most suspicious of U.S. intentions and who see the creation of an external enemy as an effective means of boosting public support. Anti-U.S. rhetoric, therefore, is most pronounced in personalist settings.

### XT: War – DPT

#### DPT is an empirical law---prices in confounding variables

Imai 21 — Kosuke Imai is Professor of Government and of Statistics at Harvard University. Imai, K., & Lo, J. (2021). Robustness of Empirical Evidence for the Democratic Peace: A Nonparametric Sensitivity Analysis. International Organization, 75(3), 901-919. doi:10.1017/S0020818321000126 WMK

The proposition that democratic states do not fight interstate wars against each other is one of the most enduring and influential ideas in international relations. The idea is theoretically rooted in the work of Immanuel Kant, who argued that interactions between states with a republican form of government give “a favorable prospect for the desired consequence, i.e., perpetual peace.”Footnote1 This has led to a large literature empirically documenting a negative association between democracy and conflict,Footnote2 leading one scholar to comment that the democratic peace is “the closest thing we have to an empirical law in the study of international relations.”Footnote3

Despite the law-like nature of this association, no scholarly consensus has emerged on whether the observed association reflects a causal relationship or a spurious correlation. According to a recent survey, more than 30 percent of international relations scholars disagree with the democratic peace theory.Footnote4 In particular, skeptics have challenged the democratic peace by arguing that alliance structures from the Cold War,Footnote5 capitalism,Footnote6 and contract-intensive economiesFootnote7 confound the observed association. These authors find that adding certain confounding variables to regression models eliminates the statistical significance of the estimated coefficient for the joint democracy variable.Footnote8

How should we resolve this empirical debate regarding the democratic peace?Footnote9 Unfortunately, in the absence of randomized experiments, we can never completely rule out the possible existence of confounding biases that arise from omitted variables. While scholars in this literature have exclusively relied on parametric regression models, this approach requires strong assumptions, namely that the model accurately characterizes the true data-generating process (correct set of variables, right functional form, valid distributional assumption, etc.). Given that these assumptions may not be verifiable from observed data, it is no surprise that various scholars advocate different regression models with diverging sets of variables, resulting in contradictory findings. The difficulty of adjudicating between these alternative modeling approaches has led to the ongoing controversy in the empirical democratic peace literature.

We propose an alternative approach based on nonparametric sensitivity analysis to formally assess the robustness of the empirical evidence.Footnote10 Specifically, we quantify the strength of confounding relationships that could explain away the observed association between democracy and peace. That is, we compute the precise level of unobserved confounding needed to render the observed association between democracy and conflict spurious. The idea is that although not all correlations imply causation, a very strong correlation suggests it. Unlike the parametric regression modeling approach prevalent in the literature, the proposed nonparametric sensitivity approach directly addresses the existence of unobserved confounders without assuming a particular regression model.Footnote11 Although one can never know with certainty from observational data whether democracy causes peace, this nonparametric sensitivity analysis can formally assess the robustness of empirical evidence for the democratic peace.

Our analysis applies the nonparametric sensitivity analysis method originally developed by Cornfield and colleagues, who were concerned with the robustness of the positive association between cigarette smoking and lung cancer in the potential presence of unobserved confounders.Footnote12 The study of the causal relationship between smoking and lung cancer closely parallels the dispute on the democratic peace. In both cases, randomized experiments cannot be conducted for ethical and logistical reasons, and critics contend that the observed association suffers from confounding biases. While no definitive conclusion can be drawn from observational data, Cornfield and colleagues argue that no existing confounder can explain the strong association between smoking and cancer and therefore this relationship is likely to be causal. Their conclusion is worth quoting here:

Cigarette smokers have a ninefold greater risk of developing lung cancer than nonsmokers, while over-two-pack-a-day smokers have at least a 60-fold greater risk. Any characteristic proposed as a measure of the postulated cause common to both smoking status and lung-cancer risk must therefore be at least nine-fold more prevalent among cigarette smokers than among nonsmokers and at least 60-fold more prevalent among two-pack-a-day smokers. No such characteristic has yet been produced despite diligent search.Footnote13

Our application of nonparametric sensitivity analysis to the democratic peace yields striking results. Depending on the definition of democracy, we find that a confounder must be at least forty-seven times more prevalent in democratic dyads than in other types of dyads. Thus, any potential confounder that could explain the democratic peace would have to be at least five times as prevalent as a similar confounder for smoking and lung cancer. In other words, according to our analysis, the positive association between democracy and peace is much more robust than that between smoking and lung cancer.

While no such confounder has yet been found for the relationship between smoking and lung cancer, we examine whether the confounders identified in the democratic peace literature meet the conditions of nonparametric sensitivity analysis. For example, we consider a set of economic confounders proposed by Gartzke who argues that the democratic peace can be explained by capitalism.Footnote14 We also consider other confounders, such as military alliances.Footnote15 Overall, our findings imply that for a potential confounder to explain away the democratic peace, it must be much more strongly associated with regime types and conflicts than the confounders that have been proposed to date. This finding again demonstrates the robustness of empirical evidence for the democratic peace.

#### Democratic spread puts a cap on conflict, and authoritarianism makes all of their impacts more likely

Diamond 19 – PhD in Sociology, professor of Sociology and Political Science at Stanford University (Larry, “Ill Winds: Saving Democracy from Russian Rage, Chinese Ambition and American Complacency,” Kindle Edition)

To make our republics more perfect, established democracies must not only adopt reforms to more fully include and empower their own citizens. They must also support people, groups, and institutions struggling to achieve democratic values elsewhere. The best way to counter Russian rage and Chinese ambition is to show that Moscow and Beijing are on the wrong side of history; that people everywhere yearn to be free; and that they can make freedom work to achieve a more just, sustainable, and prosperous society. In our networked age, both idealism and the harder imperatives of global power and security argue for more democracy, not less. For one thing, if we do not worry about the quality of governance in lower-income countries, we will face more and more troubled and failing states. Famine and genocide are the curse of authoritarian states, not democratic ones. Outright state collapse is the ultimate, bitter fruit of tyranny. When countries like Syria, Libya, and Afghanistan descend into civil war; when poor states in Africa cannot generate jobs and improve their citizens’ lives due to rule by corrupt and callous strongmen; when Central American societies are held hostage by brutal gangs and kleptocratic rulers, people flee—and wash up on the shores of the democracies. Europe and the United States cannot withstand the rising pressures of immigration unless they work to support better, more stable and accountable government in troubled countries. The world has simply grown too small, too flat, and too fast to wall off rotten states and pretend they are on some other planet. Hard security interests are at stake. As even the Trump administration’s 2017 National Security Strategy makes clear, the main threats to U.S. national security all stem from authoritarianism, whether in the form of tyrannies from Russia and China to Iran and North Korea or in the guise of antidemocratic terrorist movements such as ISIS. 1 By supporting the development of democracy around the world, we can deny these authoritarian adversaries the geopolitical running room they seek. Just as Russia, China, and Iran are trying to undermine democracies to bend other countries to their will, so too can we contain these autocrats’ ambitions by helping other countries build effective, resilient democracies that can withstand the dictators’ malevolence. Of course, democratically elected governments with open societies will not support the American line on every issue. But no free society wants to mortgage its future to another country. The American national interest would best be secured by a pluralistic world of free countries—one in which autocrats can no longer use corruption and coercion to gobble up resources, alliances, and territory. If you look back over our history to see who has posed a threat to the United States and our allies, it has always been authoritarian regimes and empires. As political scientists have long noted, no two democracies have ever gone to war with each other—ever. It is not the democracies of the world that are supporting international terrorism, proliferating weapons of mass destruction, or threatening the territory of their neighbors.

#### DPT true

Hegre et al. ’18 (Havard; Professor Department of Peace and Conflict Research Uppsala University; Michael Bernhard; Miriam Ehrlich Chair in Political Science Department of Political Science University of Florida; Jan Teorell; Professor of Political Science Department of Political Science Lund University; *Reassessing the Democratic Peace: A Novel Test Based on the Varieties of Democracy Data*; <https://gupea.ub.gu.se/bitstream/2077/56045/1/gupea_2077_56045_1.pdf>; accessed 7/17/19)

4. Results

We estimated two sets of models for all pairs of states for every year over the 1900–2010 period with the democratic peace hypothesis represented as the democracy score(s) of the stronger country, that of the weaker country, the interaction of these two, and several control variables. In the first set of models, we entered the five indicators of constraint one by one along with our control variables. Figure 3 summarizes the results from these models. Complete estimation results in table form with all control variables are found in Appendix Table A-1.

The first model (called ‘Electoral accountability’) enters the three terms based on the electoral accountability index along with control variables. The estimates from this model are printed in green color at the top of the figure. The points represent the estimates and the whiskers their estimated 95% confidence interval. The two main terms are both positive, although that for the weaker country is not statistically significant. The interaction between the index values for the two countries in the dyad, on the other hand, is negative and highly significant – when both countries score highly in terms of electoral accountability, the risk of fatal dispute is much lower than if either have low scores. In line with expectations, we show in Appendix Table A-3 that the effect of electoral democracy is driven by the “Schumpeterian” core dimensions tapping into contestation – whereas suffrage does not play an independent role in promoting peace.

The second model enters the ‘Legislative constraints’ index terms. Again, the interaction term is negative and significant, whereas the main terms are positive and significant. Similar patterns are observed for the other three individual indicators.

Figure 4 shows that the net effect for each of these indicators is consistent with the democratic peace. In the left panels, the dashed line plots the estimated log odds of a MID when the weaker country j is at the mean of the index, as a function of the score for the stronger country (along the x-axis). The metric for the y-axis is log odds relative to the case where both countries have scores of 0 for the index. The dotted and solid lines show the same when the index is one standard deviation below or above the mean.19

The graph on the right plots the marginal effect of this relationship – it shows the change in the estimated probability of a fatal dispute when comparing a pair of countries where the weaker country has a value for the index one standard deviation below the mean and one standard 22 deviation above, respectively, as a function of the index for the stronger country. Both these graphs show a clear dyadic democratic peace in terms of all our indices of constraint – a more democratic weaker country means a clearly lower risk of fatal MID if the stronger country is relatively democratic.20

All of our individual indicators of constraint reflect the democratic peace when entered on their own. Given the high correlation between them, however, each of them may serve as a proxy for one of the other. We investigate which of them are relatively most important along two routes.

#### Prefer our evidence---newest methods provide clear causality.

Hegre et al. ’18 (Havard; Professor Department of Peace and Conflict Research Uppsala University; Michael Bernhard; Miriam Ehrlich Chair in Political Science Department of Political Science University of Florida; Jan Teorell; Professor of Political Science Department of Political Science Lund University; *Reassessing the Democratic Peace: A Novel Test Based on the Varieties of Democracy Data*; <https://gupea.ub.gu.se/bitstream/2077/56045/1/gupea_2077_56045_1.pdf>; accessed 7/17/19)

5. Conclusion

In this article we have introduced two novelties into the study of the democratic peace. First, we make use of the V-Dem data and demonstrate that it improves on Polity, the dominant measure in that literature, along at least two dimensions. First, V-Dem has a superior concept-to measurement consistency, given its starting point was the overt modeling of democracy. Moreover, the V-Dem data are vastly more detailed than Polity, allowing us to operationalize much more precise theoretical mechanisms than the simpler datasets. Accordingly, our fit tests show that our V-Dem-based indices model the democratic peace much better than Polity, both in terms of in-sample goodness of fit and out-of-sample predictive performance.

Second, and more importantly, we have identified a subset of the multiplicity of democracy’s attributes that seem to explain its ability to deter war-like behavior. Specifically we show that, when entered individually, electoral accountability, judicial and legislative constraints on the executive, media freedom and civil society participation promote the democratic peace, when controlling for the other standard determinants of inter-state disputes. When pitted against each 28 other, however, only horizontal constraints on the executive and civil society participation continue to have a direct effect on dyadic peace. We thus find most consistent support for the horizontal and informal-vertical accountability mechanisms underlying the democratic peace. Earlier we cited the claim of Maoz and Russett (1993, 626) that ‘the mobilization of … general public opinion’ matters at the same order of importance as the ‘variety of institutions that make up the system of government’. Our findings provide support for the institutional side of their claims but to some extent contradict what they say about social mobilization. We confirm important aspects of earlier work on the democratic peace such as Doyle’s (1983a,b) ‘liberal peace’ argument and Choi’s (2010) focus on legislative veto players. However, our results on the role of civil society suggest that social mobilization is also important. The exclusion of the peace-making role of civil society in this literature may well be a function of the past paucity of data to measure it. Given the strong model fit and predictive performance of the models that include this new V-Dem variable, this omission has been an important oversight in the literature from the perspective of our constraint-based theorization of the mechanisms behind the democratic peace.

### 2ac – Terrorism


#### Democracy solves terrorism---the data *overwhelmingly goes our way*.

Magen 18, Amichai; head of the Diplomacy and Conflict Studies Program at the Lauder School of Government, Diplomacy, and Strategy of the Interdisciplinary Center (IDC) in Herzliya, Israel. He is also a senior researcher at the International Institute for Counter-Terrorism (ICT). (*Fighting Terrorism: The Democracy Advantage*; Journal of Democracy Volume 29, Issue 1, Pages 111-125; <https://www.journalofdemocracy.org/articles/fighting-terrorism-the-democracy-advantage/>; accessed 7/22/19)

The scourge of terrorism is real, yet summary data tell us little about the distribution of attacks or the rates of increase in terrorist incidents across various regime types. In reality, the disparity in the internal distribution [End Page 115] of terrorism incidents across regime types is already immense and seems to be getting wider.

A number of insights can be gleaned from the aggregate trends. Contrary to the traditional view, we observe a robust and growing “double democracy advantage” among liberal democracies and polyarchies over the 2002–16 period, and especially since 2007. Not only are higher-quality democracies less prone to terrorist attacks than all other regime types, but the rate of increase in the number of attacks among such democracies is substantially lower in comparison to the rest.

The pattern is maintained even where we exclude any country that is farther than two standard deviations from the subcategory mean, namely the United Kingdom among liberal democracies, and Israel among the polyarchies. This is all the more striking given the already relatively low levels of terrorist incidents experienced by liberal democracies and polyarchies at the start of the measurement period. It lends support to the minority view in the literature that sees political openness and the protection of civil liberties and the rule of law as assets that facilitate the minimization of terrorism through the airing and redress of grievances; the wide scope granted to peaceful political expression; and the resulting lower legitimacy accorded to violent fringe groups.



#### Terrorism goes nuclear.

Arguello 18, founder and chair of the NPSGlobal Foundation, and head of the secretariat of the Latin American and Caribbean Leadership Network. She holds a degree in physics, a Master’s in business administration, and completed graduate studies in defense and security. Arguello previously worked on nuclear projects for the Argentine National Atomic Energy Commission. (Irma, “The global impacts of a terrorist nuclear attack: What would happen? What should we do?”, *Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists*)

Though hard to accept, the detonation of a nuclear device – by states or non-state actors – is today a plausible scenario. And while much of the world’s focus has been on the current nuclear weapons arsenals possessed by states – about 14,550 warheads, all of which carry the risk of intentional or unintentional use – the threat of nuclear terrorism is here and increasing. For more than a decade, Al Qaeda, Aum Shinrikyo, and other terrorist groups have expressed their desire to acquire fissile material to build and detonate an improvised nuclear bomb. None of them could fulfill that goal – so far. But that does not mean that they will not succeed in the future. Making matters worse, there is evidence of an illicit market for nuclear weapons-usable materials. There are sellers in search of potential buyers, as shown by the dismantlement of a nuclear smuggling network in Moldova in 2015. There certainly are plenty of sites from which to obtain nuclear material. According to the 2016 Nuclear Security Index by the Nuclear Threat Initiative, 24 countries still host inventories of nuclear weapons-usable materials, stored in facilities with different degrees of security. And in terms of risk, it is not necessary for a given country to possess nuclear weapons, weapons-usable materials, or nuclear facilities for it to be useful to nuclear terrorists: Structural and institutional weaknesses in a country may make it favorable for the illicit trade of materials. Permeable boundaries, high levels of corruption, weaknesses in judicial systems, and consequent impunity may give rise to a series of transactions and other events, which could end in a nuclear attack. The truth is that, at this stage, no country in possession of nuclear weapons or weapons-usable materials can guarantee their full protection against nuclear terrorism or nuclear smuggling. Because we live in a world of growing insecurity, where explicit and tacit agreements between the relevant powers – which upheld global stability during the post-Cold War – are giving way to increasing mistrust and hostility, a question arises: How would our lives be affected if a current terrorist group such as the Islamic State (ISIS), or new terrorist groups in the future, succeed in evolving from today’s Manchester style “low-tech” attacks to a “high-tech” one, involving a nuclear bomb, detonated in a capital city, anywhere in the world? We attempted to answer this question in a report developed by a high-level multidisciplinary expert group convened by the NPSGlobal Foundation for the Latin American and Caribbean Leadership Network. We found that there would be multiple harmful effects that would spread promptly around the globe (Arguello and Buis 2016); a more detailed analysis is below, which highlights the need for the creation of a comprehensive nuclear security system. The consequences of a terrorist nuclear attack A small and primitive 1-kiloton fission bomb (with a yield of about one-fifteenth of the one dropped on Hiroshima, and certainly much less sophisticated; cf. Figure 1), detonated in any large capital city of the developed world, would cause an unprecedented catastrophic scenario. An estimate of direct effects in the attack’s location includes a death toll of 7,300-to-23,000 people and 12,600-to-57,000 people injured, depending on the target’s geography and population density. Total physical destruction of the city’s infrastructure, due to the blast (shock wave) and thermal radiation, would cover a radius of about 500 meters from the point of detonation (also known as ground zero), while ionizing radiation greater than 5 Sieverts – compatible with the deadly acute radiation syndrome – would expand within an 850-meter radius. From the environmental point of view, such an area would be unusable for years. In addition, radioactive fallout would expand in an area of about 300 square kilometers, depending on meteorological conditions (cf. Figure 2). But the consequences would go far beyond the effects in the target country, however, and promptly propagate worldwide. Global and national security, economy and finance, international governance and its framework, national political systems, and the behavior of governments and individuals would all be put under severe trial. The severity of the effects at a national level, however, would depend on the countries’ level of development, geopolitical location, and resilience. Global security and regional/national defense schemes would be strongly affected. An increase in global distrust would spark rising tensions among countries and blocs, that could even lead to the brink of nuclear weapons use by states (if, for instance, a sponsor country is identified). The consequences of such a shocking scenario would include a decrease in states’ self-control, an escalation of present conflicts and the emergence of new ones, accompanied by an increase in military unilateralism and military expenditures.

### I/L Terrorism

#### Democracy prevents state collapse – failed states are a prerequisite to organized terror

Abrams 16 – Former assistant secretary of state for human rights and humanitarian affairs (Elliott, lead author on a foreign policy essay written along with 145 other influential ambassadors, former members of Congress, NED and UNCHR staff, etc.,“U.S. Must Put Democracy at the Center of its Foreign Policy,” *Foreign Policy*, https://foreignpolicy.com/2016/03/16/the-u-s-must-put-democracy-at-the-center-of-its-foreign-policy/)

The United States is founded on the principles of life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness, and for decades, support for democracy and human rights around the world has been a central tenet of American foreign policy. While the United States must maintain relations with many autocratic governments abroad, there are excellent reasons why most of our closest allies are democracies. Free nations are more economically successful, more stable, and more reliable partners for the United States. Democratic societies are less likely to launch aggression and war against their neighbors or their own people. They are also less likely to experience state failure and become breeding grounds for instability and terrorism, as we have seen, for example, in Syria. This means that the advance of democracy serves U.S. interests and contributes to order and peace around the globe. During the past four decades, the number of countries that are free and democratic has more than doubled. From Latin America and Central Europe to East Asia and sub-Saharan Africa, people have opted for accountable government. This remarkable progress is rooted in the universal longing for liberty and dignity — but it is also due to America’s strong support for human rights and democracy, under administrations of both parties. This support has been not only a means of expressing the values upon which our nation was founded, but also a pragmatic choice to promote the governing system that advances security, provides stable markets, and protects human rights. We write to urge you to embrace this cause and to make it a central part of your foreign policy platform. In recent years, authoritarian regimes such as Russia and China have become more repressive; they see the advance of democracy not only within their borders but in neighboring states as a threat to their monopoly on political power. A regime’s treatment of its own people often indicates how it will behave toward its neighbors and beyond. Thus, we should not be surprised that so many of the political, economic and security challenges we face emanate from places like Moscow, Beijing, Pyongyang, Tehran, and Damascus. Repressive regimes are inherently unstable and must rely on suppressing democratic movements and civil society to stay in power. They also are the source and exporter of massive corruption, a pervasive transnational danger to stable democratic governance throughout the world. The result is that democracy is under attack. According to Freedom House, freedom around the world has declined every year for the past decade. That heightens the imperative for the United States to work with fellow democracies to reinvigorate support for democratic reformers everywhere. Supporting freedom around the world does not mean imposing American values or staging military interventions. In non-democratic countries, it means peacefully and creatively aiding local activists who seek democratic reform and look to the United States for moral, political, diplomatic, and sometimes material support. These activists often risk prison, torture, and death struggling for a more democratic society, and their resilience and courage amid such threats demand our support. Helping them upholds the principles upon which our country was founded. Supporting democracy involves partnerships between the U.S. government and non-governmental organizations that are struggling to bring freedom to their countries. Often, it means partnering as well with emerging democracies to strengthen their representative and judicial institutions. This requires resources that Congress must continue to provide, and foreign assistance must be linked to positive performance with regard to human rights and the advancement of fundamental freedoms. It also requires diplomatic backing at the highest levels of the Executive Branch, throughout the different agencies of government, and from the Congress as well. It means meeting with democratic activists from various parts of the world and speaking out on their behalf. Demonstrating solidarity with and support for these brave individuals’ efforts to build a better future for their country is the right thing to do. In aiding their struggles for freedom and justice, we build a more secure world for the United States. There is no cookie-cutter approach to supporting democracy and human rights, but there are fundamental, universal features we should emphasize: representative institutions, rule of law, accountability, free elections, anti-corruption, free media (including the Internet), vibrant civil society, independent trade unions, property rights, open markets, women’s and minority rights, and freedoms of expression, assembly, association, and religion. Many Americans question why the United States should have to shoulder the burdens of supporting freedom and democracy throughout the world. But a growing number of democracies in Europe and Asia, as well as international organizations, are expending significant resources to lend this kind of assistance. We should continue to build on our partnerships with like-minded organizations and countries, including relatively new democracies that are eager to help others striving for freedom. Some argue that we can pursue either our democratic ideals or our national security, but not both. This is a false choice. We recognize that we have other interests in the economic, energy, and security realms with other countries and that democracy and human rights cannot be the only items on the foreign policy agenda. But all too often, these issues get shortchanged or dropped entirely in order to smooth bilateral relationships in the short run. The instability that has characterized the Middle East for decades is the direct result of generations of authoritarian repression, the lack of accountable government, and the repression of civil society, not the demands that we witnessed during the Arab Spring of 2011 and since for dignity and respect for basic human rights. In the longer run, we pay the price in instability and conflict when corrupt, autocratic regimes collapse. Our request is that you elevate democracy and human rights to a prominent place on your foreign policy agenda. These are challenging times for freedom in many respects, as countries struggle to make democracy work and powerful autocracies brutalize their own citizens while undermining their neighbors. But these autocracies are also vulnerable. Around the world, ordinary people continue to show their preference for participatory democracy and accountable government. Thus, there is real potential to renew global democratic progress. For that to happen, the United States must exercise leadership, in league with our democratic allies, to support homegrown efforts to make societies freer and governments more democratic. We ask you to commit to providing that leadership and to embracing the cause of democracy and human rights if elected president of the United States.

### ! Terrorism

#### Terrorism causes nuclear war---lash out ensures escalation

Hayes ’18 [Peter; January 18th; *Non-State Terrorism and Inadvertent Nuclear War*; <https://nautilus.org/napsnet/napsnet-special-reports/non-state-terrorism-and-inadvertent-nuclear-war/>; accessed 11/16/18//MSCOTT]

Conclusion

We now move to our conclusion. Nuclear-armed states can place themselves on the edge of nuclear war by a combination of threatening force deployments and threat rhetoric. Statements by US and North Korea’s leaders and supporting amplification by state and private media to present just such a lethal combination. Many observers have observed that the risk of war and nuclear war, in Korea and globally, have increased in the last few years—although no-one can say with authority by how much and exactly for what reasons. However, states are restrained in their actual decisions to escalate to conflict and/or nuclear war by conventional deterrence, vital national interests, and other institutional and political restraints, both domestic and international. It is not easy, in the real world, or even in fiction, to start nuclear wars.[19] Rhetorical threats are standard fare in realist and constructivist accounts of inter-state nuclear deterrence, compellence, and reassurance, and are not cause for alarm per se. States will manage the risk in each of the threat relationships with other nuclear armed states to stay back from the brink, let alone go over it, as they have in the past. This argument was powerful and to many, persuasive during the Cold War although it does not deny the hair-raising risks taken by nuclear armed states during this period. Today, the multi-polarity of nine nuclear weapons states interacting in a four-tiered nuclear threat system means that the practice of sustaining nuclear threat and preparing for nuclear war is no longer merely complicated, but is now enormously complex in ways that may exceed the capacity of some and perhaps all states to manage, even without the emergence of a fifth tier of non-state actors to add further unpredictability to how this system works in practice. The possibility that non-state actors may attack without advance warning as to the time, place, and angle of attack presents another layer of uncertainty to this complexity as to how inter-state nuclear war may break out. That is, non-state actors with nuclear weapons or threat goals and capacities do not seek the same goals, will not use the same control systems, and will use radically different organizational procedures and systems to deliver on their threats compared with nuclear armed states. If used tactically for immediate terrorist effect, a non-state nuclear terrorist could violently attack nuclear facilities, exploiting any number of vulnerabilities in fuel cycle facility security, or use actual nuclear materials and even warheads against military or civilian targets. If a persistent, strategically oriented nuclear terrorist succeed in gaining credible nuclear threat capacities, it might take hostage one or more states or cities. If such an event coincides with already high levels of tension and even military collisions between the non-nuclear forces of nuclear armed states, then a non-state nuclear terrorist attack could impel a nuclear armed state to escalate its threat or even military actions against other states, in the belief that this targeted state may have sponsored the non-state attack, or was simply the source of the attack, whatever the declared identity of the attacking non-state entity. This outcome could trigger these states to go onto one or more of the pathways to inadvertent nuclear war, especially if the terrorist attack was on a high value and high risk nuclear facility or involved the seizure and/or use of fissile material. Some experts dismiss this possibility as so remote as to be not worth worrying about. Yet the history of nuclear terrorism globally and in the Northeast Asian region suggests otherwise. Using the sand castle metaphor, once built on the high tide line, sand castles may withstand the wind but eventually succumb to the tide once it reaches the castle—at least once, usually twice a day. Also, theories of organizational and technological failure point to the coincidence of multiple, relatively insignificant driving events that interact before accumulate in ways that lead the “metasystem” to fail, even if each individual component of a system works perfectly. Thus, the potential catalytic effect of a nuclear terrorist incident is not that it would of itself lead to a sudden inter-state nuclear war; but that at a time of crisis when alert levels are already high, when control systems on nuclear forces have already shifted from primary emphasis on negative to positive control, when decision making is already stressed, when the potential for miscalculation is already high due to shows of force indicating that first-use is nigh, when rhetorical threats promising annihilation on the one hand, or collapse of morale and weakness on the other invite counter-vailing threats by nuclear adversaries or their allies to gain the upper hand in the “contest of resolve,” and when organizational cybernetics may be in play such that purposeful actions are implemented differently than intended, then a terrorist nuclear attack may shift a coincident combination of some or all of these factors to a threshold level where they collectively lead to a first-use decision by one or more nuclear-armed states. If the terrorist attack is timed or happens to coincide with high levels of inter-state tension involving nuclear-armed states, then some or all of these tendencies will likely be in play anyway—precisely the concern of those who posit pathways to inadvertent nuclear war as outlined in section 2 above.

## ATs Demo Bad T/s

### AT: Warming

#### Democracy is key to solve warming — authoritarian states aren’t empirically better, there is no alternative, and uncaring public thesis is wrong

Willis 21 — Rebecca Willis is a professor of energy and climate governance at the University of Lancaster, and the author of Too Hot to Handle? The Democratic Challenge of Climate Change. Willis, Rebecca. “The big idea: Is democracy up to the task of climate change?” The Guardian. November 1st, 2021. <https://www.theguardian.com/books/2021/nov/01/the-big-idea-is-democracy-up-to-the-task-of-climate-change> WMK

Yet proposals for some sort of eco-authoritarianism raise more questions than they answer. How, exactly, do we move beyond democracy? Who appoints the experts? Scientists may have evidence at their disposal, but how would they make deeply social decisions about who wins and who loses? Under whose authority would they regulate, and how exactly would that regulation happen – how would laws be made? The best that can be said about these proposals is that they gloss over the complex realities of political, social and legal change.

There’s also the fact that authoritarian states have not performed better, historically. A recent study by the University of Gothenburg’s V-Dem Institute showed that autocratic regimes lag significantly on climate action. Given the economic and political might of China, we have to hope that they find a way to buck this trend – but it would be reckless, not to mention ethically dubious, to suggest China as a political role model on climate. Despite the considerable flaws in our democratic systems, the alternatives crumble under any sort of close inspection. It is hard to disagree with Churchill’s pithy summary that “democracy is the worst form of government, except for all the others”.

My experience leads me to a very different conclusion to that of the eco-authoritarians. The data just doesn’t support the picture of an uncaring or uninformed public. Research consistently shows high levels of concern about climate change, across different ages, demographic groups and parts of the world. Yet this concern is coupled with a deep mistrust in government and political elites, and a breakdown in the means by which people’s priorities are translated into political action. To generalise, we have a population that is cynical yet concerned about the climate, frustrated with the inability of politicians to act decisively in the face of growing climate impacts.

Could it be that the problem here is not too much democracy, but too little? What if we were to begin with the assumption that people can and do make sensible decisions if they have the evidence and the influence that they need? That if we designed a meaningful dialogue between citizens, experts and governments, we would get better outcomes?

#### Almost all climate action is coming from democracies---our ev prices theirs in

Casas-Zamora 21 — Kevin Casas-Zamora is a Costa Rican politician, lawyer and political scientist. Kevin Casas-Zamora Why democracy is the key ingredient to battling climate change,” 6-29-2021, https://www.euronews.com/green/2021/06/29/why-democracy-is-the-key-ingredient-to-battling-climate-change, accessed 7-5-2022, WMK

What unites nearly all of these cases? They are taking place in democracies.

The recent court rulings tell us a lot, not just about the powerful assets that democracy can deploy in the struggle against climate change, but also the long-term robustness of the case for democracy as a political system.

Democracies are under pressure from populism, disinformation, inequality and voter frustration, according to the Global State of Democracy report from the intergovernmental organisation International (IDEA). They are also afflicted by a crisis of self-confidence.

Fairly or not, the current pandemic has helped cement a narrative portraying liberal democracies as lumbering and too divided to cope with big challenges, while extolling the presumed ability of authoritarian systems to act decisively.

What are the vices to democracy?

This narrative is not concocted out of thin air. Democracies do suffer from vices when it comes to slow-burning crises like global warming.

Voters and politicians have short attention spans. Balances of power mean reforms can be held hostage to obstinate US Senators or oil lobbyists. Science can play second fiddle to voters if it entails higher taxes - France’s yellow vest protests, sparked by fuel price rises, are a case in point.

And yet, despite all this, the facts are clear - 9 out of the 10 top performers in the 2021 Climate Change Performance Index are democracies.

Sweden tops the list of 57 countries. China is 30th.

The reasons for this are not hard to fathom. Democracies allow for the free flow of information that enables policy makers to debate and find solutions, and for civil society to mobilise. It is no coincidence that youth campaigner Greta Thunberg helped spark a global movement from a lone street demonstration in Sweden, one of the world’s top performing democracies.

Democracies are more effective against climate change for the same reasons that they don’t experience famines, as Nobel Laureate Indian economist Amartya Sen suggested long ago - because in allowing freedom of expression, a vibrant civil society, regular elections and the workings of checks and balances, they increase the likelihood that crises will be met and destructive policies corrected.

Democracy is not simply elections - it is the often chaotic workings of myriad institutions and groups as well as a culture of open debate, where climate reform is nudged along by courts, free media, parliaments, and public protests. Democracy’s most powerful weapon against the challenges of this century is its ability to self-correct.

And then there is the capacity of democratic systems to forge the social consensus required for long-term transformations to be sustainable. We know this story - participatory decision-making may be slower than executive decrees, but almost always yields outcomes that are more legitimate and accepted by society, and hence more durable.

This is vital for climate change. Decarbonisation is not something governments do by fiat, though act they must - it is something societies as a whole must do by conviction. Consumer habits will need to change, from reducing air travel to adjusting diets. Trillions of dollars will have to be invested in transforming the sources of energy that fuel economies

#### Authoritarianism collapses global climate efforts

Kendall-Taylor 16 – PhD in Political Science @ UCLA, Senior Fellow and Director of the Transatlantic Security Program at the Center for a New American Security (CNAS). She works on national security challenges facing the United States and Europe, focusing on Russia, populism and threats to democracy, and the state of the Transatlantic alliance (Andrea, “How Democracy’s Decline Would Undermine the International Order,” *Center for Strategic and International Studies*, <https://www.csis.org/analysis/how-democracy%E2%80%99s-decline-would-undermine-international-order>)

Although none of these burgeoning relationships has developed into a highly unified partnership, democratic backsliding in these countries has provided a basis for cooperation where it did not previously exist. And while the United States certainly finds common cause with authoritarian partners on specific issues, the depth and reliability of such cooperation is limited. Consequently, further democratic decline could seriously compromise the United States’ ability to form the kinds of deep partnerships that will be required to confront today’s increasingly complex challenges. Global issues such as climate change, migration, and violent extremism demand the coordination and cooperation that democratic backsliding would put in peril. Put simply, the United States is a less effective and influential actor if it loses its ability to rely on its partnerships with other democratic nations.

### AT: Drones

#### Drone prolif inevitable

Singh and Wittes 12 – \*Research Assistant, Governance Studies @ AEI \*\*Senior Fellow, Governance Studies @ AEI

Ritka and Benjamin, 1-11-12, “Drones Are a Challenge — and an Opportunity” <http://www.brookings.edu/research/opinions/2012/01/11-drones-wittes>

Yes, as Cortright says, a great many other countries are getting into the drone game too—but this is less because the United States is paving the way than because this logic is obvious to those countries too. And this same logic, combined with the reality that robotic technologies are getting cheaper and easier to acquire even as their power increases, means that proliferation will happen irrespective of what the United States does. Indeed, the question is not whether we will live in a world of highly proliferated technologies of robotic attack. It is whether the United States is going to be ahead of this curve or behind it.

#### Claims that drone proliferation increases conflict are backwards – drone strikes decrease the frequency and intensity of conflicts and are key to tactical flexibility.

Goure ‘12

[Jan, Daniel Goure is a vice president of the Lexington Institute. In 2001, he was a member of the Defense Department’s Transition Team. Prior to that, he served as director of the Office of Strategic Competitiveness for the Secretary of Defense and was a senior analyst with the Center for Naval Analyses, Dr. Goure has been a consultant for the Departments of State, Defense, and Energy. He has taught or lectured at the Johns Hopkins University, the Foreign Service Institute, the National War College, the Naval War College, the Air War College, and the Inter-American Defense College. Since 2001, Dr. Goure has been an adjunct professor in graduate programs at the Center for Peace and Security Studies at Georgetown University, and an adjunct professor at National Defense University since 2002. Dr. Goure a Ph.D. in international relations and Russian studies from the Johns Hopkins, “Drones and the Changing Nature of Warfare: Hold the Presses! “http://www.cato-unbound.org/2012/01/13/daniel-goure/drones-changing-nature-warfare-hold-presses]

Modern drones provide many of the best features of both cruise missiles and manned aircraft. Most significantly, they provide the tactical and operational flexibility of manned platforms with the reduced risk to personnel associated with cruise missiles. Unlike the former, they allow for man-in-the-loop control and vehicle recovery. Unlike the latter, they can operate at altitudes and in environments unsuited to manned systems and, in some cases, for extended periods of time. Despite the proliferation of drones, particularly by the United States, at best it can be argued that the proliferation of unmanned aerial systems (UASs) is changing tactics, particularly with respect to operations on land. The predominant mission of drones today is to collect information, primarily electro-optical data in the form of pictures and full motion video. The overwhelming majority of drone flying hours are conducted by systems such as Aerovironment’s Wasp, Puma, and Raven; Insitu’s ScanEagle; and Textron’s Shadow for the purpose of providing overwatch for maneuvering Army and Marine Corps units. Even the vaunted Predator, a variant of which, the MQ-9 Reaper, is the platform employed for armed strikes, is predominantly employed for intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance missions. The larger systems such as Northrop Grumman’s Global Hawk and Lockheed Martin’s stealthy RQ-170 Sentinel are intended solely to gather intelligence. Armed drones serve a niche function. They are useful in situations where real-time tactical intelligence is required in order to launch a weapon and the operating environment is extremely benign. Because they can loiter in the area of a suspected target, waiting for positive identification and the proper time to strike with the least possibility of inflicting collateral damage, they are far less lethal than any other aerial weapons system. Attempts to connect an increased tendency to use force are supported neither by the evidence nor by logic. The frequency and intensity of conflicts has declined even as the ability to conduct remote combat has increased exponentially. There were only a handful of drones available to the U.S. military when Operations Enduring Freedom and Iraqi Freedom began. The lack of unmanned systems appears to have posed no obstacle to the decision to initiate either operation. It is difficult to accord any serious influence over the conduct of air operations in past or current conflicts to the presence of armed drones. In the era before drones, the U.S. imposed ten year long no-fly zones over northern and southern Iraq. In addition, the number of drone sorties in total is but a tiny fraction of all aerial sorties. Armed drone sorties constitute only a small fraction of total drone missions. Cortright notes that since 2009 there have been 239 drone strikes into Pakistan. However, for the month of January 2011, Coalition forces in Afghanistan flew 387 sorties in which guns were fired or munitions expended.[2] These statistics suggest a clear preference on the part of the military for manned aerial systems and not drones in the conduct of tactical air operations. Cortright also reports that 145 drone strikes were conducted during Operation Odyssey Dawn—the liberation of Libya. Actually this is an incorrect statement. While drones were used over Libya, these were not armed flights, hence they were sorties and not strikes. But this is good example of the breathless quality of much of the analysis today of the implications of drones for warfare. Look at the numbers. The U.S. alone conducted some 3,500 sorties during Operation Odyssey Dawn. So drones amounted to 4% of the total. By the way, the United States and United Kingdom also launched 228 Tomahawk cruise missiles during this operation, 112 on the first night of the conflict. If we are to accord to weapon systems influence over the decision to use force, then in the case of Libya, precedence must be given based simply on the number of sorties conducted to cruise missiles, aerial refueling tankers, tactical fighters, and even cargo planes before we come to the little-used drone. The availability of unmanned aerial systems in no way makes conflict more likely or more brutal. Quite the opposite, in fact, seems to be the case. The presumption that were it not for the availability of drones, the U.S. would refrain from conducting military operations against terrorists based in Pakistan is highly dubious. We have an example of an alternative military option: Operation Enduring Freedom. As Joshua Goldstein pointed out in a recent article, the use of armed drones in Pakistan may have prevented the use of far bloodier means. “Armed drones now attack targets that in the past would have required an invasion with thousands of heavily armed troops, displacing huge numbers of civilians and destroying valuable property along the way.”[3] According to Robert Woodward’s reporting on President Obama’s decision to deploy additional forces to Afghanistan in 2009, a number of senior advisors proposed a lower-cost, smaller deployment based on increased use of special operations forces and unmanned aerial vehicles. I might go even farther than Goldstein and argue that Cortright should advocate the greater use of drones, armed and otherwise, precisely due to his interest in reducing the frequency, intensity, and costs of conflicts. Just as dash cameras in police cars and cell phone cameras have led to a decrease in police brutality and the ability to bring those who violate procedures to account, the electro-optical sensors on drones can be used to increase oversight over military forces in the field. In fact, cameras can reduce what Cortright calls “the psychological distance that separates the launching of a strike from its bloody impact.” It can also help reduce the alleged isolation of the American people from the use of force in their name.

### AT: Disease

#### No disease link---there might be more cases, but democracies prevent deaths

Karabulut et al. 21 — Gokhan Karabulut is Prof. Dr. Department of Economics, Istanbul University. Klaus Felix Zimmermann is a German economist and emeritus professor of economics at Bonn University. Mehmet Huseyin Bilgin is professor of economics at the Department of International Relations at Istanbul Medeniyet University. Gokhan Karabulut, Klaus F. Zimmermann, Mehmet Huseyin Bilgin, Asli Cansin Doker, Democracy and COVID-19 outcomes, Economics Letters, Volume 203, 2021, 109840, ISSN 0165-1765, https://doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2021.109840. (https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0165176521001178) WMK

3. Results In the Table 1, Panel A reports the baseline regressions includ- ing only the democracy indicators for the full sample (N = 128), and Panel B presents the estimates with all control variables (N = 99). The baseline equations show that democracy is positively re- lated to infections at the 1% significance level. When control variables are added, coefficients of the democracy variables con- tinue to be statistically significant at the 1% level except for column 3 where the Civil Liberties Index is used. In panel B, both temperature and population share of 65 and older variables’ coefficients are negative and significant for all five equations. Li et al. (2020), reach similar results for the temperature variable and (Zimmermann et al., 2020), for the older population group variable. Haischer et al. (2020) argue that people who are 65 and older are more likely to wear a mask, and thus the government’s stringency policies are mainly targeted towards this group. Using data from an earlier stage of the pandemic, Zimmermann et al. (2020) noted that the older age group has standard activities that make it less exposed to the virus. Both lines of argument would explain why the possibility of infection is lower for the older group compared to the younger population. Testing policy and doctor per 1000 variables are positively related to CP (ex- cept column 3 for testing policy), which is intuitive and confirm expectations. Finally, the Government Censorship Effort variable is negatively related to CP in general and significant in column 2 (Panel B). This indicates a weak tendency where more media control leads to higher infection rates since public attention to the disease is possibly smaller. The results of the regressions for the Case Fatality Rate are quite different. There is a negative relationship between all democracy measures and CFR. All coefficients are statistically significant at the 1% level except for column 5 where it is 10%. We observe COVID-19 to have a smaller effect on mortality for more democratic countries. Government Censorship has the largest coefficient at the 1% significance level and the sign of the coefficient is positive. This implies that a lower degree of censorship is associated with a larger case fatality rate. Beds per 1000 population and testing policy both have a negative relationship with the Case Fatality Rate. Therefore, more hospital beds and more tests may help to decrease CFR. GDP is also negatively related to CFR. This result is consistent with the results of previous studies (Liu et al., 2020; Zimmermann et al., 2020). On the other hand, the share of the population over the age of 65 is positively related to CFR at 1%; this means that once elderly people get the disease, they are more likely to die (Zimmermann et al., 2020). Results remain robust (see Online Appendix Table A5) for more detailed controls for the age distribution of the populations (estimates are not significant) and the inclusion of continent dummies with the exceptions of temperature (no longer affect- ing infection rates) and older age (somewhat weaker size and significance without changing conclusions). 4. Conclusion Democratic countries may react slowly in the short term but place a higher value on human life and health.

#### Democracy solves disease through public health infrastructure

Bollyky et al. 19 (Thomas; Tara Templin; Matthew Cohen; Diana Schoder; Joseph L Dieleman; Simon Wigley; Senior Fellow for Global Health, Economics, and Development and Director of the Global Health Program @ the Council on Foreign Relations; *Lancelet*; March 19th; *The relationships between democratic experience, adult health, and cause-specific mortality in 170 countries between 1980 and 2016: an observational analysis*; <https://www.thelancet.com/journals/lancet/article/PIIS0140-6736(19)30235-1/fulltext#%20>; accessed 7/11/19)

The theoretical reasoning that democracy should improve population health is straightforward. First, when enforced through regular, free, and fair elections, democracies should have a greater incentive than autocracies to provide health-promoting resources and services to a larger proportion of the population.9 Second, democracies are more open to feedback from a broader range of interest groups, more protective of media freedom, and might be more willing to use that feedback to improve their public health programmes. Autocracies reduce political competition and access to information, which might deter constituent feedback and responsive governance.10 Various studies (11, 12, 13, 14, 15) have concluded democratic rule is better for population health; almost all focus on infant and child mortality or life expectancy at birth. Some academics16 have questioned those studies' results, arguing that democratic leaders do not need the electoral support of low-income voters to stay in office. Others17 have claimed that the underlying determining factor is wealth or the quality of government institutions, rather than the democratic process. At least four studies16, 18, 19, 20 have found that democracy has no clear relationship with child and infant mortality.

#### Authoritarian regimes fail – have incentives to cover up outbreaks, silence their population, and are uncooperative – only democracy is a sustainable way of preventing pandemics

Burkle 20 – (Frederick Burkle, Senior Fellow & Scientist, Harvard Humanitarian Initiative, Harvard University & T.H., “Declining Public Health Protections within Autocratic Regimes: Impact on Global Public Health Security, Infectious Disease Outbreaks, Epidemics, and Pandemics,” Prehospital and Disaster Medicine, Vol 35, Iss 3, June 2020, Cambridge University Press, https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/prehospital-and-disaster-medicine/article/declining-public-health-protections-within-autocratic-regimes-impact-on-global-public-health-security-infectious-disease-outbreaks-epidemics-and-pandemics/8D8927B7B4117E07B666E83D8605D085)

Conclusions Lipsitch predicts that some 40%-70% of the world’s population will be infected this year.78 Despite political claims, a vaccine is more likely seen within a year or two at best.79 It is no longer realistic to expect the management of these gaps in infectious disease outbreaks, especially those that threaten to be epidemics and pandemics, are to be capably managed in their present state of willful denial and offenses by many countries, especially those that are ruled by authoritarian regimes.80 Despite resistance to globalization’s health benefits that would markedly benefit the global community during these crises by authoritarian regimes, in 2015, I called for a new WHO leadership granted by the International Health Regulations Treaty that has consequences if violated. I stated: The intent of a legally binding Treaty to improve the capacity of all countries to detect, assess, notify, and respond to public health threats are being ignored. While there is a current rush to admonish globalization in favor of populism, epidemic and pandemics deserve better than decisions being made by incapable autocrats. During Ebola, a rush by the Global Health Security Agenda partners to fill critical gaps in administrative and operational areas was crucial in the short term, but questions remain as to the real priorities of the global leadership as time elapses and critical gaps in public health protections and infrastructure take precedence over the economic and security needs of the developed world. The response from the Global Outbreak Alert and Response Network and foreign medical teams to Ebola proved indispensable to global health security, but both deserve stronger strategic capacity support and institutional status under the WHO leadership granted by the [International Health Regulations] Treaty. Treaties are the most successful means the world has in preventing, preparing for, and controlling epidemics in an increasingly globalized world. Other options are not sustainable. Given the gravity of on-going failed treaty management, the slow and incomplete process of reform, the magnitude and complexity of infectious disease outbreaks, and the rising severity of public health emergencies, a recommitment must be made to complete and restore the original mandates as a collaborative and coordinated global network responsibility, not one left to the actions of individual countries. The bottom line is that the global community can no longer tolerate an ineffectual and passive international response system. As such, this Treaty has the potential to become one of the most effective treaties for crisis response and risk reduction world-wide. Practitioners and health decision-makers world-wide must break their silence and advocate for a stronger Treaty and a return of WHO authority. Health practitioners and health decision-makers world-wide must break their silence and advocate for a stronger Treaty and a return of WHO’s undisputed global authority.81 Will China’s unilateral decisions just be a temporary stay as it was post-SARS, or is China capable of adopting, without conditions, the WHO public health requirements they have so far ignored? Autocratic leaders in history have a direct impact on health security. Dictatorships, with direct knowledge of the negative impact on health, create adverse political and economic conditions that only complicate the problem further. This is more evident in autocratic regimes where health protections have been seriously and purposely curtailed. This summary acknowledges that autocratic regimes are seriously handicapped by sociopathic narcissistic leaders who are incapable of understanding the health consequences of infectious diseases or their impact on their population. They will universally accelerate defenses indigenous to their personality traits when faced with contrary facts, double down against or deny accurate science to the contrary, delay timely precautions, and fail to meet health expectations required of nations under existing International Health Regulations, laws, and Epidemic Control surveillance.82 Kavanaugh’s Lancet editorial initially praised Chinese tactics that reflected a level of control only available to authoritarian regimes. As days and weeks passed, it revealed a government that inherently became victims of their own propaganda based on “need to avoid sharing bad news.” He concluded that authoritarian politics inhibited an effective response, and that openness and competitive politics favor a strategically fair public health strategy.83 Democratic nations in comparison to autocratic regimes recognize that public health fundamentally depends on public trust.84 The WHO’s China Joint Mission on Coronavirus Disease report has applauded China’s eventual response capability and capacity with strict measures to interrupt or minimize transmission chains with extremely proactive surveillance, rapid diagnosis, isolation tracking, quarantine, and population acceptance of these measures, to implement the measures to contain COVID-19 within the country.85 It must not be forgotten that China’s authoritarian rule “put secrecy and order ahead of openly confronting the growing crisis and risking alarm or political embarrassment,” 86 arrested and compelled Dr. Li Wenliang to sign a statement that his warning constituted “illegal behavior,” all of which delayed a concerted public health offensive that led to his death.86 This was an “issue of inaction” that would have contained COVID-19 within China and remains a potent symbol of China’s failures.86 There is no evidence that the authoritarian regime has or will change to prevent this from happening again.87 I suspect China’s sophisticated censorship and propaganda systems will outlast any public health improvements.